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In this dissertation, I attempt to provide some new evidence in favour of the claim that meaning 
is normative—specifically, for the claim that semantic judgments or ascriptions of meaning are 
action-guiding. I attempt to achieve this by developing an analogue of the Moral Twin Earth 
argument advanced by Horgan and Timmons (1992a) which I call the ‘Meaning Twin Earth’ 
argument. In the course of the dissertation, I outline Kripke’s 1982 sceptical argument for the 
thesis that there are no meaning facts in virtue of which ascriptions of meaning are true or false 
and highlight how the claim that meaning is normative is necessary for that argument to succeed 
with the kind of generality that Kripke intends. I then explain how one of Kripke’s main 
arguments against dispositionalist accounts of meaning can be viewed as a kind of open question 
argument. This argument is ultimately a failure, but nonetheless, I argue that the argument can be 
revised in a way that does pose a genuine threat to dispositionalist accounts of meaning by using 
an analogue of Horgan and Timmons’ Moral Twin Earth argument. I claim that a Meaning Twin 
Earth scenario yields linguistic intuitions that, in my view, are best explained by invoking the 
claim that meaning is normative. These intuitions constitute evidence against both reductive 
dispositionalism and anti-normativism about meaning. I forestall several potential objections to 
the Meaning Twin Earth argument drawn from Plunkett and Sundell (2013), Copp (2000), Merli 
(2002), and Baker (2016). In closing, I consider two broad options for a normativist account of 
semantic judgment: an expressivist form (Gibbard) and a rationalist form (McDowell). I argue 
that, provisionally, McDowell’s rationalist version of factualism about meaning faces a less 
serious challenge than Gibbard’s expressivist alternative. 
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One topic of recent debate in the philosophy of language is whether meaning is normative. 
If an ascription of meaning is a statement of the form ‘Smith means pigeon by ‘pigeon’’, then the 
claim that meaning is normative amounts (roughly) to the idea that ascriptions of meaning are 
evaluative, prescriptive, or action-guiding, in a way that is loosely analogous to the normative 
nature of moral judgment. The view that meaning is normative has been popular and even 
uncontroversial since Ludwig Wittgenstein’s discussion of rule-following and meaning in the 
Philosophical Investigations (1953/2009), but more recently this view has come under scrutiny 
in the wake of the sceptical argument that Saul Kripke extracts from Wittgenstein in his 
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982). According to Kripke, we can extract from 
Wittgenstein a sceptical argument for the conclusion that there are no facts about meaning. Some 
critics have attempted to rebut this argument and its apparently intolerable conclusion by 
abandoning the thesis that meaning is normative, given the role this thesis plays in Kripke’s 
defence of the argument. We will call these critics ‘anti-normativists’. According to them, we can 
capture the intuitive notion of meaning without invoking the normativity of meaning and thus 
avoid Kripke’s unpalatable conclusion that there are no meaning facts. Normativists have argued 
that we cannot abandon the idea that meaning is normative without causing serious damage to the 
notion of meaning in general. 
This dissertation attempts to make a modest contribution to the debate over the 
normativity of meaning by providing some new evidence in favour of the claim that meaning is 
normative. I do this by developing an analogue of the ‘Moral Twin Earth’ argument proposed by 
Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons against certain forms of ethical naturalism. I call this the 
‘Meaning Twin Earth’ argument and claim that our intuitions about a so-called Meaning Twin 
Earth scenario are best explained by the thesis that meaning is normative. I frame this as a kind 
of explanatory challenge against the anti-normativist, to explain the intuitions elicited from the 
Meaning Twin Earth scenario without invoking the normativity of meaning. 
Chapter Outline 
1. Kripke’s Sceptical Paradox 
This chapter outlines the sceptical argument developed by Kripke’s Wittgenstein (KW) 
that there are no meaning facts. KW is able to sustain this argument against any putative candidate 
for a meaning fact, by assuming that meaning is normative. I highlight the role that the normativity 
thesis plays in KW’s argument by outlining KW’s reasons for rejecting the various possible 
responses to the sceptical argument. I delineate two interpretations of the idea that meaning is 
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normative (as it appears in KW’s argument), which we will call ‘Normativity’ and ‘Norm-
Relativity’, and I will explain how these relate to the views defended by normativists and anti-
normativists. 
 
2. Twin Earth and the Open Question Argument 
One of the most formidable responses to KW’s argument, and the one that KW spends 
the most time in addressing, is a dispositionalist account of meaning, according to which meaning 
facts can be reduced to dispositional facts, i.e. facts about how speakers are disposed to apply 
expressions, especially under idealized conditions. KW’s response to this argument can be viewed 
as an analogue of G.E. Moore’s open question argument applied in the case of meaning. 
Ultimately, however, this argument cannot be convincingly applied against modern reductive 
dispositionalist accounts of meaning, given that these accounts view the reduction of meaning 
facts to dispositional facts as being a posteriori in the same manner of the identification of water 
with H2O. Nonetheless I argue that a revised open question argument may pose a genuine threat 
to these reductive dispositionalist accounts of meaning. I attempt to show this by developing an 
analogue of the Moral Twin Earth argument advanced by Horgan and Timmons (1992a). I claim 
that a Meaning Twin Earth argument yields intuitions that are apparently at odds with both 
reductive dispositionalism and anti-normativism about meaning. 
 
3. Plunkett and Sundell on ‘Metalinguistic Negotiation’ 
In this chapter I motivate a recent objection to the Moral Twin Earth argument advanced 
by David Plunkett and Timothy Sundell (2013) and situate this objection with respect to my 
Meaning Twin Earth argument. Plunkett and Sundell claim that Horgan and Timmons’ argument 
depends on the faulty assumption that speakers who disagree must mean the same thing by the 
words they use to express that disagreement. According to Plunkett and Sundell, genuine 
disagreement is not always best explained in this way: according to them, some genuine 
disagreements are non-canonical disputes—disputes in which speakers do not mean the same 
thing by the words they use in expressing conflicting contents. Plunkett and Sundell introduce the 
notion of metalinguistic negotiation in order to explain a special subset of these disputes and 
claim that Moral Twin Earth is one such example. If so, this would enable an objector to explain 
the Moral Twin Earth scenario without abandoning a naturalist semantic view or saying anything 
about the normativity of moral terms such as ‘morally right’. I argue that even if Horgan and 
Timmons’ argument can be defused via the invocation of metalinguistic negotiation, this same 
line of objection cannot be successfully applied against the Meaning Twin Earth argument. 
 
4. Copp ‘Milk, Honey, and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth’ 
In this chapter I discuss two objections against the Moral Twin Earth argument proposed 
by David Copp (2000) and claim that neither objection poses a threat to the Meaning Twin Earth 
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argument. Copp’s first objection claims that we can view the Earther and Twin Earther of Horgan 
and Timmons’ scenario as if they disagree for all practical purposes, but this objection cannot 
succeed for two reasons. First it disposes of something like the principle that sense determines 
reference, something that prima facie any account of meaning ought to preserve; and second, it 
does not enable us to view the Earther and Twin Earther as actually disagreeing. Copp’s second 
objection claims that a broader interpretation of Putnam’s work enables the naturalist to escape 
Horgan and Timmons’ charge that naturalism cannot capture the idea that the Earther and Twin 
Earther are genuinely disagreeing. According to Copp, the Earther and Twin Earther can be 
viewed as meaning the same thing and as genuinely disagreeing on account of their having the 
same referential intentions in using their respective moral terminologies. I argue that even if 
Copp’s strategy can be deployed against the Moral Twin Earth argument, it cannot be used against 
the Meaning Twin Earth argument 
 
5. Merli ‘Return to Moral Twin Earth’ 
In this chapter I address three objections against the Moral Twin Earth argument from 
David Merli (2002) and argue that each of these objections fails. In the first objection, Merli 
claims that an underdescription of the Moral Twin Earth argument enables Horgan and Timmons 
to conclude that naturalistic moral realism cannot explain the intuition that the Earther and Twin 
Earther of the Moral Twin Earth scenario genuinely disagree. Merli argues that once we attempt 
to fill in these details, it turns out that the Earthers and Twin Earthers can be viewed as meaning 
the same thing and as genuinely disagreeing in spite of the fact that their moral terms refer to 
distinct natural (functional) properties. Merli claims that this second component is a key 
concession in Horgan and Timmons’ argument. According to him, this concession demonstrates 
that the Moral Twin Earth argument is not a new challenge to realism. I object that the challenge 
is still a formidable one even if it is familiar, and that further, Horgan and Timmons can subtly 
alter their scenario to avoid Merli’s objection or even drop the concession that realism can capture 
univocity and disagreement on Earth. In the second objection, Merli assumes that Horgan and 
Timmons do drop this concession, but nonetheless Merli says, realism has good prospects for 
preserving univocity by its own lights given that realism can address this issue holistically, i.e. by 
appealing to similar problems in moral epistemology. The key reason for optimism on this front, 
Merli says, is that realists can count on a convergence in moral theory and so disputes like the 
one between the Earther and Twin Earther can be viewed as genuine disagreements if we construe 
reference as determined by the judgments the Earther and Twin Earther converge on at the end of 
inquiry. I argue that this is unreasonably optimistic and so Merli’s second objection cannot 
succeed because there are some disputes in which we cannot reasonably expect convergence in 
the relevant sorts of judgment. Merli introduces the idea that we should defer to idealized 
moralisers in these cases as well, but I argue that we can only speculate about what these idealized 
moralisers would judge. As such, this suggestion is likewise no help to Merli’s second objection. 
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In the third objection, Merli argues that we can view the disagreement between the Earther and 
Twin Earther of the Moral Twin Earth scenario as a kind of practical disagreement about what to 
do, something that can be explained via an expressivist analysis of all-in endorsement. I claim 
that this objection cannot succeed on account of two issues: First, the disagreement between the 
two parties cannot be viewed as a practical disagreement about what to do rather than a strictly-
speaking moral disagreement about what is right. Second, if naturalistic moral realism must bring 
in expressivism to explain the disagreement between the Earther and Twin Earther, this leaves 
naturalistic moral realism facing a dilemma: it is either unmotivated or unable to meet the Moral 
Twin Earth argument. Either way, Merli fails to make a convincing case against the Moral Twin 
Earth argument and by proxy, none of these objections are available to damage the Meaning Twin 
Earth argument. 
 
6. In What Sense is Meaning Normative? 
I outline in broad terms two candidates for a normativist account of semantic judgment 
that would explain the intuitions elicited from the Meaning Twin Earth scenario. First, I discuss 
how a theory of this sort could be developed in the moral case by discussing one of R.M. Hare’s 
central arguments for a prescriptivist metaethical theory in his 1952. I then sketch out the two 
main options for a theory of normative judgment as outlined by Smith (1994), which are an 
expressivist form and a rationalist form. I then discuss how a theory such as Hare’s could be 
applied in the semantic case, as Gibbard (2012) attempts. I respond to two objections by Baker 
(2016) to this approach, including a defence of the application of the Moral Twin Earth argument 
to the case of meaning. I consider two candidates for a robust normativist theory of semantic 
judgment by looking to Gibbard’s non-factualist account of meaning and McDowell’s non-
reductive realist account of meaning. I come to the provisional conclusion that McDowell’s non-
reductive realist account stands to fare better in going forward. Granted, McDowell’s account 
does face formidable epistemological and metaphysical challenges, but Gibbard’s account faces 
a debunking objection from a generalised version of Kripke’s sceptical argument. 
Overview 
Overall, the thesis attempts to provide some new evidence in favour of the claim that 
meaning is normative, and suggests, provisionally, that a form of non-reductive normative realism 
offers the best hope of capturing this claim. However, this is a large and highly controversial area 
of inquiry, spanning as it does issues in both metaethics and the philosophy of language. In the 
conclusion of the thesis, I reiterate the modest nature of its aspirations and some of the limitations 
to which it is inevitably subject. 
  






Chapter One: Kripke’s Sceptical Argument 
§1.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I outline the sceptical argument from Saul Kripke’s 1982, according to 
which there are no facts in virtue of which ascriptions of meaning, such as “Ingrid means bellbird 
by ‘bellbird’” are true or false. This argument proceeds in three stages: The first stage introduces 
a challenge via a so-called ‘sceptical paradox’ against the intuitive assumption that is there is 
some fact about me that determines whether I meant, for example, the function of addition or 
some other non-standard function in my past use of the ‘plus’ sign. The second stage places a set 
of constraints on any adequate account of a meaning fact that would secure my meaning addition 
by ‘plus’ and thus block the hypothesis that I really meant some non-standard function. The third 
stage enumerates all of the potential candidates for a meaning fact that could potentially meet 
these constraints, but finds all of these candidates wanting. As such, it is concluded that there are 
no facts of the relevant kind, i.e. there are no facts in virtue of which ascriptions of meaning are 
true or false. 
In the following sections I detail each stage of this argument and emphasize the 
importance of one key premise—the thesis that ‘meaning is normative’. Kripke’s original 
exposition is unclear about what this thesis amounts to. I draw on Hattiangadi (2007) to tease 
apart at least two conceptions of the normativity of meaning. I then explain how Kripke’s defence 
in the third stage of the argument hinges on the strongest conception of that thesis in order to rule 
out any putative meaning fact offered to meet the sceptical challenge. The primary line of 
objection against Kripke’s argument that I discuss at length here, as Kripke does in his exposition, 
is suggested by the proponent of semantic dispositionalism—the view that there are facts about 
meaning, constituted by a speaker’s dispositions to apply his or her expressions in a determinate 
pattern. 
§1.2 Kripke’s Wittgenstein and the Sceptical Paradox 
In Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982), Kripke develops an argument that 
aims to show that there are no facts in virtue of which ascriptions of meaning, such as “Jemma 
means addition by ‘plus’”, are true or false. Kripke takes this argument to be one possible upshot 
of Wittgenstein’s reflections on rule-following in the Philosophical Investigations. This version 
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of Wittgenstein, of “Wittgenstein as it struck Kripke”, we will call ‘Kripke’s Wittgenstein’ given 
that this view is at least inspired by Wittgenstein’s remarks on the topic.1 
Kripke’s Wittgenstein—hereafter referred to as ‘KW’—motivates his sceptical argument 
by using a mathematical example. Suppose that in the past I have never computed the sum for an 
arithmetical query involving numbers greater than or equal to 57.2 Though I have never performed 
this particular operation, I know what to do with the two integers flanking the symbol ‘+’ given 
my grasp of the meaning of that symbol, i.e. as the symbol that denotes the function addition. To 
know what the symbol ‘+’ or the term ‘plus’ means is to know that addition is the correct function 
to perform for any two integers conjoined with the plus symbol.3 So when queried with ‘68 + 57 
= ?’, I add 68 and 57, double check my work, and report the sum—‘125’.4  
Suppose that a bizarre sceptic approaches and challenges my answer ‘125’ to the query 
‘68 + 57 = ?’. The sceptic claims that I now misunderstand my past usage of ‘plus’ and that I 
should have answered ‘5’. I should have answered this way, the sceptic explains, because ‘plus’ 
as I used it in the past actually referred to a non-standard function that he refers to as ‘quaddition’ 
where quaddition is an arithmetical function continuous with addition for any two integers, unless 
one or both of those integers are greater than or equal to 57, in which case performing quaddition 
yields the answer ‘5’. So, for any x and y less than 57, performing addition and quaddition will 
yield the same answer. That is, the sum and the quum for any such x and y will be the same. For 
any x and y greater than or equal to 57, performing quaddition (unlike addition) will always yield 
the answer ‘5’. This function can be defined more formally, using the sign ‘⊕’ to denote 
quaddition in the following way: 
x ⊕ y = x + y if x, y < 57 
= 5 otherwise 
The sceptic’s hypothesis is admittedly bizarre, but not logically impossible—for if we 
assume that my past computations involved only integers less than 57, it is compatible with my 
past use of the ‘plus’ sign that I actually meant quaddition all along: “Perhaps when I used the 
term ‘plus’ in the past, I always meant quus: by hypothesis I never gave myself any explicit 
directions that were incompatible with such a supposition” (1982, p.13). This is possible, 
according to KW’s sceptic, because “no fact about my past history—nothing that was ever in my 
mind, or in my external behaviour—establishes that I meant plus rather than quus” (1982, p.13). 
                                                     
1 I expand on how KW’s reading departs from the standard interpretation of Wittgenstein in discussing 
John McDowell’s account of meaning in Chapter Five. 
2 There must be some such example given the finitude of computations I have performed in the past. 
3 KW uses ‘+’ and ‘plus’ interchangeably. Hereafter I stick to the term ‘plus’ for clarity. 
4 It is important to note that ‘125’ is the correct answer to ‘68 + 57 = ?’ in two senses: First, it is correct in 
the arithmetical sense that 125, as a matter of mathematical fact, is the sum of 68 and 57. Second, it is 
correct in the metalinguistic sense that the ‘plus’ symbol or ‘+’ as it appears in ‘68 + 57 = ?’ actually refers 
to the function of addition (Miller 2002, p.3). Miller points out that these two senses of correctness could 
in principle come apart—e.g. “if the ‘+’ sign really stood for the subtraction function, 125 would still be 
the sum of 68 and 57, but the correct answer to the question ‘68 + 57 = ?’ would now be ‘11’” (Miller 2002, 
p.3). KW is only concerned with the latter. 
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If there is no fact that secures addition as the unique function governing my past use of the term 
‘plus’, the sceptic argues, there is likewise no fact that secures addition as the unique function 
governing my present use of that term (1982, p.13). Consequently, there is nothing that determines 
that ‘125’ and not ‘5’ is the answer I ought to give to the query ‘68 + 57 = ?’. So given that nothing 
in my past dictates the answer ‘125’ as the one I ought to give presently, then according to KW, 
we are forced toward a devastating sceptical conclusion: “When I respond in one way rather than 
another to such a problem as ‘68 + 57 = ?’, I can have no justification for one response rather than 
another . . . There can be no fact as to what I mean by ‘plus’, or any word at any time” (1982, 
p.21). 
§1.2.1 Ground Rules 
The sceptical challenge can only get off the ground, KW says, on account of a few basic 
rules. First, the sceptic must share a language with me, for otherwise he could not converse with 
me at all (1982, p.11-12). Second, the sceptic cannot challenge my present use of ‘plus’: “he 
agrees that, according to my present usage, ‘68 plus 57’ denotes 125” (1982, p.12). In fact, the 
sceptic, we shall suppose, “conducts the entire debate with me in my language as I presently use 
it” (1982, p.12). Third, the sceptic grants that “the accuracy of my computation nor of my memory 
is under dispute” (1982, p.11). The sceptic does not deny the mathematical fact that 125 is the 
sum of 68 and 57; instead he denies the existence of any metalinguistic fact that would determine 
whether my present use of the ‘plus’ sign conforms to my past use of that sign. If ‘plus’ as I used 
it in the past actually refers to quaddition, then ‘5’ would be the correct answer to ‘68 + 57 = ?’ 
in light of that past linguistic intention. If this hypothesis is correct, then according to KW, “the 
concepts of meaning and of intending one function rather than another will make no sense” (1982, 
p.13). In order to block the sceptic’s hypothesis, we need some account of my meaning, in terms 
of some fact about my past self, that justifies my response ‘125’: “Ordinarily, I suppose that, in 
computing ‘68 + 57’ as I do, I do not simply make an unjustified leap in the dark. I follow 
directions I previously gave myself that uniquely determine that in this new instance I should say 
‘125’. What are these directions?” (1982, p.10). 
§1.2.2 Generalizing the Sceptical Challenge 
Though the challenge advanced by KW’s sceptic is directed against my past use of the 
‘plus’ sign, that challenge extrapolates to language generally—a potentially infinite number of 
sceptical challenges could be drawn against the past use of any expression. The sceptic can, for 
example, question my past usage of the word ‘green’ as it applies to green-coloured things. 
Perhaps by ‘green’, I always meant grue, where x is grue if and only if t < t* and x is green or t ≥ 
t* and x is blue. If by ‘green’ I meant grue, then I ought to answer ‘green’ to the query “What 
colour is the sky?” if the query is made at time t ≥ t*. If there is no fact that secures my meaning 
grue or green by ‘green’, then we are left at the same impasse as with ‘plus’. If no answer can be 
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given to the sceptic for any expression, then there is no fact as to what anyone means by anything. 
The whole enterprise of language seems to “vanish into thin air” (1982, p.22). 
§1.3 Two Constraints on Any Account of Meaning 
Any suitable response to the sceptic’s challenge, as an account of my meaning addition 
by ‘plus’, must satisfy two constraints according to KW. First, it must provide an account of what 
constitutes, in terms of some fact about my past self, what I meant by the ‘plus’ sign. Second, it 
must explain how that fact about my past meaning informs my present use of that sign, i.e. justifies 
the answer ‘125’ to the query ‘68 + 57 = ?’. The first constraint demands some fact that would 
isolate addition as the unique function governing my past use of the ‘plus’ sign. At minimum, this 
would block the sceptical hypothesis that I meant quaddition all along. We can call this constraint 
the ‘extensionality constraint’ given that it is grounded in the principle that the meaning of an 
expression determines the class of things to which that expression can be correctly applied (and 
those to which it is incorrectly applied). The second constraint makes a further demand on any 
candidate fact that apparently meets the first: any meaning fact must explain how my past 
linguistic intention with respect to the ‘plus’ sign dictates or normatively compels the present 
answer ‘125’ as the only answer I ought to give when prompted with ‘68 + 57 = ?’. This constraint 
serves as a kind of normative requirement insofar as it calls for an account of how some fact about 
my past meaning bears a normative relation to my future behaviour in this way, i.e. any fact there 
is about my past use of the term ‘plus’ must prescribe how I ought to go on in using that expression, 
i.e. We will refer to this constraint as the ‘normativity constraint’ given that this constraint is 
grounded in the principle that the meaning of an expression prescribes how a speaker ought to 
use that expression. In the next two sections, I spell out the above two constraints in more detail 
and explain how they bear on any account of meaning offered in response to KW’s sceptical 
argument. 
§1.3.1 The Extensionality Constraint 
The extensionality constraint depends on the platitude that the meaning of a term 
determines how that term is correctly applied, i.e. by setting a standard according to which uses 
of that expression count as correct and incorrect. The meaning of the term ‘plus’ for instance 
dictates that certain answers to ‘plus’ queries are correct and others incorrect: e.g. ‘125’ is the 
correct answer to ‘57 + 68 = ?’ since the ordered triple <57, 68, 125> belongs to the extension of 
the function denoted by ‘plus’, while the answer ‘5’ is incorrect since the ordered triple <57, 68, 
5> does not so belong.  Moreover, if I were to use 'plus' to apply to addition I would use that term 
correctly while if I used it to apply to quaddition I would use it incorrectly. Likewise, if I were to 
apply ‘plus’ to division or subtraction, I would do something incorrect—division and subtraction 
are not referred to by ‘plus’ either. The sceptic’s challenge puts this intuitive thesis about meaning 
in danger. This can be brought home by subtly altering the way the sceptic’s charge is delivered. 
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The sceptic effectively argues that there is no fact that can be cited about my past self that 
determines what standard governs my use of the term ‘plus’ and thus my responses to arithmetical 
queries in which ‘plus’ appears. Given that there is no such fact, the sceptic argues, there is no 
sense to be made of the idea that I can accord or fail to accord with my past meaning. No standard 
dictates that answering ‘125’ would be the correct way for me to respond to the query ‘68 + 57 
= ?’ and so, as per the sceptic’s hypothesis, the answer ‘5’ would be just as “correct” as ‘125’. 
Nothing secures the ‘addition standard’ rather than a deviant ‘quaddition standard’ as the one that 
determines the extension of the term ‘plus’ as I understand it (and therefore the correctness of 
answers to queries in which ‘plus’ appears). If the sceptic is right, then the very idea of my making 
a mistake is ruled out. In order to head off the sceptic’s challenge, there must be some fact that 
rules out the bizarre hypothesis that my use of the term ‘plus’ in the past referred to quaddition. 
After all, it is because I intend to conform to my past use of the term ‘plus’, as it is used to refer 
to the addition function, that I take ‘125’ to be the only correct answer to ‘68 + 57 = ?’. This first 
constraint is closely connected with the second in terms of how they each bear on any adequate 
account of meaning as a whole. 
§1.3.2 The Normativity Constraint 
Suppose for a moment that some fact is cited which apparently meets the extensionality 
constraint. That is, there is a fact in virtue of which the judgement ‘Jon means addition by ‘plus’’ 
would be true. According to KW, any fact specified on account of the first constraint must answer 
to a second and further constraint in order to block the sceptic’s hypothesis: Any account of a fact 
about my past meaning must explain how that fact bears a normative relation to my present 
behaviour in the sense that it justifies or normatively compels the answer ‘125’ to ‘68 + 57 = ?’. 
Otherwise, if my past meaning does not prescribe ‘125’ as the only answer I ought to give, then I 
might as well say ‘5’ just the same—the sceptic’s claim that I should have said ‘5’ would be 
equally justified! In a nutshell, any fact about my meaning with respect to the ‘plus’ sign must be 
essentially ‘normative’ in the action-guiding sense of that term, i.e. it must dictate how I ought to 
go on in using that sign or expression. So supposing that I intended to use the ‘plus’ sign to mean 
addition, there is only one thing I ought to do when prompted with ‘68 + 57 = ?’: to respond with 
the answer ‘125’. This rules out the sceptic’s suggestion that ‘5’ would have been equally 
appropriate in light of my past meaning. In summary, then, any adequate account of my meaning 
addition by ‘plus’ must guarantee the truth of two judgments: First, it must be true that ‘125’ is 
the only answer that would be correct in virtue of my past meaning. Second, it must be true that 
‘125’ is the only answer I ought to give. If both of these constraints can be met, then we can block 
the sceptic’s hypothesis about a change in my use of the ‘plus’ sign. 
§1.4 Scope of the Sceptical Challenge 
According to KW, there are no limitations to the kind of fact that can be cited to answer 
the sceptical challenge. In particular, KW says, there are no behaviourist limitations on such a 
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fact (14). That is, any fact cited about my meaning plus rather than quus by the ‘plus’ symbol 
need not be something available to an external observer. KW allows that there could be some fact 
about my internal mental state that would satisfy the sceptic. So even if nothing in my external 
behaviour can be shown to demonstrate that I meant plus rather than quus in using the ‘plus’ sign, 
something in my inner state might nonetheless do so (1982, p.14). As KW points out, this puts 
some distance between his challenge and Quine’s argument concerning the ‘indeterminacy of 
translation’ because the evidence permitted to satisfy KW’s sceptical challenge is, unlike Quine’s 
case, not limited to behavioural evidence (1982, p.14).5 The sceptical challenge does not consist 
in a behaviouristic doubt about whether there is something about me in virtue of which an outside 
observer could judge what I meant by the ‘plus’ sign. Instead, KW explains, the doubt is delivered 
from the “inside” (1982, p.15): 
Whereas Quine presents the problem about meaning in terms of a linguist, trying to guess 
what someone else means by his words on the basis of his behavior, Wittgenstein's 
challenge can be presented to me as a question about myself: was there some past fact 
about me - what I ‘meant’ by plus - that mandates what I should do now? (1982, p.15) 
KW argues that there is no such ‘solution’ to the paradox in terms of some fact—even one 
concerning a mental state of mine—that would head off the sceptic’s challenge. 
§1.5 Two Ways to Respond to the Sceptical Challenge 
KW argues that there are two broad ways to respond to the sceptical challenge. First, one 
could offer a ‘straight solution’ to the argument by pointing out a flaw in the line of reasoning 
that led to its conclusion that there are no meaning facts or by producing a fact that satisfies the 
two constraints imposed by KW.6 Alternatively, one could offer a ‘sceptical solution’ to the 
argument by conceding its conclusion and then rekindling the notion of meaning in a way that 
does not depend on the existence of meaning facts. KW takes his sceptical argument to succeed, 
naturally, and so he concludes that there are no meaning facts of the sort that would meet both 
sceptical constraints. As such, KW claims that we should abandon meaning factualism and turn 
to a sceptical solution, built on some non-factualist account of meaning. KW endorses a solution 
of this kind—one that he takes Wittgenstein to adopt in the wake of the sceptical paradox of 
Investigations §201—according to which we can preserve the notion of meaning by viewing 
ascriptions of meaning, such as “Simon means bellbird by ‘bellbird’” as assertable under certain 
conditions: 
All that is needed to legitimize assertions that someone means something is that there be 
roughly specifiable circumstances under which they are legitimately assertable, and that 
the game of asserting them under such conditions has a role in our lives. No supposition 
that 'facts correspond' to those assertions is needed. (Kripke 1982, p.77-78) 
                                                     
5 See Quine Word and Object (1960). 
6 In this respect, a straight solution to the paradox is a form of meaning factualism. 
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In Chapter Six, I argue that non-factualist ‘solutions’ of this sort, including KW’s, are unlikely to 
have any more traction than the factualist alternatives that we will consider later in this chapter. 
For now, I set this topic aside and turn to KW’s defence of the sceptical challenge against any 
putative straight solution to that challenge. 
§1.6 Candidate Facts 
In the following sections, I enumerate several candidates for a meaning fact, as they are 
discussed in KW, and show how each candidate apparently fails to meet the sceptical challenge. 
Perhaps the most formidable candidate and the one that we will discuss at length in this 
dissertation is dispositionalism. 
§1.6.1 Past Behaviour or Mental History 
The first candidate that KW considers is the suggestion that some fact about my past 
behaviour would meet the sceptical challenge. KW rejects this response because: (1) by 
stipulation, I have never computed the sum for any integers greater than or equal to 57; and (2) 
‘plus’ and ‘quus’ have the same extension for any two integers less than 57. Therefore, KW says, 
my past behaviour is perfectly consistent with the hypothesis that I meant quaddition by the ‘plus’ 
sign. Even if we were to enlarge the pool of past behaviour this would not make any difference: 
. . . no matter how [the pool of behaviour] is enlarged, a “deviant” interpretation of “+”, 
such as that which takes it as standing for the quaddition function, will always be possible; 
even if we enlarge the pool of previous behaviour so that we have encountered numbers 
larger than 57, there will always be some number which is larger than those we have 
previously encountered, and the skeptic can use this to construct an analogue of the 
quaddition interpretation. (Miller 2002, p.5) 
§1.6.2 Set of Instructions or General Rule 
The second candidate KW considers is the suggestion that a set of instructions or a general 
rule that I gave myself in the past would meet the challenge: 
Many readers . . . protest that our problem arises only because of a ridiculous model of 
the instruction I gave myself regarding ‘addition’. Surely I did not merely give myself 
some finite number of examples, from which I am supposed to extrapolate the whole table 
(“Let ‘+’ be the function instantiated by the following examples: . . . “). No doubt 
infinitely many functions are compatible with that. Rather I learned - and internalized 
instructions for - a rule which determines how addition is to be continued. What was the 
rule? Well, say, to take it in its most primitive form: suppose we wish to add x and y. 
Take a huge bunch of marbles. First count out x marbles in one heap. Then count out y 
marbles in another. Put the two heaps together and count out the number of marbles in 
the union thus formed. The result is x + y. This set of directions, I may suppose, I 
explicitly gave myself at some earlier time. It is engraved on my mind as on a slate. It is 
incompatible with the hypothesis that I meant quus. It is this set of directions, not the 
finite list of particular additions I performed in the past, that justifies and determines my 
present response. (1982, p.15) 
KW rejects this response because the sceptical challenge can be readily reconfigured to target my 
understanding of the word ‘count’. Given that I have applied ‘count’ on finitely many occasions, 
the sceptic can argue that by ‘count’ I really meant quount where to quount a heap “is to count it 
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in the ordinary sense, unless the heap was formed as the union of two heaps, one of which has 57 
or more items, in which case one must automatically give the answer ‘5’” (1982, p.16). So if 
‘counting’ really amounted to quounting, then even if I were to follow the general rule above with 
respect to ‘plus’, I would be forced to admit that ‘5’ would be the correct answer to ‘68 + 57 = ?’ 
(1982, p.16). We have no further traction here in citing a general rule or set of instructions because 
“the sceptic can always respond by giving a deviant interpretation of the symbols of the general 
thought or instruction itself” (Miller 2002, p.5). Moreover, this point can be generalized: “any set 
of instructions that come before the mind require interpretation as much as the linguistic 
expression whose understanding they are supposed to facilitate, and are thus as susceptible to 
deviant interpretation as that original expression” (2002, p.5-6). At this stage, we might be 
tempted to bring in a set of instructions for interpreting the instructions here, but this will push us 
toward an infinite and fruitless regress (2002, p.6). KW takes this to be the lesson of 
Wittgenstein’s discussion of a “rule for interpreting a rule” (1982, p.17): 
It is tempting to answer the sceptic by appealing from one rule to another more ‘basic’ 
rule. But the skeptical move can be repeated at the more ‘basic’ level also. Eventually the 
process must stop - “justifications come to an end somewhere” - and I am left with a rule 
which is completely unreduced to any other. How can I justify my present application of 
such a rule, when a sceptic could easily interpret it so as to yield any of an indefinite 
number of other results? (1982, p.17) 
In other words, KW says: 
To say that there is a general rule in my mind that tells me how to add in the future is 
only to throw the problem back on to other rules that also seem to be given only in terms 
of finitely many cases. (1982, p.22) 
Consequently, KW concludes that any conception of a set of instructions or some general rule 
cannot meet the sceptical challenge. 
§1.6.3 Dispositionalism 
One way to avoid the above problems would be to abandon the idea that a meaning 
intention consists in an occurrent mental state (one that ‘comes before the mind’) and opt instead 
for a dispositional account of my meaning something by an expression such as ‘plus’. KW replies 
to two dispositionalist responses of this sort. The first is embodied by a view that we will call 
‘simple dispositionalism’ and the second, a more nuanced version of this view, ‘sophisticated 
dispositionalism’. 
§1.6.4 Simple Dispositionalism 
Dispositionalism is the thesis that what a speaker means by an expression is constituted 
by his or her disposition to apply that expression in a determinate pattern, e.g. to apply a term to 
some objects and not others, to apply ‘penguin’ only to penguins and not sharks. According to 
the dispositionalist, what determines that ‘plus’ as I used it in the past means addition is a 
disposition to respond with the unique sum for any x and y conjoined with the addition symbol: 
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To mean addition by ‘+’ is to be disposed, when asked for any sum ‘x + y’ to give the 
sum of x and y as the answer (in particular, to say ‘125’ when queried about ‘68 + 57’). 
(1982, p.22) 
The dispositionalist argues that it is the possession of this disposition that rules out the sceptical 
hypothesis that reporting the answer ‘5’ would be the correct way for me to respond when 
prompted with ‘68 + 57 = ?’. The only correct way for me to respond, if indeed I possess the 
disposition cited above, is to report the answer ‘125’. Given that I possessed this disposition in 
the past I would likewise have answered ‘125’ if previously queried with ‘68 + 57 = ?’: 
True, my actual thoughts and responses in the past do not differentiate between the plus 
and the quus hypotheses; but, even in the past, there were dispositional facts about me 
that did make such a differentiation. To say that in fact I meant plus in the past is to say - 
as surely was the case! - that had 1 been queried about '68 + 57', I would have answered 
'125'. By hypothesis I was not in fact asked, but the disposition was present none the less. 
(1982, p.23) 
Any like query involving two integers conjoined with the ‘plus’ symbol will, given my disposition, 
be met by my reporting their sum and not their quum. 
§1.6.5 KW’s Finitude Objection 
KW’s first objection against simple dispositionalism states that dispositionalism cannot 
meet the extensionality constraint on any adequate account of a meaning fact, given that the finite 
disposition of a speaker cannot determine the correct application of an expression across a 
potentially infinite number of future cases. This objection can be called the ‘finitude objection’, 
given that this argument is based on the principle that the meaning of an expression should 
determine its extension in a potentially infinite number of cases conjoined with the fact that a 
speaker, as a finite being, has a finite disposition for applying a given expression in the future. 
The former premise, which we can call the ‘principle of extension’, states that the meaning of an 
expression determines its extension in the sense that it determines the class of things to which that 
expression correctly applies. For example, the word ‘turtle’ is correctly applied to turtles, and not 
crocodiles, seagulls, etc. Consequently, ‘turtle’ is applied incorrectly when it is applied to things 
that do not fall under the extension of that word. The problem for dispositionalism is that a 
speaker’s dispositions only determine how an expression is to be used in a finite number of cases, 
and so a dispositional analysis of meaning looks inadequate at first pass. As Boghossian puts it: 
If I mean horse by ‘horse’, then there are literally no end of truths about how it would be 
correct for me to apply the term—to horses on Alpha Centauri, to horses in Imperial 
Armenia, and so on, but not to cows or cats wherever they may be—if I am to use it in 
accord with its meaning. But, Kripke argues, the totality of my dispositions is finite, being 
the dispositions of a finite being that exists for a finite time. And so, facts about 
dispositions cannot capture what it is for me to mean addition by ‘+’. (1989, p.509) 
The meaning of an expression, as Boghossian explains, seems to dictate the correct application 
of that expression in an infinite number of cases, i.e. there is “literally no end of truths” in virtue 
of which an expression is correctly applied (1989, p.509). One way to bring out the inadequacy 
of the simple dispositionalist view is to note that all of the facts about my actual dispositions are 
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consistent with the hypothesis that I mean skaddition by ‘+’, where x skadd y is equal to x plus y 
for numbers x and y that are small enough for me to comprehend during my lifespan, but equal 
to 5 otherwise. Given this, a dispositional account of a meaning fact looks doomed to fail insofar 
as a speaker’s dispositions are always in this sense finite. 
§1.6.6 KW’s Normativity Objection 
KW’s second objection against a simple dispositionalist response to the sceptical 
argument states that dispositionalism fails the normativity constraint: Any adequate fact cited 
about my past meaning must justify the answer ‘125’ as the only answer I ought to give to the 
present query ‘68 + 57 = ?’. KW’s sceptic argues that my response ‘125’ “is no better than a stab 
in the dark” in the sense that ‘125’ is no more justified than ‘5’ (1982, p.23). According to him, 
nothing about my past meaning justifies ‘125’ over ‘5’ as the answer I should give to ‘68 + 57 
= ?’. As such, the sceptic argues that if I were to report the answer ‘5’, this would be equally 
compatible with my past meaning. The way that the sceptic brings this out, of course, is to 
hypothesize that whenever I used the ‘plus’ symbol in the past I really meant quaddition and so I 
ought to answer ‘5’ to the current prompt ‘68 + 57 = ?’. Any adequate answer to the sceptic must 
block this hypothesis by giving an account of my meaning, in terms of some fact, that justifies 
the answer ‘125’. A dispositionalist analysis of my meaning, in terms of some fact about how I 
am disposed to use the ‘plus’ symbol, appears inadequate for this purpose; how I ought to respond 
for any arithmetical query involving the ‘plus’ symbol, on a dispositional analysis, simply 
collapses into however I am disposed to or will respond to any like query involving the ‘plus’ 
symbol (Miller 2007, p.172). 
KW argues that dispositionalism is not equipped to meet the sceptic’s hypothesis. All that 
the dispositionalist has said is that at present I am disposed to answer ‘125’ and that perhaps I 
would have answered ‘125’ to the same query in the past. Therefore, it is unclear how a strictly 
dispositional account of my meaning could do anything more than, at best, describe how I am 
disposed to answer arithmetical queries, when what is required by KW’s sceptic is a fact that 
determines how I ought to answer such queries: 
“‘125’ is the response you are disposed to give, and (perhaps the reply adds) it would also 
have been your response in the past.” Well and good, I know that ‘125’ is the response 1 
am disposed to give (I am actually giving it!), and maybe it is helpful to be told - as a 
matter of brute fact - that I would have given the same response in the past. How does 
any of this indicate that - now or in the past - ‘125’ was an answer justified in terms of 
instructions I gave myself, rather than a mere jack-in-the-box unjustified and arbitrary 
response? Am I supposed to justify my present belief that I meant addition, not quaddition, 
and hence should answer ‘125’, in terms of a hypothesis about my past dispositions? (Do 
I record and investigate the past physiology of my brain?) Why am I so sure that one 
particular hypothesis of this kind is correct, when all my past thoughts can be construed 
either so that I meant plus or so that I meant quus? Alternatively, is the hypothesis to refer 
to my present dispositions alone, which would hence give the right answer by definition? 
(Kripke 1982, p.23) 
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As KW puts it, the dispositionalist looks committed to the idea that my present disposition with 
respect to the ‘plus’ sign is, by its very definition, a disposition to answer correctly with the sum 
for any arithmetic query involving that symbol. Consequently, KW argues, this dispositionalist 
response misses the mark by simply running together performance with correctness, where KW’s 
sceptic is precisely worried about whether my performance really does count as correct—whether 
‘125’ really is justified by my past meaning. 
Any plausible account of meaning must accommodate the idea that a speaker could fail 
to use an expression in accordance with how that expression ought to be applied. Dispositionalism 
fails this requirement insofar as it offers a descriptive account of a normative relation. Describing 
my disposition to report the sum for any arithmetical query involving ‘plus’ suffices as an account 
of what I will do, that I will answer ‘125’ to the query ‘68 + 57 = ?’, but that description does not 
suffice as an account of what I should do, that I ought to report the sum ‘125’ in virtue of the fact 
that it is the only answer justified by my past meaning: 
Suppose I do mean addition by ‘+’. What is the relation of that supposition to the question 
of how I will respond to the problem ‘68 + 57’? The dispositionalist gives a descriptive 
account of this relation: if ‘+’ meant addition, then I will answer ‘125’. But this is not the 
proper account of the relation, which is normative, not descriptive. The point is not that, 
if I meant addition by ‘+’ I will answer ‘125’, but that I should answer ‘125’. 
Computational error, finiteness of my capacity, and other disturbing factors may lead me 
not to be disposed to respond as I should, but if so, I have not acted in accordance with 
my intentions. The relation of meaning and intention to future action is normative and 
not descriptive. (Kripke 1982, p.37) 
Dispositionalism fails to capture the normative relation between meaning and use. For this reason, 
dispositionalism fails as a response to the sceptical challenge. 
The key problem for dispositionalism is that, on strictly dispositional terms, there is no 
room to explain how a speaker’s use of an expression could come apart from how that speaker 
ought to use that expression, in accordance with its meaning and the conditions under which it 
can be correctly applied. Dispositionalism is committed to running these two together and simply 
equates performance with competence (Kripke, 1982, p.24). This is problematic because the fact 
that a speaker is disposed to apply an expression in a certain pattern cannot itself guarantee that 
that pattern would be correct or uniquely justified in virtue of the meaning of that expression. 
Boghossian highlights this point in KW’s reply: 
The point is that, if I mean something by an expression, then the potential infinity of 
truths that are generated as a result are normative truths: they are truths about how I ought 
to apply the expression, if I am to apply it in accord with its meaning, not truths about 
how I will apply it. My meaning something by an expression, it appears, does not 
guarantee that I will apply it correctly; it guarantees only that there will be a fact of the 
matter about whether my use of it is correct. (1989, p.509) 
The primary lesson of KW’s second objection, on Boghossian’s view, is that one cannot ‘read off’ 
the correct use of an expression from a speaker’s disposition to use that expression: “to be 
disposed to use an expression in a certain way implies at most that one will, not that one should” 
use that expression in that way (1989, p.509). Boghossian continues: 
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Any theory which, like the crude dispositional theory currently under consideration, 
simply equates how it will be correct for me to use a certain expression with how I am 
disposed to use it, would have ruled out, as a matter of definition, the very possibility of 
error. And as Wittgenstein was fond of remarking, if the idea of correctness is to make 
sense at all, then it cannot be that whatever seems right to me is (by definition) right. 
(1989, p.531) 
The problem here is further illustrated by the fact that I could after all be disposed to answer 
incorrectly. For example, I could be disposed to forget to carry, e.g. I might report ‘115’ when 
asked for the sum of ‘68 + 57 = ?’ by forgetting to carry the ‘1’ from right to left in a standard 
addition table. Given this, dispositionalism would imply, not that I am disposed to make mistakes, 
but that I actually mean some non-standard function skaddition obtained by deleting carrying 
from performing addition computations. Moreover: 
. . . even if there were a suitably selected disposition that captured the extension of an 
expression accurately, the disposition could still not be identified with that fact of 
meaning, because it still remains true that the concept of a disposition is descriptive 
whereas the concept of meaning is not. In other words, according to Kripke, even if there 
were a dispositional predicate that logically covaried with a meaning predicate, the one 
fact could still not be identified with the other, for they are facts of distinct sorts. 
(Boghossian 1989, p.532) 
As Boghossian points out, KW assumes that meaning facts would essentially amount to normative 
facts and so there could be no reduction of meaning facts to dispositional facts—facts that are 
only descriptive and thus non-normative in kind. One way to bring this out is by noting that, for 
example, the question “S is disposed to apply ‘bellbird’ to bellbird, but does S really mean bellbird 
by ‘bellbird’?” would be an open question in the sense that sincerely asking it is perfectly coherent. 
So even if we stipulate that S is disposed to apply ‘bellbird’ to all and only bellbirds and exhibits 
a flawless record of doing so, it seems that we can still coherently ask whether he actually means 
what we think he does. The property of being disposed to apply ‘bellbird’ to an object if and only 
if that object is a bellbird cannot, as a matter of conceptual necessity, be identical to the property 
of actually meaning ‘bellbird’ by bellbird. This is the heart of KW’s normativity objection, 
according to Boghossian, and it is a topic that we will return to at length in Chapter Two once we 
have a grasp on the open question argument as it appears in metaethics.7 
§1.6.7 Sophisticated Dispositionalism 
One way that a dispositionalist could address the objections outlined above would be to 
introduce the idea that under some ceteris paribus or ideal conditions a speaker would be disposed 
                                                     
7 In Chapter Two, I claim that, in line with Zalabardo (1997), this argument cannot succeed as an a priori 
and fully general objection against any dispositionalist account of meaning given that modern proponents 
of this view deny the claim that meaning facts are reducible to dispositional facts as a matter of conceptual 
necessity. Modern proponents of dispositionalism instead accept the more modest thesis that meaning facts 
are reducible, as a matter of empirical fact on a par with the a posteriori reduction of water to H2O. This 
blocks KW’s normativity objection as it is construed here. I argue in Chapter Two that a revised version of 
this argumentative strategy can potentially be used against modern dispositionalist theories of meaning by 
developing an analogue of the Moral Twin Earth argument proposed by Horgan and Timmons (1992). 
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to apply an expression in a certain pattern, e.g. one that corresponds to ‘plus’ referring to addition 
and no other function. This view we will call ‘sophisticated dispositionalism’. In the next sections 
I explain how this response to KW’s argument can apparently meet the preceding objections and 
then consider whether this response can stave off three subsequent objections: KW’s revived 
finitude objection, KW’s circularity objection, and Boghossian’s belief-holism objection. 
We can elucidate the thesis suggested by the sophisticated dispositionalist by drawing an 
analogy with the fact that, for example, salt is roughly-speaking ‘disposed’ to dissolve when 
exposed to water under certain conditions: 
. . . common salt possesses a disposition to dissolve when placed in water, but it will not 
dissolve in a sample of water which is already saturated; so to say that salt is water soluble 
is really to say that it is disposed to dissolve in water under certain conditions, one 
consequence of whose obtaining is that the water in question is not already saturated. 
(Miller 2007, p.208) 
If dispositionalism about meaning can be sketched in a similar fashion, i.e. by equating what a 
speaker means by an expression with how he or she is disposed to use it under ideal conditions, 
then a dispositionalist account of a meaning fact can avoid the two preceding objections against 
simple dispositionalism. The finitude objection can be met, according to Miller, by specifying the 
ideal conditions in such a way that rules out the thesis that ‘plus’ refers to skaddition: 
The problem which the finiteness of our actual dispositions posed might then be avoided 
if we could include some specification in these conditions to the effect that the speaker 
lives long enough to hear out the relevant arithmetical enquiry: it seems plausible to say 
that if I were to live long enough, even for numerals “n” and “m” which are in fact too 
large for me to take in in my normal life span, I would, in response to an appropriate 
query, utter a numeral denoting the sum of the two numbers rather than “5”. This would 
rule out the interpretation of “+” as standing for the skaddition function. (2007, p.208) 
Likewise, the normativity objection can be met by specifying the ideal conditions with respect to 
my disposition in such a way that if certain ideal conditions obtain, then I would both be disposed 
to report the sum for any arithmetical query of the form ‘x + y = ?’ and be justified in doing so: 
. . . if the conditions specified are genuinely ideal, or at least conditions of proper 
functioning, then doesn’t it follow from the fact that I would respond in a certain way 
under conditions of that type that I have a reason for responding in that fashion? For 
example, if someone in ideal conditions for appraising arithmetical claims were to say 
that a certain answer to an arithmetical problem was appropriate, and moreover, I know 
that the conditions are in fact ideal, doesn’t it follow that I ought to accept the verdict 
given on the arithmetical problem? (2007, p.208) 
Moreover, this allows the scope for the distinction that KW calls for, between my performance 
with respect to using an expression and my competence or correctness in using that expression as 
I do: 
Competence would be a matter of acting as one would act under ideal conditions; this 
could come apart from actual performance, in the cases where the ideal conditions fail to 
obtain. One could thus be systematically disposed to make a mistake, because the ideal 
conditions could systematically fail to obtain. (2007, p.208) 
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All that is left, of course, is to specify the set of ideal conditions in requisite way, i.e. in such a 
way that just in case these conditions obtain, then it would be true that I would be disposed to 
report the sum for any query of the form ‘x + y = ?’ (2007, p.208-9). Crucially, the specification 
of these conditions must abide the dispositionalist’s general project of reducing meaning facts to 
dispositional facts without referencing facts about meaning, otherwise: 
. . . this would put the cart before the horse, since the story about how speakers are 
disposed to behave under those conditions is supposed to tell us what constitutes the facts 
about meaning. So, no use of semantic or intentional materials is to be made in the 
specification of the ideal conditions (2007, p.209). 
A simpler example from Boghossian illustrates how such a specification could go for the 
dispositionalist. 
Intuitively, “magpie” stands for magpies: bullfinches, sparrows, people, and tables do not 
fall within its extension. Suppose that Jones means magpies by the predicate “magpie”. 
The dispositionalist will say that this fact about Jones is constituted by the fact that he is 
disposed, under ideal conditions, to apply the predicate “magpie” to all and only those 
objects which are magpies. In other words, Jones’s meaning magpie by “magpie” is 
constituted by the fact that he is disposed, under ideal conditions, to token the belief that 
x is a magpie, if and only if x is in fact a magpie. Can Sophisticated Dispositionalism 
spell out a set of ideal conditions such that this is true, in a way which avoids the use of 
prior semantic and intentional materials? (Miller 2007, p.209) 
KW and Boghossian argue that sophisticated dispositionalism cannot spell out an appropriate set 
of ideal conditions on the basis of three objections: the revived finitude objection, the circularity 
objection, and the belief-holism objection. The first two are proposed by KW and the third by 
Boghossian. 
§1.6.8 KW’s Revived Finitude Objection 
In his first pass at sophisticated dispositionalism, KW imagines how a dispositionalist 
could try to avoid the finitude objection outlined above by introducing a ceteris paribus clause 
that would guarantee my answering with the sum for any query of the form ‘x + y = ?’: 
[H]ow should we flesh out the ceteris paribus clause? Perhaps as something like: if my 
brain had been stuffed with sufficient extra matter to grasp large enough numbers, and if 
it were given enough capacity to perform such a large addition, and if my life (in a healthy 
state) were prolonged enough, then given an addition problem involving two large 
numbers, m and n, I would respond with their sum, and not with the result according to 
some quus-like rule. (1982, p.27) 
KW rejects this suggestion on account of an epistemic worry. How could we know what would 
happen if such a ceteris paribus clause was met? According to KW, this kind of speculation would 
be best left to “science fiction writers and futurologists”: 
But how can we have any confidence of this? How in the world can I tell what would 
happen if my brain were stuffed with extra brain matter, or if my life were prolonged by 
some magic elixir? Surely such speculation should be left to science fiction writers and 
futurologists. We have no idea what the results of such experiments would be. They might 
lead me to go insane, even to behave according to a quus-like rule. The outcome really is 
obviously indeterminate, failing further specification of these magic mind-expanding 
processes; and even with such specifications, it is highly speculative. (1982, p.27) 
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KW concludes that a dispositionalist reply of this sort cannot meet the sceptical challenge, given 
that a speaker could not be reasonably viewed as being disposed ceteris paribus to apply an 
expression in a determinate pattern across a potentially infinite number of future cases. 
§1.6.9 KW’s Circularity Objection 
KW’s second attempt at spelling out a set of ceteris paribus conditions improves on the 
preceding construal by using a more realistic counterfactual: 
If I somehow were to be given the means to carry out my intentions with respect to 
numbers that presently are too long for me to add (or to grasp), and if I were to carry out 
these intentions, then if queried about 'm + n' for some big m and n, I would respond with 
their sum (and not with their quum). (1982, p.28) 
KW argues that though this counterfactual would be true, it would have no more traction against 
the sceptical challenge in that it effectively presupposes that the speaker intends to use ‘plus’ to 
refer to the addition function. In other words, it was already settled for the dispositionalist what 
function I meant by ‘plus’, in virtue of some prior fact. This is problematic, of course, because 
presupposing that there is some such fact is off limits to the reductive dispositionalist: 
. . . if the dispositionalist attempts to define which function I meant as the function 
determined by the answer I am disposed to give for arbitrarily large arguments, he ignores 
the fact that my dispositions extend to only finitely many cases. If he tries to appeal to 
my responses under idealized conditions that overcome this finiteness, he will succeed 
only if the idealization includes a specification that I will still respond, under these 
idealized conditions, according to the infinite table of the function I actually meant. But 
then the circularity of the procedure is evident. The idealized dispositions are determinate 
only because it is already settled which function I meant. (1982, p.28) 
The introduction of a ceteris paribus cannot help the dispositionalist, KW argues, even if that 
clause is designed to “exclude ‘noise’, or by [drawing] a distinction between ‘competence’ and 
‘performance’” (1982, p.30): 
No doubt a disposition to give the true sum in response to each addition problem is part 
of my 'competence', if by this we mean simply that such an answer accords with the rule 
I intended, or if we mean that, if all my dispositions to make mistakes were removed, I 
would give the correct answer. (Again I waive the finiteness of my capacity.) But a 
disposition to make a mistake is simply a disposition to give an answer other than the 
one that accords with the function I meant. To presuppose this concept in the present 
discussion is of course viciously circular. If I meant addition, my 'erroneous' actual 
disposition is to be ignored; if I meant skaddition, it should not be. Nothing in the notion 
of my 'competence' as thus defined can possibly tell me which alternative to adopt. (1982, 
p.30) 
We could try to “specify the ‘noise’ to be ignored” without presupposing that my use of ‘plus’ 
refers to addition, KW says, though this effort will not be fruitful either: 
Recall that the subject has a systematic disposition to forget to carry in certain 
circumstances: he tends to give a uniformly erroneous answer when well rested, in a 
pleasant environment free of clutter, etc. One cannot repair matters by urging that the 
subject would eventually respond with the right answer after correction by others. First, 
there are uneducable subjects who will persist in their error even after persistent 
correction. Second, what is meant by 'correction by others'? If it means rejection by others 
of ‘wrong’ answers (answers that do not accord with the rule the speaker means) and 
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suggestion of the right answer (the answer that does accord), then again the account is 
circular. If random intervention is allowed (that is, the 'corrections' may be arbitrary, 
whether they are 'right' or 'wrong'), then, although educable subjects may be induced to 
correct their wrong answers, suggestible subjects may also be induced to replace their 
correct answers with erroneous ones. The amended dispositional statement will, then, 
provide no criterion for the function that is really meant. (1982, p.31-32) 
Consequently, KW concludes that sophisticated dispositionalism cannot succeed in addressing 
the sceptical challenge on pain of circularity. In the next two sections I outline Boghossian’s claim 
that KW’s revived finitude objection fails to convince and then explain Boghossian’s claim that 
a circularity objection similar to KW’s can be based on a principle about belief holism. 
§1.6.10 Boghossian’s Reply to KW’s Revived Finitude Objection 
Boghossian (1989) argues that KW’s revived finitude objection against sophisticated 
dispositionalism cannot succeed given that KW does not sufficiently argue for why we should 
omit idealized generalizations about how a speaker would, for example, be disposed to use an 
expression in the distant future. According to Boghossian, KW’s objection boils down to the claim 
that “there will always be a serious indeterminacy in what my dispositions are, and thus . . . 
dispositional properties [prove to be] an inappropriate reduction base for meaning properties” 
(1989, p.528). Boghossian argues that KW’s demands for refuting this thesis are unwarranted. 
KW effectively demands that: 
. . . if it is indeed the property horse that I am disposed to apply the term [‘horse’] to, then 
I should be disposed to apply it to all horses, including horses so far away and so far in 
the past that it would be nonsense to suppose that I could ever get into causal contact with 
them. Otherwise, what is to say that my disposition is not a disposition to apply the term 
to the property nearby horse, or some such? But no one can have a disposition to call all 
horses ‘horses’, for no one can have a disposition with respect to inaccessible objects [e.g. 
horses on Alpha Centauri]. (1989, p.528) 
Boghossian claims that this argument fails to convince: 
If I were now to go to Alpha Centauri, I probably would not be in any position to call 
anything by any name, for I would probably die before I got there. But that does by itself 
need not pose an insuperable obstacle to ascribing the disposition to me. All dispositional 
properties are such that their exercise—the holding of the relevant counterfactual truth—
is contingent on the absence of interfering conditions or equivalently, on the presence of 
ideal conditions. And it certainly seems conceivable that a suitable idealization of my 
biological properties will render the counterfactual about my behaviour on Alpha 
Centauri true. (1989, p.529) 
KW does not provide a robust argument against these idealized considerations, but instead says 
that “such speculation should be left to science fiction writers and futurologists” (Kripke 1982, 
p.27). According to Boghossian, this is a serious problem for KW given that the burden of proof 
is on him to show why idealized generalizations about semantic dispositions are inadmissible: 
If the point is supposed to be . . . that one can have no reason for accepting a generalization 
defined over ideal conditions unless one knows exactly which counterfactuals would be 
true if the ideal conditions obtained, then, as Jerry Fodor has pointed out, it seems 
completely unacceptable. For example, no one can claim to know all of what would be 
true if molecules and containers actually satisfied the conditions over which the ideal gas 
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laws are defined; but that does not prevent us from claiming to know that, if there were 
ideal gases, their volume would vary inversely with the pressure on them. Similarly, no 
one can claim to know all of what would be true if I were so modified as to survive a trip 
to Alpha Centauri; but that need not prevent us from claiming to know that, if I were to 
survive such a trip, I would call the horses there ‘horse’. (1989, p.529) 
According to Boghossian, nothing in KW’s argument demonstrates that relevant idealizations of 
this sort are inadmissible and so this objection of KW’s cannot convincingly block a 
dispositionalist response.8 However, Boghossian argues that there are other considerations that 
are potentially much more problematic for the sophisticated dispositionalist. 
§1.6.11 Boghossian’s Belief-Holism Objection 
Boghossian argues that the dispositionalist’s efforts to specify a set of ideal conditions 
that make no mention of any meaning or intentional facts must fail because the fixation of a 
speaker’s beliefs is “a holistic affair” (Miller 2007, p.209). According to Boghossian, the fixation 
of a speaker’s belief is “mediated” by the background assumptions that that speaker already has—
as Boghossian puts it: 
Belief fixation is typically mediated by background theory – the contents a thinker is 
prepared to judge will depend on what other contents he is prepared to judge . . . just 
about any stimulus can cause just about any belief, given a suitably mediating set of 
background assumptions. (1989, p.539) 
For example, a speaker may token the belief there is a magpie just in case “there is some other 
kind of bird present, due to the presence of a belief to the effect that there are no birds apart from 
magpies in the relevant neighbourhood, and so on” (Miller 2007, p.209). The problem for 
dispositionalism is that the dispositionalist is committed to specifying in non-semantic and non-
intentional terms the conditions under which a speaker is disposed to token the belief there is a 
magpie only in the presence of a magpie: 
The Sophisticated Dispositionalist wishes to identify someone’s meaning such and such 
with facts of the form: S is disposed to token the belief B under conditions C, where the 
C are to be specified non-semantically and non-intentionally. Boghossian’s argument 
focuses on the fact that these conditions will have to include some proviso to the effect 
that certain other clusters of background beliefs B1, . . ., Bn . . . are absent. Thus, in 
specifying the optimal conditions for the meaning-constituting disposition concerning 
“magpie”, we will require non-intentional and non-semantic optimal conditions for the 
range of background beliefs which figure in the clusters B1, . . ., Bn . . .: otherwise we 
will not be able to stipulate, in non-intentional terms, the conditions under which each 
member of that range of beliefs is absent. (Miller 2007, p.210) 
According to Boghossian, there exist a “potential infinity of such mediating background clusters 
of belief” and so what is required is “precisely what a dispositionalist theory was supposed to 
provide: namely, a set of naturalistic necessary and sufficient conditions for being a belief with a 
certain content” (1989, p.540). For this reason, Boghossian concludes that the dispositionalist’s 
                                                     
8 See Boghossian (1989), p.529-530 for a more detailed discussion of this objection. 
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project of specifying some such conditions is doomed and so dispositionalism9, as a reductive 
version of meaning factualism, must fail.10 
§1.6.12 Simplicity 
 A further suggestion that KW rejects is the suggestion that my meaning addition by ‘plus’ 
“is to be preferred as the simplest hypothesis” (1982, p.38). According to KW, this suggestion 
cannot work because “[s]uch an appeal must be based either on a misunderstanding of the 
sceptical problem, or of the role of simplicity considerations, or both” (1982, p.38). On the first 
front, KW explains, the sceptical challenge is constitutive and not epistemological: the sceptic 
questions whether there is anything that would constitute my meaning one function or another, 
addition or quaddition, by my use of the ‘plus’ sign in the past. Considerations about simplicity 
might help us sort through the competing hypotheses, “but they obviously can never tell us what 
the competing hypothesis are” (1982, p.38). KW continues: “If we do not understand what two 
hypotheses state, what does it mean to say that one is ‘more probable’ because it is ‘simpler’? If 
the two hypotheses are not genuine hypotheses, not assertions of genuine matters of fact, no 
‘simplicity’ considerations will make them so” (1982, p.38). 
§1.6.13 Mental Images and other Mental States 
A further type of mental state reply that KW considers is the idea that meaning addition 
by ‘plus’ would be constituted by a kind of distinct and irreducible experience known to me by 
introspection: 
Why not argue that "meaning addition by 'plus'" denotes an irreducible experience, with 
its own special quale, known directly to each of us by introspection? (Headaches, tickles, 
nausea are examples of inner states with such qualia.) Perhaps the “decisive move in the 
conjuring trick” has been made when the sceptic notes that I have performed only finitely 
many additions and challenges me, in the light of this fact, to adduce some fact that 
‘shows’ that I did not mean quus. Maybe I appear to be unable to reply just because the 
experience of meaning addition by ‘plus’ is as unique and irreducible as that of seeing 
yellow or feeling a headache, while the sceptic’s challenge invites me to look for another 
fact or experience to which this can be reduced. (1982, p.41) 
KW rejects this response because, as Miller points out: 
                                                     
9 So far we have targeted individualist versions of dispositionalism and thus it may be objected that 
communitarian versions of dispositionalism may fare better, i.e. by appealing to the idea that an individual’s 
dispositions may fail to match those of his or her community. This move will not save dispositionalism 
because KW’s sceptical argument and the preceding objections turn on the attribution of a systematic error, 
something that can manifest at the community level as well. A community could be disposed to make 
systematic errors. For further discussion on the generality of the above objections against communitarian 
versions of dispositionalism, see Boghossian (1989), p.534-536 and Kusch (2006), p.123-125. 
10 This objection is discussed further by Miller (2007). According to Miller, the need to rule out background 
clusters of beliefs generates the circularity worry even if the set of background beliefs is finite (2007, p.211). 
Miller argues that a dispositionalist may be able to avoid this charge by adopting a kind of ‘ultra-
sophisticated’ dispositionalist account of meaning, in line with a David Lewis style reductive analysis. This 
move gets this dispositionalist out of trouble from Boghossian's circularity objection, Miller says, but also 
generates a new problem: there is no way for ultra-sophisticated dispositionalism to specify the optimality 
conditions in such a way that blocks out a potential infinitude of background clusters of beliefs (See Miller 
2007, p.212-216). 
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[I]t is not a necessary condition for understanding that some particular item come before 
one’s mind when one hears or uses a given expression . . . even in cases where there does 
seem to be an empirical regularity between a particular expression and a particular such 
item we can still perfectly well conceive of someone understanding the expression in the 
absence of that item (indeed, we can conceive of someone understanding the expression 
even when no such item is present at all (Miller 2002, p.6). 
For example, it seems that I could understand the meaning of the expression ‘cube’ without having 
a cube before me or a mental image of a cube in my mind (2002, p.6). Moreover, it is not even a 
sufficient condition for meaning something by an expression or grasping the meaning of an 
expression that a certain mental image comes to mind, given that that mental image “does not by 
itself determine the correct use of the associated word, because the [image] thus associated is 
really just another sign whose meaning too requires to be fixed” (2002, p.6). KW’s sceptic can 
here challenge the relation between any mental image I cite and the expression associated with 
that image: “the relation of any picture or image to the associated word can be construed in such 
a way that any future pattern of use of the expression can count as correct” (2002, p.6). As such, 
The sceptic concludes: “Whatever comes before the mind can be made to accord with a deviant 
application of the expression [and thus] mental images set no standards for the correct use of an 
expression; one cannot “read off” from a mental image what counts as the correct use of an 
associated expression” (2002, p.6). And what goes for mental images also goes for any mental 
state conceived to have its own distinctive quale. The occurrence of such a mental state is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for understanding a word in a particular way. 
§1.6.14 Primitive Mental State 
One way that the above mental state suggestion could be potentially strengthened in order 
to deal with the objection above would be to suggest that a “non-quotidian” state of mind, a state 
that is not introspectable, constitutes my meaning addition by ‘plus’. In other words, my meaning 
addition by ‘plus’ is constituted by a primitive and sui generis state “not to be assimilated to 
sensations or headaches or any ‘qualitative’ states, nor to be assimilated to dispositions, but a state 
of a unique kind of its own” (1982, p.51). This might block the objection developed in the 
previous section, though at the cost of opening up two further lines of objection. 
First, even if the primitive state reply is apparently “irrefutable”, it is irrefutable precisely 
because it “leaves the nature of this postulated primitive state - the primitive state of ‘meaning 
addition by ‘plus’’ - completely mysterious” (1982, p.51). In particular, it would be completely 
mysterious how a primitive state of this kind could inform my future use of an expression if indeed 
that state is inaccessible to me via introspection. How could I be aware of and yet guided by such 
a state? Second, this primitive mental state response faces a ‘considerable’ if not ‘impossible’ 
logical problem: If there is such a primitive state as my meaning addition by the ‘plus’ sign, then 
that state would have to be a finite object, contained in my finite mind.11 As such, KW continues, 
                                                     
11 See Kripke 1982, p.52.  
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such a state could “not consist in my explicitly thinking of each case of the addition table, nor 
even of my encoding each separate case in the brain: we lack the capacity for that” (1982, p.52). 
Nonetheless, whatever primitive state there is that would constitute my meaning addition by ‘plus’ 
would have to be present “in a queer way” (1982, p.52, KW cites Wittgenstein’s Investigations, 
§195). KW wonders how this could be the case: “Can we conceive of a finite state which could 
not be interpreted in a quus-like way? How could that be?” (1982, p.52). Even if we set aside this 
worry, KW says, and concede that meaning addition by ‘plus’ is a primitive state of a totally 
distinct sort, this does not get us out of trouble from the sceptic. Presumably, KW imagines, what 
the advocate of this primitive mental state response has in mind is a sort of entailment thesis like, 
“If I now mean addition by ‘plus’; then, if I remember this meaning in the future and wish to 
accord with what I meant, and do not miscalculate, then when asked for ‘68 + 57’, I will respond 
‘125’” (1982, p.53). This thesis cannot succeed according to KW because “it remains mysterious 
exactly how the existence of any finite past state of my mind could entail that, if I wish to accord 
with it, and remember the state, and do not miscalculate, I must give a determinate answer to an 
arbitrarily large addition problem” (1982, p.53). 
§1.6.15 Platonism 
The final response KW considers is the suggestion that my meaning addition by ‘plus’ is 
constituted by my grasp of an abstract entity on par with the non-mental entities posited by 
mathematical realists and ‘Platonists’ (1982, p.53). On this account, KW explains, “[t]he addition 
function is not in any particular mind, nor is it the common property of all minds [instead] it has 
an independent, ‘objective’, existence” (1982, p.53). Therefore, there is no problem with respect 
to how the meaning of ‘plus’ could have consequences for a potential infinitude of addition 
problems, given that this abstract entity could be an infinite object. After all, KW says: “The proof 
that the addition function contains such a triple as (68, 57, 125) belongs to mathematics and has 
nothing to do with meaning and intention” (1982, p.54). Frege espoused a view that could account 
of my meaning addition by ‘plus’ in line with this suggestion: 
Frege's analysis of the usage of the plus sign by an individual posits the following four 
elements: (a) the addition function, an ‘objective’ mathematical entity; (b) the addition 
sign ‘+’, a linguistic entity; (c) the ‘sense’ of this sign, an ‘objective’ abstract entity like 
the function; (d) an idea in the individual's mind associated with the sign. The idea is a 
‘subjective’ mental entity, private to each individual and different in different minds. The 
‘sense’, in contrast, is the same for all individuals who use ‘+’ in the standard way. Each 
such individual grasps this sense by virtue of having an appropriate idea in his mind. The 
‘sense’ in turn determines the addition function as the referent of the ‘+’ sign. (1982, p.54) 
As KW points out, it seems that there is no special problem for this position because the sense of 
an expression determines its reference, or what that expression refers to (1982, p.54). However, 
KW argues that this suggestion cannot meet the sceptical challenge because what is in question 
is precisely how “the existence in my mind of any mental entity or idea can constitute ‘grasping’ 
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any particular sense rather than another” (1982, p.54). Given that that mental entity or idea is a 
finite object in my mind, it can be interpreted in a quus-like way: 
The idea in my mind is a finite object: can it not be interpreted as determining a quus 
function, rather than a plus function? Of course there may be another idea in my mind, 
which is supposed to constitute its act of assigning a particular interpretation to the first 
idea; but then the problem obviously arises again at this new level. (A rule for interpreting 
a rule again.) And so on. For Wittgenstein, Platonism is largely an unhelpful evasion of 
the problem of how our finite minds can give rules that are supposed to apply to an infinity 
of cases. Platonic objects may be self-interpreting, or rather, they may need no 
interpretation; but ultimately there must be some mental entity involved that raises the 
sceptical problem. (1982, p.54) 
Consequently, KW claims that a Platonist reply of this kind cannot meet the sceptical challenge. 
This concludes our brief discussion of candidate facts that might meet the sceptic’s 
demands. As we’ve seen, KW argues that there are no promising candidates for a meaning fact 
that would satisfy both the extensionality constraint and the normativity constraint. In the next 
two sections, I clarify and emphasize the importance of the latter constraint in KW’s argument. 
§1.7 What is the Normativity of Meaning? 
One crucial feature of KW’s argument that is necessary for its success against any 
factualist account of meaning is the thesis that meaning is in some sense normative. But what 
does it mean to say that meaning is normative? This point has not been thoroughly clear in reading 
KW because, as Anandi Hattiangadi (2007) points out, KW often conflates two broad claims with 
respect to the normativity of meaning: The first is the thesis that meaning is normative in the 
‘norm-relative’ sense that the meaning of an expression sets a standard relative to which 
applications of that expression count as either correct or incorrect. According to Hattiangadi, this 
is an ‘anodyne’ or ‘platitudinous’ thesis for any theory of meaning. The second thesis KW 
employs is the ‘normativist’ or ‘prescriptivist’ thesis that meaning is essentially normative or 
prescriptive in the sense that the meaning of an expression normatively compels or prescribes 
how a speaker ought to apply that expression. Hattiangadi argues that it is this thesis that KW’s 
argument crucially turns on. More specifically, it is this thesis that enables KW’s argument to 
succeed against any form of meaning factualism. Hattiangadi addresses the unclarity between this 
thesis and the preceding one by differentiating the thesis that ‘meaning is normative’ from its 
cousin above, embodied in the slogan ‘meaning is norm-relative’. I follow Hattiangadi in teasing 
these two views apart and emphasize how KW requires that meaning is normative on the 
‘normativist’ or ‘prescriptivist’ reading in order to maintain his argument with the kind of 
generality he aspires to. 
§1.7.1 Hattiangadi: Normativity and Norm-Relativity 
In order to adumbrate the thesis that meaning is normative, we need to tease apart two 
conceptions of that thesis. These two conceptions conveniently map onto the two constraints set 
by KW on any adequate account of my meaning addition by ‘plus’, the extensionality constraint 
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and the normativity constraint. The first thesis consists in the view that meaning is normative in 
the norm-relative sense that the meaning of an expression determines how that expression is 
correctly applied, i.e. in terms of the uses of that expression that count as correct and those that 
count as incorrect. Hattiangadi (2007) labels this thesis ‘Norm-Relativity’. This conception of the 
normativity of meaning maps onto KW’s extensionality constraint in the sense that if I do mean 
addition by ‘plus’, then that fact about my meaning rules out the deviant hypothesis that my use 
of that term denotes quaddition or anything else, i.e. given that addition is the function referred 
to by my term ‘plus’. Given that addition is the function that governs my use of the term ‘plus’, 
‘125’ is the only answer that accords with my past meaning—it is the only answer that would 
count as correct insofar as ‘plus’ denotes addition. The intuitive idea behind the sceptic’s demand 
on this front is that the meaning of the term ‘plus’ must determine a standard of correctness for 
the application of that term, the grasp of which would determine whether I use that term correctly 
or not (in line with the principle embodied by Norm-Relativity). So in light of whatever fact there 
is about me that secures addition as the function that regulates my use of the term ‘plus’, that fact 
dictates what behaviour counts as correct and incorrect going forward (in terms of how that term 
would be correctly and incorrectly applied by me). Of course, this is not the only constraint on 
meaning for KW and likewise it is not the only construal of the claim that ‘meaning is normative’. 
KW’s second constraint involves a more robust conception of this thesis, as we saw earlier, in 
terms of how a speaker’s meaning intention with respect to a given expression dictates or 
prescribes how a speaker ought to go on in using that expression. 
Recall that on KW’s second constraint for any candidate fact as to what I meant by ‘plus’, 
whatever fact secures addition as the unique function governing my use of that term must also 
prescribe how I ought to go on in applying that term. Whatever fact is cited with respect to the 
first constraint must also satisfy the second. An adequate account of my meaning addition by 
‘plus’ in terms of some fact must also provide an account of how that fact prescribes how I ought 
to use that term at present and in the future. This constraint of KW’s is based on a stronger 
conception of the normativity of meaning, embodied in a thesis that Hattiangadi dubs 
‘Normativity’. According to this thesis, the claim that meaning is normative consists in the 
intuitive idea that the meaning of an expression prescribes how that expression ought to be applied, 
e.g. that ‘green’ ought to be applied only to green things and not, say, blue things, and that ‘125’ 
and not ‘5’ is the answer that ought to be given in response to the query ‘68 + 57 = ?’. Normativity, 
as such, essentially involves the preceding thesis that meaning is norm-relative but expands on 
that thesis by taking the notion of correctness to immediately imply a prescription. According to 
Hattiangadi, KW runs this conception of the normativity of meaning together with the former: 
On the one hand, Kripke clearly attributes to the semantic realist [i.e. factualist] the 
assumption that understanding the meaning of a word is analogous to following a rule—
that when someone means something by a word, such as ‘plus’, she has a specific rule in 
mind (either the rule for addition or quaddition) which determines whether any answer 
she might give to an addition sum is correct. This assumption is evident, for instance, 
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when he says ‘[t]his is the whole point of the notion that in learning to add I grasp a rule: 
my past intentions regarding addition determine a unique answer for indefinitely many 
new cases in the future.’ On the other hand, Kripke attributes to the semantic realist the 
view that meaning is normative, that is, that what I mean is prescriptive, or action-guiding. 
This is evident, for instance, when Kripke expresses the ‘eerie feeling’ someone under 
the sway of the intuitive, semantic realist view, might have. He says: ‘Even now as I write, 
I feel confident that there is something in my mind—the meaning I attach to the “plus” 
sign—that instructs me what I ought to do in all future cases. I do not predict what I will 
do . . . but instruct myself what I ought to do to conform to the meaning.’ That is, Kripke 
seems to maintain that, at least according to the semantic realist, meaning must be both 
norm-relative and normative. (2007, p.37-38) 
KW requires the stronger thesis that meaning is normative in the prescriptive or action-guiding 
sense, Hattiangadi says, in order to maintain the a priori success of his sceptical argument against 
any account of a meaning fact (i.e. to draw the conclusion with the sort of generality that KW 
intends) as opposed to having to deal with particular versions of meaning factualism on a case-
by-case basis. 
In brief, Hattiangadi claims that by assuming that meaning is normative, KW is able to 
“remove the gaps in the sceptical argument” by making use of the arguments originally devised 
by Hume and Moore against the existence of moral facts, arguments that “purport to rule out all 
naturalistic reductions of normative moral concepts and properties” (2007, p.37-38). Hattiangadi 
points out that this argument is structurally similar to A.J. Ayer’s argument against the existence 
of moral facts (2007, p.39): 
Ayer holds that moral realists, in committing themselves to the existence of objective, 
moral facts, face a dilemma. If the putative moral facts are said to be ‘natural’ facts, the 
realist commits the ‘naturalistic fallacy’. If the putative moral facts are said to be non‐
natural, moral facts turn out to be unlike ordinary empirical facts and therefore 
unknowable. (2007, p.39) 
KW’s argument takes analogous route by attempting to show that meaning factualism faces a 
similar dilemma. As Hattiangadi explains: 
. . . if we grant that meaning is normative, Kripke’s sceptic could be taken to show that 
the semantic realist faces the same dilemma as the moral realist: if she says that semantic 
facts are natural, as the dispositionalist does, she commits a fallacy, and if she says that 
semantic facts are non‐natural, she makes them inherently mysterious and unknowable. 
(2007, p.39) 
These arguments share two crucial assumptions, according to Hattiangadi. First, it is assumed that 
the judgments involved are action-guiding, and second, it is assumed that an internalist account 
of action-guidingness for these judgments is true, i.e. “they presuppose that if someone judges 
that she ought to do something, then she is ipso facto motivated to do it” (2007, p.39). So, in the 
meaning case, this amounts to assuming both that semantic judgments are essentially action-
guiding and that semantic ‘oughts’ are categorically prescriptive. Most importantly, Hattiangadi 
explains, “semantic oughts cannot simply be means/end prescriptions . . . concerning what one 
ought to do in order to achieve the object of a wish or a desire or to achieve an end” because this 
would not engage the metaethical arguments that KW requires in order to maintain the a priori 
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success of his argument against any putative account of a meaning fact (2007, p.182). As 
Hattiangadi puts it, “[t]he crucial point is that semantic prescriptions must be categorical as 
opposed to merely instrumental if the sceptic is to use the normativity of meaning in his service” 
(2007, p.183). Hattiangadi argues that we could not reasonably view semantic obligations as 
categorically prescriptive. According to her, the ‘oughts’ that issue from semantic judgments 
could only be merely instrumental in the latter sense. So, given that KW’s argument against the 
existence of meaning facts hinges on the claim that meaning is normative in the sense that it 
involves categorical ‘oughts’, this argument can be blocked by showing that we do not have 
semantic obligations in the sense that Normativity implies. As Hattiangadi has mentioned, the 
assumption that meaning is norm-relative is not sufficient for grounding these arguments against 
the existence of any meaning facts. So, if meaning is only norm-relative and semantic 
prescriptions are only instrumental, as Hattiangadi claims, then KW’s argument cannot have the 
a priori and fully general success that we initially viewed that argument to have.12 
§1.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter I introduced KW’s sceptical argument according to which there are no 
meaning facts in virtue of which ascriptions of meaning such as “Gerard means addition by ‘plus’” 
are true or false. I explained how KW motivates this argument via a sceptical paradox that he 
imagines a bizarre sceptic poses. This sceptic hypothesizes that my past meaning intention with 
respect to the ‘plus’ sign was actually to refer not to addition, but to a non-standard function 
quaddition. KW set two constraints on any adequate account of a meaning fact that would rule 
out this hypothesis proposed by the sceptic: the extensionality constraint and the normativity 
constraint. Following KW, I enumerated several candidates for a meaning fact that would meet 
these two constraints, and explained why KW found all of them wanting—including even the 
most sophisticated version of a dispositionalist account of meaning. Thus it was concluded that 
there simply are no facts of the sort in virtue of which a speaker means one thing rather than 
another by an expression. One of the key premises in this argument was the thesis that meaning 
is essentially normative. As Hattiangadi suggested, this thesis could amount to two different 
claims: The weak conception of that thesis states that meaning is normative in the norm-relative 
sense that the meaning of an expression implies a standard according to which applications of that 
expression can count as correct or incorrect. The stronger conception of the thesis states that the 
meaning of an expression normatively compels or prescribes how that expression ought to be 
applied. KW requires the latter thesis, Hattiangadi says, in order to maintain his conclusion that 
there are no meaning facts. 
                                                     
12 Very roughly, the thought is that one can be released from semantic ‘obligations’ via a mere change in 
desires. If I have no desire to tell the truth, for example, in what sense am I obliged to apply a term to 
objects that fall within its extension? However, the details of Hattiangadi’s argument against Normativity 
are beyond the scope of this dissertation. For a complete exposition of the argument, see Hattiangadi (2006) 
or Hattiangadi (2007), ch.7. 
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Chapter Two continues the discussion of KW’s normativity objection against 
dispositionalist theories of meaning and links this discussion to ongoing debate in metaethics 
concerning ‘open question’ style arguments of a similar kind. We’ll see that KW’s normativity 
objection apparently fails due to the fact that the reduction of meaning facts to facts about speakers’ 
dispositions can be conceived to be a posteriori in the manner of the reduction of water to H2O. 
However, we’ll go on to argue that despite this a normativity challenge to dispositionalism can 
be given by constructing an analogue of the ‘Moral Twin Earth’ argument developed by Terry 
Horgan and Mark Timmons against a posteriori versions of ethical naturalism. The eventual 
upshot will be that meaning is normative in a sense that poses a genuine—and as yet 
unanswered—challenge to reductive dispositionalist accounts of meaning. 
  






Chapter Two: Twin Earth and the Open Question Argument 
§2.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter I continue the discussion of KW’s ‘normativity’ objection against 
dispositionalism by viewing that objection as a kind of open question argument. I explain that 
KW’s version of this argument cannot succeed against reductive dispositionalist accounts of 
meaning, given that these accounts conceive meaning facts as reducible to facts about speakers’ 
dispositions by means of an a posteriori reduction, i.e. in the manner of the reduction of water to 
H2O. Nonetheless I argue that this objection can be revived by constructing an analogue of the 
‘Moral Twin Earth’ argument proposed by Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons against a posteriori 
versions of ethical naturalism. The upshot of this argument is that there is evidence that meaning 
is normative in a way that poses a genuine threat to reductive dispositionalist accounts of meaning. 
In the following I first outline Moore’s open question argument and explain how, 
following Zalabardo (1997), KW’s analogue of this argument cannot succeed against the a 
posteriori versions of dispositionalism. I then develop a revised open question argument that does 
challenge these accounts, modelled on the Moral Twin Earth argument developed by Horgan and 
Timmons (1992a).13 
§2.2 Moore: The Classical Open Question Argument 
In his Principia Ethica (1903), G.E. Moore develops an objection to definitional 
naturalism, “the thesis that moral properties are identical or reducible to natural properties as a 
matter of definitional or conceptual fact[,]” by arguing that this view commits what he calls the 
‘naturalistic fallacy’ (Miller 2013, p.11). According to Moore, this fallacy is committed by any 
attempt to define ‘good’ in terms of a property or set of properties, natural or otherwise. On 
Moore’s view, ‘good’ is not definable at all and so even if good was a natural property, Moore 
says, “that would not alter the nature of the fallacy nor diminish its importance one whit. All that 
I have said about it would remain quite equally true: only the name which I have called it would 
not be so appropriate as I think it is” (Moore 1903, p.65). As such, Moore argues, the fallacy is 
“thus committed by anyone who tries to give any definition of ‘good’ or analysis of the concept 
which it expresses” (Miller 2013, p.12). 
                                                     
13 Horgan and Timmons develop this argument in a number of different formats. The ‘revised’ open 
question argument outlined here is only one version of the argument. Horgan and Timmons see themselves 
as developing a formula for constructing arguments as opposed to developing a single specific argument. 
See Horgan and Timmons 1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1996a, 1996b, 2000a, 2009, 2015. Horgan and Timmons 
discuss the broad strategy of their Moral Twin Earth argument more generally in a 2013 entry to the 
International Encyclopedia of Ethics, “Moral Twin Earth”. 
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Moore motivates his case against any attempt to define ‘good’ by means of some 
conceptual or a priori reduction to a certain property or set of properties by constructing an 
argument that we will call the ‘classical open question argument’. Before we outline that argument, 
we’ll need to define what it is for a question to be ‘open’ or ‘closed’ on Moore’s technical use of 
those terms. First, a question is closed just in case sincerely asking that question implies that a 
speaker does not grasp the meanings of the terms or concepts involved in that question’s 
formulation (Miller 2007, p.12). If a speaker were to ask for example ‘Smith is an unmarried man, 
but is he a bachelor?’, this would suggest that that speaker is prey to some linguistic or conceptual 
misunderstanding of the expressions ‘unmarried man’ or ‘bachelor’. Anyone who truly grasps the 
meaning of these expressions (and thus the concepts they stand for) knows that they are equivalent. 
Any competent speaker would be able to answer the question ‘Smith is an unmarried man, but is 
he a bachelor?’ simply on the basis of their linguistic competence. By contrast, a question is open 
just in case it is not closed. With this crucial distinction in place, we can reconstruct Moore’s 
argument: 
(1) Suppose that the predicate ‘good’ is synonymous with, or analytically equivalent 
to, the naturalistic predicate ‘N’. 
In that case, it would also be true that: 
(2) It is part of the meaning of the claim that ‘x is N’ that x is good. 
And consequently: 
(3) Someone who seriously asked ‘Is an x which is N also good?’ would betray some 
conceptual confusion. The question would be closed. 
But quite the contrary seems to be true, according to Moore: 
(4) For, given any natural property N, it is always an open question whether an x 
which is N is good. That is to say, asking the question ‘Is an x which is N also 
good?’ betrays no conceptual confusion. For example, it would be coherent to 
ask “Is a pleasurable action good” or “Is something which we desire to desire 
good?” (13). 
Thus, Moore concludes: 
(5) It cannot be the case that ‘good’ is synonymous with, or analytically equivalent 
to, ‘N’. 
And consequently: 
(6) The property of being good cannot as a matter of conceptual necessity be 
identical to the property of being N. (Miller 2013, p.12-13) 
Though this argument faces some formidable objections in the moral case, we will bracket these 
and focus on whether a similar argument can be run in the meaning case.14 We will see that even 
                                                     
14 Miller (2013) outlines three objections against Moore’s argument. See Miller 2013, p.14-17. 
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if the standard objections can be met, an open question argument against dispositionalism has its 
own troubles. 
§2.3 Zalabardo: KW’s Normativity Argument 
Jose Zalabardo argues in his 1997 that if KW’s normativity objection is construed as an 
open question argument in the style of Moore, this argument cannot succeed against modern 
reductive dispositionalist accounts of meaning.15 Zalabardo credits this insight to Fodor (1990), 
who interprets KW as claiming that “we cannot draw evaluative conclusions from descriptive 
premises concerning speakers’ dispositions because an open question argument would invalidate 
these inferences” (Zalabardo 1997, p.282). KW may have been drawn to this argument, Zalabardo 
explains, on account of the following line of reasoning: 
How a speaker would apply a predicate under ideal conditions cannot be the fact that 
determines how he should apply it because we can meaningfully ask whether the 
applications that he would endorse under ideal conditions are the ones that he should 
endorse. (1997, p.282) 
On this construal, KW would be arguing that for any speaker disposed to apply an expression in 
a certain pattern, one could sincerely and coherently ask whether that speaker ought to apply that 
expression in that way. 
In Chapter One, we briefly discussed how an ‘open question’ interpretation of the 
normativity objection could be grounded in KW’s demand that meaning facts must essentially 
amount to normative facts. Boghossian (1989) gestures at this interpretation of the objection by 
emphasizing KW’s point that “[t]he relation of meaning and intention . . . is normative, not 
descriptive” (1982, p.37). Dispositionalism is unequipped to explain this relation, on KW’s view, 
because facts about speakers’ dispositions are essentially descriptive, whereas what is required is 
a normative fact. As Boghossian explains: 
. . . even if there were a suitably selected disposition that captured the extension of an 
expression accurately, the disposition could still not be identified with that fact of 
meaning, because it still remains true that the concept of a disposition is descriptive 
whereas the concept of meaning is not. In other words, according to Kripke, even if there 
were a dispositional predicate that logically covaried with a meaning predicate, the one 
fact could still not be identified with the other, for they are facts of distinct sorts. 
(Boghossian 1989, p.532) 
In light of this, KW rejects dispositionalism as an adequate response to the sceptical challenge. 
We can formalize this construal of the objection by tracking Moore’s argument as formulated 
above. It can be formulated thus: 
(1) Suppose that ‘means addition by the ‘plus’ sign’ means the same as ‘disposed to 
answer with the sum’. 
In that case, it would also be true that: 
                                                     
15 Zalabardo also considers what he calls the 'justification argument', but as the cogency of this argument 
is irrelevant to the main strategy of my thesis, I don't discuss it here. 
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(2) It is part of the meaning of the claim that ‘S is disposed to answer with the sum’ that 
S means addition by the ‘plus’ sign. 
And consequently: 
(3) Someone who seriously asked ‘S is disposed to answer with the sum, but does S mean 
addition by the ‘plus’ sign?’ would betray some conceptual confusion. The question 
would be closed, just as ‘Smith is an unmarried male, but is he a bachelor?’ would 
be closed. 
But quite the contrary seems to be true: 
(4) Given any S that is disposed to answer with the sum, it is an open question as to 
whether S means addition by the ‘plus’ sign. The question ‘Smith is disposed to give 
the sum, but does he mean addition by the ‘plus’ sign?’ would be open in that it 
betrays no conceptual confusion in asking that question. (It is open because ‘Smith is 
disposed to give the sum, but ought he to give the sum?’ is open.) 
Therefore: 
(5) It cannot be the case that ‘means addition by the ‘plus’ sign’ means the same as 
‘disposed to answer with the sum’. 
And subsequently, KW concludes: 
(6) The property meaning addition by the ‘plus’ sign cannot as a matter of conceptual 
necessity be identical with the property being disposed to answer with the sum. 
This argument might in principle succeed against versions of dispositionalism grounded in an 
allegedly analytic connection between ‘means addition’ and ‘disposed to give the sum’, though it 
cannot succeed against the reductive versions of dispositionalism popular today. As Fodor puts it, 
if KW’s normativity objection amounts to this kind of open question argument, then it is not a 
new issue and moreover it is unclear how this objection could have any traction in the meaning 
case: 
In short, I’m not clear how - or whether - “open question” arguments can get a grip in the 
present case. I am darkly suspicious that the Kripkensteinian worry about the normative 
force of meaning is either a non-issue or just the reduction issue over again; anyhow that 
it’s not a new issue. (Fodor 1990, p.136) 
Fodor does not explain why this open question argument ends up being a “non-issue” in his brief 
comments on the topic. Zalabardo tries to flesh this out on Fodor’s behalf. 
According to Zalabardo, the heart of Fodor’s objection is that dispositionalism can avoid 
an open question argument of the sort sketched above by rejecting the idea that meaning facts 
reduce to dispositional facts as a matter of conceptual necessity, i.e. by means of an a priori 
reduction grounded in a claimed analytic equivalence or synonymy relation. Instead, the 
dispositionalist can say that meaning facts reduce to dispositional facts as a matter of metaphysical 
necessity, i.e. by means of an a posteriori reduction, similar in kind to the reduction of water to 
H2O. So the fact that we can coherently ask whether a speaker’s disposition to use an expression 
conforms to the way he ought to use that expression does not rule out the theoretic reduction of 
   
 
34 
meaning facts to facts about idealized dispositions—instead it rules out a particular a priori 
conception of that reduction. As Zalabardo explains, this objection cannot succeed against forms 
of dispositionalism that view meaning facts as a posteriori reducible to facts about dispositions: 
[P]roponents of naturalistic reductions of semantic notions see their task as on a par with 
other theoretic reductions, such as the identification of water with H2O or of heat with 
kinetic energy. The proponents of [modern reductive dispositionalist accounts of meaning] 
aim at revealing the nature of [meaning], and of the attending normative facts, precisely 
in the sense in which the nature of water is revealed by its identification with a certain 
molecular structure . . . No doubt we can meaningfully ask whether water is H2O, but the 
meaningfulness of this question does not undermine the identification of water with H2O[.] 
(Zalabardo 1997, p.282-283) 
Or as Miller (2006) puts it: 
Just as one cannot undermine the theoretical identification of water with H2O by showing 
that judgments about water are not analytically equivalent to judgments about H2O, the 
versions of reductive dispositionalism on offer cannot be undermined via an argument to 
the effect that semantic judgments are not analytically equivalent to judgments about 
optimal dispositions.  (Miller 2006, p.110) 
Consequently, it looks as though KW’s normativity objection, conceived as an open question 
argument, cannot be applied generally to rule out any dispositionalist account of meaning. Some 
versions of reductive dispositionalism can avoid this objection and thus block KW’s thesis that 
there are no meaning facts by suggesting that meaning facts are constituted by facts about 
dispositions, by means of an a posteriori reduction.16 
In the next sections I consider whether the open question argument can be conceived in 
a way that does apply against reductive dispositionalist accounts of meaning. I argue that it can 
and take the Moral Twin Earth argument posed by Horgan and Timmons (1992a) as a model for 
devising this objection. 
§2.4 Horgan and Timmons: The Open Question Argument Revised 
In the past Moore’s open question argument was thought to deliver a death blow to 
naturalistic moral realism. As Horgan and Timmons (hereafter ‘H&T’) explain in their 1992: 
. . . the argument’s persuasive appeal held a good many philosophers in its sway. Its 
appeal was felt by W.D. Ross (1930: 7-11, 92-3) and A.C. Ewing (1948: 41-2) who, like, 
Moore were led to espouse ethical nonnaturalism. Its appeal was also felt by A.J. Ayer 
(1952: 104-5) and R.M. Hare (1952: ch.5) who, because they found the metaphysical and 
epistemological commitments of nonnaturalism unpalatable, were led to noncognitivist 
accounts of moral discourse. (1992a, p.153) 
Moore’s argument, as it turned out, was only persuasive insofar as a certain semantic view was 
popular among ethical naturalists. In time, this thesis was abandoned in favour of a more plausible 
view pioneered by Kripke (1972) and Putnam (1975). Consequently, “a novel strain of ethical 
naturalism - a kind allegedly immune to Moorean open question arguments - was bound to sprout 
                                                     
16 Nothing changes if these dispositions are idealized in the way we discussed in Chapter One. Boghossian 
(1989) claims that all dispositions are idealized, it’s just that some are tacitly so. 
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forth” and indeed it did, “[o]ne now sees this new strain of ethical naturalism everywhere” (1992a, 
p.153). 
H&T argue that though recent forms of ethical naturalism side-step Moore’s argument, 
that argument can be reconfigured such that it does apply against these views: “the currently 
popular version of naturalism, despite its immunity to Moore’s version of the open question 
argument, succumbs to a newly fashioned open question argument” (1992a, p.153).17 According 
to them, a ‘Moral Twin Earth’ scenario supports this contention. 
§2.4.1 New Wave Moral Semantics 
H&T claim that contemporary ethical naturalism is developed around a general project 
that they call ‘new wave moral semantics’. The main aim of this project is to extend recent 
developments in the philosophy of language to moral semantics, where three developments are 
of primary importance: First, the synonymy criterion of property identity—the idea that two 
properties are identical only if the terms used to refer to those properties are synonymous—is 
widely rejected. This is so in light of numerous scientific counterexamples. For example: 
The (sortal) property being water is identified with the property being composed of H2O 
molecules; being a cloud is identified with being a mass of water droplets, temperature 
is identified with mean kinetic energy and so on. But no one supposes that ‘being water’’ 
is synonymous with ‘being composed of H2O molecules’, or that ‘temperature’ is 
synonymous with ‘mean kinetic energy’, and so forth for many other scientific identities. 
Quite simply it doesn't seem that, in general, property identity requires synonymy. (1992a, 
p.156) 
Second, the work of Kripke and Putnam has brought “widespread acceptance of the idea that 
names and natural kind terms are rigid designators—rigid in the sense that such expressions 
designate the same entity with respect to every possible world in which that entity exists” (1992a, 
p.157). Identity statements that involve rigid designators are necessarily true but not analytically 
true, and some such statements are ‘synthetic definitions’, e.g. ‘Water = H2O’ (1992a, p.157). 
These statements “give the real nature or essence of the entity, property, or kind designated by a 
particular term” (1992a, p.157). So, for example, the identity statement ‘Water = H2O’ is, if true, 
an expression of the “real, underlying essence of water and provides us with a (synthetically true) 
definition of ‘water’” (1992a, p.157). Third, there has been widespread acceptance of so-called 
‘causal’ theories of reference. On these theories 
. . . the semantical property of reference is to be understood as essentially involving 
appropriate causal connections between speakers’ use of a term and the thing to which 
the term refers. (1992a, p.157) 
These theories are designed to explain two linguistic phenomena, according to H&T: 
                                                     
17  Horgan and Timmons specifically target Richard Boyd’s version of ethical naturalism, though the 
argument can be applied more generally. As they explain in a 2013 entry to the International Encyclopedia 
of Ethics: “the argument, understood generically, represents a recipe . . . that can be used as a basis for 
challenging any version of naturalist moral semantics” (2013). 
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Such theories propose to explain (i) how the reference of a term is originally determined 
(e.g. there being some sort of baptism or dubbing ceremony through which speakers in 
causal contact with an item acquire the ability to refer to that item through the use of some 
expression used in the ceremony), and (ii) how the capacity to refer is spread throughout 
a linguistic community (again, by speakers’ causally interacting with one another and 
with the item). (1992a, p.157-158) 
The basic idea behind causal theories of reference is that “reference is ‘grounded’ by relevant 
causal hook-ups between speakers and the world” (1992a, p.158). 
Richard Boyd (1988) defends a version of naturalistic moral realism characterized by 
these recent developments. First, Boyd claims that moral terms have synthetic definitions and as 
such, we can reject the synonymy criterion of property identity for moral terms: “the property 
goodness is identical with such and such natural property even though the term ‘good’ is not 
synonymous with any naturalistic term or phrase designating the relevant natural property” 
(1992a, p.158). Second, Boyd claims that moral terms rigidly designate the natural properties that 
they are used to refer to. Some such statements involving moral terms constitute definitions and 
these statements are necessarily true without being analytic. Third, Boyd extends a causal theory 
of reference to moral terms: “for moral terms, just as for names and natural kind terms, reference 
is a matter of there being certain causal connections between the use of moral terms and the 
relevant natural properties” (1992a, p.158). On Boyd’s version of a causal theory of reference, 
“reference is essentially an epistemic notion and so the relevant causal connections constituting 
reference are just those causal connections involved in the knowledge gathering activities” (1992a, 
p.158): 
Roughly, and for nondegenerate cases, a term t refers to a kind (property, relation, etc.) k 
just in case there exist causal mechanisms whose tendency is to bring it about, over time, 
that what is predicated of the term t will be approximately true of k (excuse the blurring 
of the use-mention distinction). Such mechanisms will typically include the existence of 
procedures which are approximately accurate for recognizing members or instances of k 
(at least for easy cases) and which relevantly govern the use of t, the social transmission 
of certain relevantly approximately true beliefs regarding k, formulated as claims about t 
(again excuse the slight to the use-mention distinction), a pattern of deference to experts 
on k with respect to the use of t, etc. . . . When relations of this sort obtain, we may think 
of the properties of k as regulating the use of t (via such causal relations) . . . (Boyd 1988, 
p.195) 
Boyd extends this version of a causal theory of reference to moral terms and this commits him, 
according to Horgan and Timmons, to what they call the ‘causal regulation thesis’ (1992a, p.159): 
CRT Causal regulation thesis: For each moral term t (e.g., ‘good’), there is a natural  
property N such that N alone, and no other property, causally regulates the use 
of t by humans. 
It is because moral terms regulate their use by humans in this way that moral terms “behave 
semantically like natural kind terms: they rigidly refer to certain natural properties and hence 
possess synthetic definitions” (1992a, p.159). Thereby, new wave moral semantics is expressed 
by this principle: 
CSN Causal semantic naturalism: Each moral term t rigidly designates the natural  
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property N that uniquely causally regulates the use of t by humans. 
If we combine this thesis with metaphysical ethical naturalism: 
MN Metaphysical naturalism: There are moral properties (and facts); and these are  
identical with natural properties (and facts). 
Then the result is causal ethical naturalism. According to H&T, CSN does not fall to the classical 
Moorean argument, given that the standard Moorean argument targets ASN: 
ASN Analytic semantic naturalism: Fundamental moral terms like ‘good’ have 
analytically true naturalistic definitions.18 (1992a, p.154) 
A naturalist who accepts CSN can maintain MN without fear of Moore’s argument—that 
argument is only effective against analytic ethical naturalism (the combination of ASN and MN) 
and not causal semantic naturalism. The fact that moral terms and natural terms do not stand in a 
relation of synonymy is not a problem for MN when combined with CSN. For CSN, the link 
between a moral term t and a natural property N is, as we have seen, synthetic and not analytic. 
Consequently, it would be perfectly coherent to ask whether t is N, but the fact that this is an open 
question does not show that t is not N.19 
§2.4.2 General Strategy 
H&T assume for the sake of argument that CRT is true and then go on to show, via a 
Moral Twin Earth scenario, that “nevertheless moral terms do not rigidly refer to the natural 
properties that causally regulate their use by humans” (1992a, p.160). According to them: 
Although causal regulation may well coincide with - or even constitute - reference for 
certain terms (e.g. names and physical natural-kind terms) . . . for moral terms anyway, 
causal regulation does not coincide with reference. (1992a, p.160) 
If H&T are right and CRT cannot accurately capture the meanings of moral terms, then CSN and 
thereby MN are in danger. 
In order to approach H&T’s argument, we’ll first need to discuss how a causal theory of 
reference could capture the meanings of natural kind terms. This we will do via Putnam’s Twin 
Earth thought experiment. On Putnam’s view, our intuitions about this scenario suggest that we 
should adopt a causal theory of reference for natural kind terms such as ‘water’. CSN implies that 
‘good’ is like ‘water’ and can therefore be explained via a causal theory of reference. If this were 
true, then a moral analogue of Putnam’s scenario should yield analogous results. According to 
H&T, it does not and they deploy the Moral Twin Earth scenario to show this. 
                                                     
18 Cf. the synonymy relation mentioned in step (1) of Moore’s open question outlined in §2.1 above. 
19 Please excuse the blurring of the use-mention distinction here, this is carried over from Boyd, as quoted 
from his 1988 above. 
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§2.4.3 Putnam’s Twin Earth 
In his 1975 essay “The meaning of ‘meaning’”, Putnam envisions a distant planet that he 
calls ‘Twin Earth’.20 This planet, Putnam explains is identical to Earth in every way save for the 
fact that the watery substance on this planet—the liquid that fills its oceans, rivers, and streams—
is constituted not by H2O, but by a different molecular compound, XYZ. So despite the fact that 
the superficial appearance of this watery substance is the same as that of the watery substance on 
Earth—they are both clear, odourless liquids, for example—on Earth this substance consists of 
H2O molecules, whereas on Twin Earth this substance consists of XYZ molecules. So the 
substance that Earthers apply their ‘water’ term to consists of H2O, while the substance that Twin 
Earthers apply their ‘water’ term to consists of XYZ. On reflection, Putnam says, Earthers and 
Twin Earthers do not mean the same thing by ‘water’. 
Suppose that a Twin Earther visits Earth and after some time converses with an Earther 
about ‘water’. The Twin Earther, let’s suppose, is visiting Dunedin, New Zealand. The Earther 
and Twin Earther visit a local pub, the Albar. After some time of discussing the striking 
similarities between Earth and Twin Earth, the two come to a dispute about what one of the other 
patrons at the Albar is drinking. The Twin Earther says “That man is drinking water”, using his 
Twin English term ‘water’ to communicate this to the Earther. The Earther responds, “No, that 
man is not drinking water” and uses the English term ‘water’ to communicate this reply. 
According to Putnam, there is an important sense in which the Earther and Twin Earther are 
simply speaking at cross purposes: the two could not reasonably be viewed as disagreeing about 
what is in the glass held by the other pub patron.21 In other words, any ensuing dispute would be 
merely verbal. If the Earther and Twin Earther were to become cognizant of this difference, say 
by consulting some scientific texts from each planet, then whatever dispute they had would likely 
cease. Putnam takes these intuitions as evidence that the Earther and the Twin Earther refer to 
different substances by ‘water’, and that ‘water’ has a different meaning for each of them. 
Putnam argues that our linguistic intuitions about Twin Earth can be explained by the 
view that natural kind terms such as ‘water’ possess a meaning that is crucially tied to the physical 
essence of the stuff that that term refers to, H2O. So, on Twin Earth, one would say something 
that is incorrect if one were to apply the English term ‘water’ to refer to liquid filling the lakes 
and rivers of Twin Earth, the liquid composed of XYZ. Likewise, the Twin Earther would say 
something incorrect in applying the Twin English term ‘water’ to the outwardly similar liquid on 
Earth, composed of H2O. This principle about the meaning of natural kind terms explains why we 
think that an Earther and Twin Earther do not genuinely disagree about whether the pub patron’s 
                                                     
20 See also Putnam “Is Semantics Possible?” (1970) for a broad discussion of semantics and natural kind 
terms. 
21 Granted, there is a sense in which they still might disagree, in that they could disagree about whether the 
patron is drinking ‘water’ in either the English or Twin English sense or gin (or indeed some other clear 
liquid). The example is not perfect, but the key point is that there is a way in which these two speakers fail 
to genuinely disagree about whether a liquid is ‘water’ or not (in their respective languages). 
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glass is filled with ‘water’ or not. H&T claim that we can view Putnam’s argument for this 
conclusion as a kind of semantic competence argument and close relative of Moore’s open 
question argument. 
§2.4.4 Putnam and the Open Question Argument 
According to H&T, Moore’s open question argument against definitional naturalism is 
based on a semantic competence test: If a competent speaker could readily answer a question 
solely in virtue of his or her grasp of the meanings of the terms involved in that question, then 
that question is closed. For example, ‘Sam is an unmarried man, but is he a bachelor?’ would be 
closed. A question is open, by contrast, just in case it is not closed. According to Moore, certain 
moral questions such as ‘Action x is pleasurable, but is x good?’ are open and this, he says, is 
evidence against definitional naturalism. Putnam’s argument can be viewed as using a similar 
strategy in support of treating natural kind terms as rigid designators by showing that the relevant 
analogous questions are closed. 
Suppose that someone asks whether water is H2O. This would amount to asking, ‘Liquid 
L is H2O, but is it water?’ or ‘Liquid L is water, but is it H2O?’ (1992a, p.161). The questions 
‘Liquid L is H2O, but is it water?’ and ‘Liquid L is water, but is it H2O?’ are open, but this does 
not undermine CSN. Given that it does not hold that ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ are synonymous, it is not 
committed to the idea that those questions are closed. However, the questions ‘Given that the use 
of ‘water’ by humans is causally regulated by the natural kind H2O, is Liquid L, which is H2O, 
water?’ and ‘Given that the use of ‘water’ by humans is causally regulated by the natural kind 
H2O, is Liquid L, which is water, H2O?’ would be closed given Putnam’s account of the semantics 
of ‘water’. So the fact—allegedly born out of the Twin Earth thought experiment—that they are 
closed is evidence for the truth of Putnam’s semantic view. They encapsulate the story about 
reference which holds that ‘water’ refers to H2O, which is held by Putnam to explain our semantic 
intuitions concerning Earth (and Twin Earth). H&T aim to show, via their Moral Twin Earth 
argument, that the analogous questions in the case of the term ‘good’ would be open. If this is the 
case, then despite the fact that it survives Moore’s version of the open question argument, CSN 
would be challenged by a ‘revived’ version of the open question argument. 
§2.5 Moral Twin Earth 
In setting up their Moral Twin Earth argument, H&T first stipulate a few things about the 
‘Moral Earth’ of their scenario. First they assume the truth of CRT and CSN, in line with Boyd’s 
thesis “that ‘good’ and ‘right’ are regulated by certain functional properties; and that, as a matter 
of empirical fact, these are properties whose functional essence is captured by some specific 
consequentialist normative theory” (1992a, p.163). This theory we will refer to as ‘Tc’. Second, 
they assume that “there is some reliable method of moral inquiry which, if properly and 
thoroughly employed, would lead us to discover this fact about our uses of moral terms” (1992a, 
p.163). With these two assumptions in place, H&T construct an analogue of Putnam’s Twin Earth 
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designed to support their contention that the analogous questions from Putnam’s scenario 
sketched above, concerning ‘good’, would turn out to be open. 
H&T envision a distant part of the actual world, a planet they call ‘Moral Twin Earth’. 
This Moral Twin Earth is identical to Earth in every way, including the fact that Twin Earthers 
have a certain terminology in Twin English that they use to evaluate the praiseworthiness of 
agents and their actions. They use the Twin English expressions ‘morally right’ and ‘wrong’ to 
express these sentiments and in general they are disposed to comply with their judgments about 
the actions that they call ‘morally right’ and ‘wrong’. They take seriously how these judgments 
bear on the well-being of Twin Earthers generally, and so on. All in all, this practice should be 
very familiar to the inhabitants of Earth as the kind of thing that we do when we speak about our 
moral practice, for which we reserve the terms ‘morally right’ and ‘wrong’ in English—as H&T 
put it, “the uses of [twin-moral] terms on Moral Twin Earth bear all of the ‘formal’ marks that we 
take to characterize moral vocabulary and moral practice” (1992a, p.164). 
Despite these similarities, there is one important difference between Earth and Twin Earth: 
For Twin Earthers, the use of their term ‘morally right’ in Twin English is causally regulated by 
natural (functional) properties, whose essence is captured by a deontological normative theory, 
Td. H&T explain that this difference in the causal regulation of their moral terminology is “due at 
least in part to certain species-wide difference in psychological temperament that distinguish 
Twin Earthlings from Earthlings. (For instance, perhaps Twin Earthlings tend to experience the 
sentiment of guilt more readily and less intensively, than do Earthlings)” (1992a, p.165). 
Moreover, they explain that: 
. . . if Twin Earthlings were to employ in a proper and thorough manner the same reliable 
method of inquiry which (as we are already supposing) would lead Earthlings to discover 
that Earthling uses of moral terms are causally regulated by functional properties whose 
essence is captured by the consequentialist theory Tc, then this method would lead the 
Twin Earthlings to discover that their own uses of moral terms are causally regulated by 
functional properties whose essence is captured by the deontological theory Td. (1992a, 
p.165) 
H&T claim that there are two options for assessing the status of an exchange between the 
two invoking these terms: 
On the one hand, we could say that the differences are analogous to those between Earth 
and Twin Earth in Putnam’s original example, to wit: the moral terms used by Earthlings 
rigidly designate the natural properties that causally regulate their use on Earth, whereas 
the twin-moral terms used by Twin Earthlings rigidly designate the distinct natural 
properties that causally regulate their use on Twin Earth; hence, moral and twin-moral 
terms differ in meaning, and are not intertranslatable. On the other hand, we could say 
instead that moral and twin-moral terms do not differ in meaning or reference, and hence 
that any apparent moral disagreements that might arise between Earthlings and Twin 
Earthlings would be genuine disagreements - i.e., disagreements in moral belief and in 
normative moral theory, rather than disagreements in meaning. (1992a, p.165) 
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H&T contend that the latter option is the most plausible assessment of the scenario, given that our 
intuition is that the Earther and the Twin Earther genuinely disagree. This causes trouble for CSN 
in that: 
. . . if CSN were true, and the moral terms in question rigidly designated those natural 
properties that causally regulate their use, then reflection on this scenario ought to 
generate intuitions analogous to those generated in Putnam’s original Twin Earth scenario. 
I.e., it should seem intuitively natural to say that here we have a difference in meaning, 
and that [T]win English ‘moral’ terms are not translatable by English moral terms. But 
when it comes to characterizing the differences between Earthlings and [T]win Earthlings 
on this matter, the natural-seeming thing to say is that the differences involve belief and 
theory, not meaning. (1992a, p.165-6) 
H&T reinforce this assessment of their scenario by explaining how it would strike Earthers and 
Twin Earthers if they discovered this difference in the causal regulation of their moral 
terminology: 
If CSN were true, then recognition of these differences ought to result in its seeming 
rather silly, to members of each group, to engage in inter-group debate about goodness - 
about whether it conforms to normative theory Tc or to Td. (If, in Putnam’s original 
scenario, the two groups learn that their respective uses of ‘water’ are causally regulated 
by different physical kind-properties, it would be silly for them to think they have 
differing views about the real nature of water.) But such inter-group debate would surely 
strike both groups not as silly but as quite appropriate, because they would regard one 
another as differing in moral beliefs and moral theory, not in meaning. (1992a, p.166) 
H&T argue that our intuitions about Moral Twin Earth suggest that CSN is probably false on 
account of the fact that the best explanation of Moral Twin Earth should respect the above 
intuitions rather than repudiate them. They use the phrase ‘probably false’ because “the inference 
to CSN’s falsity [is] inductive, an inference to the best explanation” and after all, our intuitions 
concerning Twin Earth scenarios “are empirical evidence about matters of semantics (just as their 
syntactic intuitions about grammaticality are empirical evidence about matters about syntax” 
(1992a, p.163). Nonetheless these intuitions “especially when robustly present among most all 
competent speakers, are quite powerful evidence; ceteris paribus, a semantic hypothesis that 
respects the intuitions is preferable to, and is more likely to be correct than, a semantic hypothesis 
that repudiates them” (1992a, p.163). 
§2.5.1 The Open Question Argument Revised 
H&T claim that a revised open question argument can be mounted from the Moral Twin 
Earth scenario: 
. . . since it is a highly non-trivial issue whether the basic good-making natural property 
is the one (if there is just one) that causally regulates the use of ‘good’ by humans, or 
instead is the one that causally regulates this term’s use by twin-humans, or instead is 
some natural property distinct from either of these, the outcome of the Moral Twin Earth 
thought experiment also undergirds [a] ‘revised open question thesis’[.] (1992a, p.166) 
According to them, our intuitions about Moral Twin Earth tell against CSN by showing that the 
analogs of the Putnam open questions outlined above are open when it comes to the term ‘good’. 
In particular, the question ‘Given that the use of ‘good’ by humans is causally regulated by natural 
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property N, is entity e, which has N, good?’ would be open, and likewise ‘Given that the use of 
‘good’ by humans is causally regulated by natural property N, does entity e, which is good, have 
N?’ would also be open. CSN implies that these two questions would be closed, but as the Moral 
Twin Earth scenario attempts to demonstrate, it appears that they are open. Therefore, H&T argue 
that we should reject CSN. 
§2.5.2 Generalizing the Revised Open Question Argument 
H&T generalize this revised open question argument against any version of metaphysical 
naturalism (MN) of the same kind. As they note, CSN is only one version of a more general 
semantic thesis (1992a, p.167): 
SSN Synthetic semantic naturalism: Fundamental moral terms like ‘good’ have  
synthetic naturalistic definitions. (1992, p.167) 
H&T concede that there may yet be some form of SSN that would be able to meet the open 
question argument mounted from Moral Twin Earth, but according to them, Moral Twin Earth is: 
. . . more than a specific thought experiment directed at the specific semantic thesis CSN. 
It is, in addition, a recipe for thought experiments. For any potential version of SSN that 
might be proposed, according to which (i) moral terms bear some relation R to certain 
natural properties that collectively satisfy some specific normative moral theory T, and 
(ii) moral terms supposedly refer to the natural properties to which they bear this relation 
R, it should be possible to construct a Moral Twin Earth scenario suitably analogous to 
the one constructed above - i.e., a scenario in which twin-moral terms bear the same 
relation R to certain natural properties that collectively satisfy some specific normative 
theory T’, incompatible with T. The above reasoning against CSN should apply, mutatis 
mutandis, against the envisioned alternative version of SSN. (1992a, p.167) 
Therefore, H&T claim, Moral Twin Earth can be used to mount a generalized argument against 
SSN: “Questions analogous in form to [those sketched for CSN], for ‘good’ and for other moral 
terms, are open questions” (1992, p.167). 
§2.5.3 How to Explain Moral Twin Earth 
In closing, H&T briefly consider how we might explain our linguistic intuitions about 
Moral Twin Earth, once we have abandoned CSN or SSN more generally. What could be 
responsible for our intuition that an Earther and Twin Earther mean the same thing and genuinely 
disagree in spite of the stipulations about reference? H&T gesture at the kind of theory that might 
suffice to answer this question: 
Although this is not the place to elaborate such a theory, the sort of rationale any such 
theory might be expected to provide for our meaning intuitions can be briefly outlined as 
follows. (1) One of the defining characteristics of a moral code is that it performs an 
action-guiding role for members of the community in which it is in force. (2) This 
normative aspect thus amounts to a semantic constraint for interpreting the practices of a 
community as moral practices, and so is plausibly taken to be built in to the meaning of 
moral terms like ‘good’ and ‘right’. (3) This action-guiding, normative feature of the 
meanings of moral terms helps explain why our intuitions engaged by the Moral Twin 
Earth thought experiment go the way they do: essential to the meaning of moral terms 
like ‘good’ and ‘right’ is their action-guiding function, which both Earthian usage of 
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moral terms and twin Earthian usage of moral terms share. Hence, despite the fact that 
the use of moral terms by the two groups is regulated by different natural properties, the 
(orthographically identical) moral terms of the two groups mean the same, contrary to 
Boydian semantics and consistent with the results of reflection on [the questions posed 
from Moral Twin Earth, assuming CSN’s truth above]. (1992a, p.170) 
In the next sections and in the remainder of this dissertation, I extend this normativist explanation 
from H&T to a Meaning Twin Earth. I argue that a Meaning Twin Earth scenario generates 
intuitions at odds with dispositionalist accounts of meaning, including the recently popular a 
posteriori versions of dispositionalism. I claim that a revised open question argument, analogous 
to the one constructed by H&T, supports this challenge to dispositionalism, and that the best 
explanation of the relevant intuitions in the Meaning Twin Earth case proceeds via the claim that 
meaning is normative.22 
§2.6 Meaning Twin Earth 
Imagine that there exists a distant planet, which we will call ‘Meaning Twin Earth’. This 
Meaning Twin Earth is identical to Earth in most every way, including the fact that the inhabitants 
of this planet, Twin Earthers, engage in a linguistic practice of ascribing linguistic understanding 
to speakers and meaning to their utterances. They use expressions like ‘means bicycle’ in “Greg 
means bicycle by ‘bicycle’” to express judgments of this sort. This practice is very much like the 
one that we are familiar with on Earth with respect to the English language. Meaning Twin Earth 
is so similar in fact that if a group of Earthers were to visit Twin Earth, they would be disposed 
to translate the Twin English ‘means’ to be identical in meaning to the orthographically identical 
English term ‘means’ on account of these terms having the same role in the practices of each 
community. 
In spite of the outward appearance that meaning ascription works exactly the same on 
Twin Earth as it does on Earth, there is one key difference that sets the two planets apart: The use 
of the English term ‘means’ as it pertains to Earther meaning ascriptions is causally regulated by 
natural (functional) properties that are best captured by a communitarian theory of meaning, Tco, 
whereas the use of the Twin English term ‘means’ as it pertains to Twin Earther meaning 
ascriptions is causally regulated by natural (functional) properties that are best captured by an 
individualist theory of meaning, Tin.23 This difference in the regulation of meaning-ascribing 
predicates between the two populations is generated by certain discrepancies in the psychological 
makeup of Earthers and Twin Earthers. As a result of these basic differences, the two populations 
each have robust justifications for why the relevant properties govern their meaning ascriptions, 
                                                     
22 For an attempt to use Twin Earth style considerations to provide evidence that the concept of belief is 
normative, see Miller and Kalantari (2016). 
23 Roughly, the communitarian theory may be along the lines of those developed by Kripke (1982) or 
Wright (1980), while the individualist theory may be along the lines of that defended in Blackburn (1984) 
or Wee (2016). 
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i.e. their uses of the term ‘means’ in English and Twin English.24 Earthers claim that what a 
speaker means by a certain expression is primarily determined by the dictates of that speaker’s 
linguistic community, whereas Twin Earthers claim that what a speaker means by a certain 
expression is primarily determined by the dictates of that speaker’s idiolect. 
The same degree of importance is placed in both theories on what counts as a speaker’s 
meaning something by his expressions, though the two theories depart from one another with 
respect to the features that are central and peripheral in determining meaning. The Earthers take 
it that conformity to the standards set by a community are more central, whereas the Twin Earthers 
take it that conformity to the standards set by a speaker him or herself are more central. These 
two theories come apart in some challenging examples. In some cases, Earthers may be disposed 
to judge that a lifelong solitary speaker cannot mean something by his or her words (e.g. on 
account of the absence of a linguistic community), whereas Twin Earthers may be disposed to 
judge that such a speaker can indeed mean something by his or her words (e.g. on account of their 
having some system for applying expressions devised by the speaker him or herself). They would, 
as such, use the English ‘means’ and Twin English ‘means’ in light of these considerations. For 
example, an Earther may express his view ‘Smith does not mean addition by the ‘plus’ sign’ and 
the Twin Earther might say ‘Smith does mean addition by the ‘plus’ sign’. 
§2.6.1 Robinson Crusoe 
Suppose that on Earth there is a man, Robinson Crusoe, who is the sole inhabitant of an 
isolated island. Crusoe has never had contact with any other human beings and moreover has 
inhabited the island since very soon after his birth. Against all odds, the young Crusoe survived a 
shipwreck and washed ashore unharmed. Suppose that Crusoe has a system for identifying 
blackberries, a staple of his diet, whereby he exclaims his Crusoean term ‘blackberry’ whenever 
he encounters such a berry. So whenever Crusoe encounters a berry with a certain outward 
appearance, he reports ‘Blackberry!’.25 
Suppose that a Twin Earther visits Earth and learns of Crusoe’s existence. This Twin 
Earther and one of the Earthers are able to actively observe Crusoe—perhaps by using a telescope 
and a directional microphone aboard a vessel near the island. The two observe him together and 
come to exchange their views on the puzzling behaviour of Crusoe. The Twin Earther engages 
the Earther on the topic of whether Crusoe means anything by his words. He says to the Earther, 
“Crusoe means blackberry by ‘blackberry’” and the Earther responds to him thus, “Crusoe does 
not mean blackberry by ‘blackberry’”. Naturally, the Earther uses his term for meaning ascription, 
                                                     
24 The precise source of these psychological differences is unimportant, but if necessary we could take them 
to be whatever differences incline actual communitarians and individualists to their respective views. 
25 The literature on rule-following and private language is rife with Crusoe cases such as this. Wittgenstein 
is credited with coining the first case of this kind in the Investigations. Kripke briefly mentions such a case 
in his discussion of the sceptical solution and refers to Ayer and Rhees’ extended discussion of the topic. 
See Kripke (1982), p.110, Ayer and Rhees (1954). See also Baker and Hacker (1985), p.160. A more recent 
discussion can be found in Hacker (2010). 
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the English term ‘means’, as it relates to his communitarian theory of meaning to convey his 
sentiments about Crusoe, while the Twin Earther uses his term for meaning ascription, the Twin 
English ‘means’, as it relates to his individualist theory of meaning to convey his sentiments about 
Crusoe. 
§2.6.2 How to Explain Meaning Twin Earth 
Two options are available for explaining Meaning Twin Earth and the difference between 
the Earther and Twin Earthers’ use of their respective terms for meaning ascription: Either the 
two parties simply speak at cross purposes on account of the fact that their terms for meaning 
ascription, ‘means’ in English and ‘means’ in Twin English, refer to distinct functional properties 
and so mean different things; or on the other hand, the two parties genuinely disagree and as such 
mean the same thing by their terms for meaning ascription in English and Twin English. I argue 
that the latter assessment best captures our linguistic intuitions: our intuition in the above case is 
that the Earther and Twin Earther do indeed genuinely disagree. 
The Earther and Twin Earther of the Meaning Twin Earth are most plausibly viewed as 
disagreeing on account of the incompatible contents they express in their judgments about 
Crusoe’s meaning. The Earther claims that Crusoe cannot mean anything by his words, whereas 
the Twin Earther claims that Crusoe can mean something by his words. The two parties disagree 
about whether Crusoe means something or nothing at all on account of the different theories that 
regulate ascriptions of meaning. So, despite the fact that Earthers and Twin Earthers use their 
terms for meaning ascription to refer to different theoretical properties, this fact does not 
apparently compromise the intuition that the two disagree.26 We can flesh the scenario a little 
more as follows. 
The Earther and Twin Earther fundamentally disagree about whether there is any room 
for a distinction between what seems right and what is right vis-a-vis Crusoe’s use of the term 
‘blackberry’. The Earther contends that Crusoe does not mean anything by ‘blackberry’ (or indeed 
any of his other expressions) on account of the fact that, according to the Earther, meaning is 
determined by the dictates of a speaking community—something that Crusoe does not have 
access to. Consequently, the Earther argues that there can be no distinction between what seems 
right and what is right for Crusoe in his use of the expression ‘blackberry’. Crusoe cannot mean 
anything by ‘blackberry’ because there is no room to draw this distinction and thus there is no 
sense in which we can reasonably speak of his uses of the expression ‘blackberry’ as being either 
                                                     
26 It may be objected that the Earther could concede in some peripheral cases of meaning ascription, like 
Crusoe’s, that an individual’s idiolect is sufficient for meaning (even if in general the more central cases 
are up to communal considerations). This is unlikely given that communitarian views of meaning are 
motivated by examples like Crusoe’s. The Earther may admit that speaker intentions are pertinent in some 
more ordinary examples. Nonetheless, according to him, communal checks are the crucial ones in 
determining meaning. In Crusoe’s case, where no communal check on meaning is present due to the absence 
of any speaking community whatsoever, the Earther is apt to judge that we cannot plausibly view Crusoe 
as saying anything with a determinate meaning. 
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correct or incorrect. The Twin Earther argues that Crusoe does mean something by his words and 
claims that there is room for the requisite distinction between what seems right and what is right 
for Crusoe. The Twin Earther perhaps emphasizes Crusoe’s system for identifying blackberries 
that have a particular colour and shape, something he has written down for himself and refers to 
every time he believes he has encountered one—and thus exclaims ‘Blackberry!’. According to 
the Twin Earther, this system is sufficient for the distinction between what seems right and what 
is right for Crusoe in that Crusoe could, on occasion, make a mistake and correct himself by using 
his system for reporting berries he can eat. There is room, on the Twin Earthers view, to judge 
that Crusoe has applied the expression ‘blackberry’ correctly or incorrectly in light of this system. 
§2.6.3 Meaning and Normativity 
I suggest that the best characterization of Meaning Twin Earth centres on the difference 
in normative positions that the Earther and Twin Earther accept. As such, Meaning Twin Earth 
may provide an interesting new argument for the normativity of meaning if this thesis constitutes 
the best explanation, as in the case of Moral Twin Earth, of why our intuitions fail to match 
Putnam’s case. The normativist may have a ready explanation for this in that, according to him, 
‘means’ plays the same evaluative role in English and Twin English. In this respect, meaning 
ascription plays an analogous role to the kind of moral evaluation at the centre of the Moral Twin 
Earth dispute. So the suggestion might be like its cousins in moral discourse, ‘means’ is essentially 
normative. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that if Earthers and Twin Earthers were to discover the 
difference in theory that underlies their use of meaning ascription, the two would persist in 
disagreeing. 
§2.7 Conclusion 
 In this chapter I considered whether a classical or revised version of Moore’s open 
question argument could apply in a convincing way against modern a posteriori versions of 
semantic dispositionalism. I found that though the classical version of the argument fails, a revised 
version the argument mounted from an analogue of H&T’s Moral Twin Earth scenario does 
potentially pose a genuine challenge to these dispositionalist theories. Although this argument 
may not a priori rule out dispositionalism as a theory of meaning, it may yet provide a serious 
challenge to dispositionalism if a normativist explanation best captures our intuitions about a 
Meaning Twin Earth scenario. Fleshing out this line of thought will be the task of the remainder 
of this dissertation. In Chapters Three, Four, and Five I counter some prominent objections that 
might be raised against the use of Moral Twin Earth style arguments before returning to the 
question, in Chapter Six, of the shape of a normativist explanation of the relevant linguistic 
intuitions. 
  






Chapter Three: Plunkett and Sundell on ‘Metalinguistic Negotiation’ 
 
§3.1 Introduction 
This chapter evaluates a potential objection to the Meaning Twin Earth argument based 
on an argument devised by Plunkett and Sundell (2013). According to Plunkett and Sundell, some 
recent arguments from disagreement, including the Moral Twin Earth argument devised by 
Horgan and Timmons (H&T), rest on the allegedly dubious premise that all genuine 
disagreements are canonical disputes—disputes in which speakers literally express conflicting 
contents (beliefs, propositions, or attitudes). Plunkett and Sundell argue that some disagreements 
are expressed non-canonically; sometimes the immediate topic of a dispute is expressed non-
literally, e.g. by implicature. In the most dramatic examples of non-canonical dispute, the topic 
of disagreement is what the terms used in communicating that dispute ought to mean, i.e. about 
whether they ought to denote one set of properties or another. Plunkett and Sundell call these 
cases ‘metalinguistic negotiations’ and count Moral Twin Earth as showcasing this kind of dispute. 
I argue that even if Moral Twin Earth can be plausibly viewed as a metalinguistic negotiation 
(over what properties ‘good’ ought to denote), Meaning Twin Earth cannot be viewed in this way. 
In the next sections I outline Plunkett and Sundell’s argument against the shared meaning 
thesis cited above and detail how the Moral Twin Earth argument can be blocked by viewing the 
focal dispute of that scenario as a metalinguistic negotiation. I attempt to apply this same objection 
to Meaning Twin Earth but ultimately find that this scenario constitutes a limit case for Plunkett 
and Sundell’s method—a Plunkett and Sundell style objection cannot be convincingly applied 
against Meaning Twin Earth. 
§3.2 Plunkett and Sundell: Shared Meaning and Disagreement 
In their 2013, David Plunkett and Tim Sundell criticize a popular argumentative strategy 
in contemporary metaethics, which they call the ‘shared meaning strategy’ or ‘SMS’. This 
strategy is based on the principle that speakers who genuinely disagree must mean the same thing 
by key terms used in conveying that disagreement. According to Plunkett and Sundell, arguments 
by Hare (1952), Smith (1994), and Horgan and Timmons (1992a) follow this pattern: 
In each of these cases, theorists take there to be a tight link between the fact that two 
speakers genuinely disagree with each other and the facts about what the respective 
speakers mean by their words. In cases where speakers are imagined to mean different 
things by their words (whether in virtue of ambiguity or difference in external 
environment or contextual variation), the worry is that the two speakers could not 
genuinely disagree with each other. To account for the purported datum that the two 
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speakers do genuinely disagree with each other, each theorist argues that we should take 
the speakers to mean the same things by the words they use in that exchange. (2013, p.6) 
This link between disagreement and meaning is motivated by the collective intuition that certain 
verbal disputes appear to evince genuine disagreement. 
According to Plunkett and Sundell, the standard way to understand two speakers as 
genuinely disagreeing begins by supposing that those “speakers disagree over the literally 
expressed content of what they are saying. Insofar as one views content in terms of propositions, 
this will amount to thinking that the speakers disagree about the truth of the propositions that they 
literally express” (2013, p.6). Such a dispute, in which speakers disagree about the truth or 
correctness of the content they literally express, can be called a canonical dispute. If a dispute is 
canonical, one can reasonably conclude that speakers engaged in that dispute mean the same thing 
by their words: 
If it is true that a dispute is canonical, this lends powerful support to the conclusion that 
the speakers mean the same things by the words they use in that exchange. Why? Because 
if speakers meant different things by their words, then they would be very unlikely to 
express inconsistent contents. Hence, from the assumption that a dispute is canonical, one 
is in a reasonably good position to conclude that, insofar as speakers in that exchange use 
the same words, those speakers mean the same things by those words. (2013, p.7) 
The general pattern of this argumentative strategy, the shared meaning strategy (SMS), takes at 
least four steps to show that a target semantic theory is implausible: 
1. Introduce an actual or imagined dispute between two speakers, A and B, that yields the 
general intuition that A and B genuinely disagree. In the course of that dispute, A and B 
use some key term ‘t’ to convey their dispute (where ‘t’ is used, not mentioned). 
2. Suppose that a target semantic theory is true. 
3. If the semantic theory from (2) is true, then A and B attach different meaning to ‘t’. 
4. If A and B attach different meaning to ‘t’, then (contrary to the intuition in (1)) A and B 
do not genuinely disagree. 
5. Therefore, the target semantic theory from (2) must be false.27 
The purpose of this strategy is to reject a metaethical theory by showing its underlying 
semantic theory to be false. The strategy does this by showing how a target semantic theory cannot 
vindicate the intuitive data in (1) for certain paradigm cases of apparently genuine moral 
disagreement. If the general aim of a metaethical theory is to explain the basic features of moral 
discourse and if moral disagreement is one such feature, then we can reasonably reject theories 
                                                     
27 Plunkett and Sundell sum up this shared meaning strategy in the following way: “Recall that the argument 
type we critique begins with the premise that a given dispute expresses genuine disagreement. From there, 
one argues (perhaps on inference to best explanation, perhaps on other grounds) that parties to the dispute 
literally express incompatible contents. In our terminology, one goes on to infer that the dispute is canonical. 
Finally, from the intermediate premise that the dispute is canonical, one can infer that parties to the dispute 
mean the same things by the relevant terms. (And from that conclusion, it follows that theories positing the 
relevant sort of variation in meaning—contextualism (variation in content only), ambiguity (variation in 
content because of variation in character), etc.—are false” (2013, p.12). 
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which cannot explain basic cases of apparent moral disagreement. This is how things generally 
go in the arguments outlined in the next three sections. 
§3.3 Hare: The Missionary and the Cannibals 
In his 1952, R.M. Hare argues that analytic ethical naturalism, which depends on a 
descriptivist moral semantics, is untenable. To show this, Hare introduces a now seminal thought 
experiment that, according to him, lends support to his so-called prescriptivist metaethical 
theory.28 
Hare envisions a missionary who visits an island of cannibals. The missionary, in 
attempting to give an enlightened moral education to the island’s inhabitants, quickly discovers 
that the cannibals use the word ‘good’ in ways that differ from the applications made by the 
missionaries. In particular, the cannibals apply ‘good’ to people who collect the most human 
scalps, where the missionary applies ‘good’ to people who are meek and mild. As such, the two 
use the word ‘good’ to express apparently contradictory moral judgments. The cannibals are in 
fact equally surprised by the missionary’s deviant use of the word ‘good’: 
[They] know that when he uses the word he is commending the person or object he applies 
it to. The only thing they find odd is that he applies it to such unexpected people, people 
who are meek and gentle and do not collect large quantities of scalps; whereas they 
themselves are accustomed to commend people who are bold and burly and collect more 
scalps than average. (1952, p.148) 
According to Hare, descriptivism is forced to draw the absurd conclusion that the missionary and 
cannibals do not mean the same by ‘good’. As such, we cannot understand the missionary and 
cannibals as having a genuine disagreement: 
If this were so, then when the missionary said that people who collected no scalps were 
good (English), and the cannibals said that people who collected a lot of scalps were good 
(cannibal), they would not be disagreeing, because in English (at any rate missionary 
English), “good” would mean among other things “doing no murder”, whereas in the 
cannibals’ language “good” would mean something quite different, among other things 
“productive of maximum scalps”. (1952, p.148-9) 
This theory must be false according to Hare, given that we believe two parties genuinely disagree 
when they apply the word ‘good’ in such radically different ways. Hare concludes that the 
missionary and the cannibals must mean the same thing by ‘good’ and moreover, that his 
prescriptivist theory can explain this result. If the meaning of ‘good’ is understood to express an 
imperative that can be universalized, then we can vindicate our intuitions about disagreement in 
the case Hare describes by viewing the missionary and cannibal as expressing incompatible 
universal prescriptions or imperatives (this involves treating ‘good’ as a normative term in the 
sense that judgments involving ‘good’ express prescriptions). 
                                                     
28 Hare introduces this theory in The Language of Morals (1952) and subsequently develops it in Freedom 
and Reason (1965), and Moral thinking: Its levels, method, and point (1981). 
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Suppose for example that the missionary and the cannibal come to speak about the late 
Mother Teresa, the 1979 Nobel Peace Prize winning Roman-Catholic missionary whose hospices 
sheltered and cared for victims of HIV, AIDS, tuberculosis, etc. The missionary informs the 
cannibals about Mother Teresa and her deeds. In due course, the missionary and the cannibals 
come to exchange their views about Mother Teresa: 
(1) (a) Mother Teresa is good. 
(b) Mother Teresa is not good. 
On a descriptivist view, the missionary and the cannibals simply speak past one another: The 
missionary expresses the judgment that Mother Teresa is meek and mild and the cannibals express 
the judgment that Mother Teresa does not collect as many scalps as possible. In this way, they 
express different beliefs but there is nothing incompatible about those beliefs on the descriptivist 
theory of meaning. Consequently, there is no sense in which the two genuinely disagree. 
On Hare’s view and for most people, the missionary and the cannibals genuinely disagree 
when they exchange A and B. Given their respective schemas for applying ‘good’ to people, the 
missionary and cannibals express incompatible judgments about Mother Teresa. The missionary, 
in making the judgment that Mother Teresa is good, commands us to be meek and mild, i.e. he 
conveys the universal prescription that being meek and mild (like Mother Teresa) is what 
everyone ought to do. The cannibals, in making the judgment that Mother Teresa is not good, 
commands us to collect as many scalps as possible, rather than be meek and mild, i.e. he conveys 
the universal prescription that collecting as many scalps, and not being meek and mild, is what 
everyone ought to do.29 Those universal prescriptions are fundamentally incompatible and cannot 
be co-executed. This explanation vindicates our intuition about disagreement between A and B, 
something that the descriptivist theory of meaning cannot capture. 
§3.4 Smith: Objectivity and the Pitfall of Moral Relativism 
The general pattern of argument targeted by Plunkett and Sundell (2013) also appears in 
Michael Smith’s argument for his own brand of moral realism in The Moral Problem (1994). 
Smith’s target in this argument is an a posteriori version of ethical naturalism which he calls 
‘non-definitional naturalism’.30 According to Smith, this naturalist view cannot explain moral 
disagreement as a feature of our moral phenomenology. Smith follows Hare’s argument in 
motivating this argument against non-definitional naturalism. 
Hare’s prescriptivism is designed to avoid the same fate of descriptivism, which as the 
missionary scenario purports to reveal, collapses into moral relativism—a thesis that is deeply at 
                                                     
29 The secondary purpose of the missionary’s words is to express his attitude of approbation toward Mother 
Teresa, who is doing what she should, being meek and mild (and not, among other things, collecting as 
many scalps as possible). Likewise, for the cannibals, the secondary purpose of their words is to express 
their attitude of disapprobation toward Mother Teresa, given that she is not doing what she should, i.e. 
collecting as many scalps as possible as she should be. 
30 Smith targets a moral theory similar to what we called ‘causal semantic naturalism’ in Chapter Two. 
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odds with moral phenomenology. On Smith’s view, the virtue of Hare’s theory is that it captures 
the objectivity of moral discourse.31 Hare is able to explain how our moral judgments are not 
merely relativistic and as such, he can explain our intuition that people genuinely disagree about 
moral matters. Descriptivism cannot capture these same features: 
If descriptive accounts of the meaning of ‘good’ and ‘right’ make our moral judgments 
inescapably relativistic, and non-descriptive accounts don't, then we surely have good 
reason to reject the idea that our moral judgments are descriptive. For such a relativism 
flouts core platitudes about moral disagreement; platitudes about the objectivity of 
morality (see also Brink, 1989, p.24, 29-35; though contrast Harman, 1985).32 (1994, p.35) 
Any adequate moral semantics cannot allow disagreement to collapse into relativism, i.e. such 
that speakers in moral dispute merely speak past one another. Metaethical theorists… 
. . . must make sure that moral claims do not turn out to have different contents in different 
contexts. And yet this seems inevitable if they simply say that, for example, the word 
‘right’ is used to refer to the feature of acts that is causally responsible for our uses of the 
term ‘right’. For if the cause of A’s and B’s uses of the word ‘right’ are not the same, 
then contrary to the platitude that if A says ‘x is right’ and B says ‘x is not right’ then A 
and B disagree, A and B are not disagreeing. A’s judgment that x is right has a different 
content from B’s judgment that x is right. (1994, p.35) 
Here Smith mounts the argument from disagreement against metaphysical but non-definitional 
naturalism. According to Smith, this version of ethical naturalism fares no better than its analytic 
descriptivist ancestor given that its underlying semantic theory forces the absurd conclusion that 
A and B do not genuinely disagree. 
§3.5 Horgan and Timmons: Moral Twin Earth 
As we saw in Chapter Two, Horgan and Timmons (1992a) claim that a revised open 
question argument is effective against the modern a posteriori versions of synthetic ethical 
naturalism popular today. According to them, an analogue of Putnam’s Twin Earth scenario, 
Moral Twin Earth, supports their contention: our intuitions about this scenario are incompatible 
with those about Putnam’s original scenario, contrary to the tenets of a modern naturalist semantic 
theory for moral terms—-what we called ‘causal semantic naturalism’ or ‘CSN’ in Chapter Two. 
On account of this mismatch, H&T conclude that moral terms like ‘good’ cannot be plausibly 
                                                     
31 Smith outlines a complete list of constraints for any adequate metaethical theory. See Smith 1994, p.127. 
The objectivity of moral judgment is the first of five constraints he lists here. 
32  Smith’s reasoning here matches Horgan and Timmons’ comments on moral phenomenology and 
relativism in “Morality without Moral Facts” (2006). According to Horgan and Timmons (2006), any 
tenable metaethical theory must account for the basic features of moral phenomenology. They embody this 
in the Moral Phenomenology Criterion (MPC), which states “A metaethical theory ought, if possible, to 
account for and vindicate as many of the deeply embedded aspects of moral thought and moral discourse–
the phenomena of morality–as possible” (2006, p.223). One of the key features of moral thought and 
discourse is moral disagreement, which Horgan and Timmons capture in a platitude they call MP3: “There 
can be genuine, deep moral disagreements—including disagreements between people over fundamental 
moral assumptions and principles” (2006, p.223).  According to Horgan and Timmons, moral relativism is 
untenable because it cannot accommodate the disagreement as a feature of (broadly-speaking) moral 
phenomenology, i.e. MP3: “The trouble with relativism, we maintain, is that it cannot make good sense of 
moral disagreements–disagreements that cannot be explained as disagreements about the non-moral facts 
of the case” (2006, p.228). 
   
 
52 
viewed as possessing a meaning in line with a Putnam-style naturalist analysis. Moral terms do 
not behave like their natural kind counterparts. This argument follows the format embodied in 
SMS above. This is revealed by the fact that they think two explanations of Moral Twin Earth are 
possible: 
Given all these assumptions and stipulations about Earth and Moral Twin Earth, what is 
the appropriate way to describe the differences between moral and twin-moral uses of 
‘good’ and ‘right’? Two hermeneutic options are available. On the one hand, we could 
say that the differences are analogous to those between Earth and Twin Earth in Putnam’s 
original example, to wit: the moral terms used by Earthlings rigidly designate the natural 
properties that causally regulate their use on Earth, whereas the twin-moral terms used 
by Twin Earthlings rigidly designate the distinct natural properties that causally regulate 
their use on Twin Earth; hence, moral and twin-moral terms differ in meaning, and are 
not intertranslatable. On the other hand, we could say instead that moral and twin-moral 
terms do not differ in meaning or reference, and hence that any apparent moral 
disagreements that might arise between Earthlings and Twin Earthlings would be genuine 
disagreements - i.e., disagreements in moral belief and in normative moral theory, rather 
than disagreements in meaning. (1992a, p.165) 
The second option captures our linguistic intuitions about the scenario—Earthers and 
Twin Earthers are best viewed as genuinely disagreeing and as such, the two must mean the same 
thing by ‘good’: 
We submit that by far the more natural mode of description, when one considers the 
Moral Twin Earth scenario, is the second. Reflection on the scenario just does not 
generate hermeneutical pressure to construe Moral Twin Earthling uses of ‘good’ and 
‘right’ as not translatable by our orthographically identical terms. (1992a, p.165) 
Our intuitions are simply different in the two scenarios. 
H&T go on to explain why ‘good’ and ‘right’ must be translatable between English and 
Twin English33, but the key assumption about the link between disagreement and shared meaning, 
SMS, is in place. If the Earther and Twin Earther mean different things by ‘good’ then they could 
not genuinely disagree. We do think that they genuinely disagree, so they must mean the same 
thing by ‘good’.34 
                                                     
33 Chapter Two outlines how Horgan and Timmons take the best explanation of Moral Twin Earth to 
involve the normativity of moral terms. See §2.5.3. 
34 Like Hare, Horgan and Timmons ultimately advocate a version of ethical expressivism, which they call 
‘cognitivist expressivism’. They rely on the notion of incompatible ought-commitments in order to vindicate 
the intuition that Earthers and Twin Earthers genuinely disagree. In their case, the literally expressed 
content of a moral judgment is an ought-commitment, something than is incompatible with the 
implementation of some other ought-commitments. So in a move that is very similar to Hare, they say that 
some ought-commitments cannot be co-executed. For instance, if being ‘good’ amounts to an ought-
commitment to “be meek, mild, and not murder people,” then one could not also “collect as many scalps 
as possible.” If ‘good’ amounts to an ought-commitment to “collect as many scalps as possible,” then one 
could not also “be meek, mild, and not murder people.” For Hare, one could not universally prescribe both 
“collect as many scalps as possible” and ‘be meek, mild, and not murder people,” so ‘good’ (on the 
corresponding moral semantic theory) cannot be consistently applied to both someone who collects as many 
scalps as possible and to someone else who is meek, mild, and does not murder people. 
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§3.6 Plunkett and Sundell: Disagreement and Literally Expressed 
Content 
Plunkett and Sundell claim that the shared meaning strategy (SMS) depends on the false 
assumption that all genuine disagreements are canonical disputes—disputes in which speakers 
conflict over the literally expressed content of what they are saying. Some genuine disagreements 
are in fact non-canonical disputes—disputes in which speakers do not literally express conflicting 
contents: 
We argue that speakers can, and often do, genuinely disagree with each other even while 
in the disputes reflecting those disagreements, those speakers do not mean the same things 
by their words. (2013, p.3) 
According to Plunkett and Sundell, an alternative strategy can better explain disagreement in 
some cases of this sort: 
Taking a dispute to be canonical is not always the best—let alone only—non-debunking 
explanation of the intuition of genuine disagreement. There are many instances of non-
canonical disputes—disputes that do not center on literally expressed content—that 
nevertheless express genuine disagreement. Non-canonical disputes that express genuine 
disagreements are, in fact, pervasive. And one type of non-canonical dispute in 
particular—what we call a metalinguistic negotiation—is not only capable of expressing 
genuine disagreement, but is, we argue, particularly plausible as an analysis of many 
normative and evaluative disputes. (2013, p.7) 
This strategy does not make the false assumption that SMS stands on and, as such, can explain 
the non-canonical examples of genuine disagreement. This strategy focuses on the functions that 
speakers take their words to denote. 35  According to Plunkett and Sundell, some genuine 
disagreements are non-canonical precisely because speakers disagree at the metalinguistic level, 
about the function that a word ought to denote. These disputes are best explained when viewed as 
metalinguistic negotiations—disputes in which speakers use words the way they do in part to 
communicate how they think those words ought to be used. 
§3.6.1 Some Disagreements are Non-Canonical Disputes 
Plunkett and Sundell claim that some disputes are cases in which speakers genuinely 
disagree even though they do not literally express incompatible contents. Indeed, according to 
them, some rather ordinary examples of non-canonical dispute are cases in which speakers 
literally express compatible contents. Take for example the following dispute: 
(2) (a) There is one proton in the nucleus of a helium atom. 
 (b) No, there are two protons in the nucleus of a helium atom. 
Taken literally, (2a) and (2b) do not express incompatible contents. There are exactly two 
protons in the nucleus of a helium atom—so strictly-speaking (2a) and (2b) are both true. 
                                                     
35 Plunkett and Sundell use the word ‘concept’, but this term is imprecise: ‘concept’ could refer to either 
items at the level of sense or items at the level of reference. I choose to use ‘function’, given that Plunkett 
and Sundell mean to use this term to refer to items at the level of reference. 
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Intuitively though, the two disagree. So how could these two speakers be viewed as disagreeing 
if they literally express compatible contents? According to Plunkett and Sundell, the two disagree 
on account of the incompatible contents (beliefs) they express non-literally, i.e. by implicature. 
The two genuinely disagree—and presumably they understand one another perfectly well to be 
disagreeing—but the root of their disagreement is implied, not literally expressed, in the exchange. 
They disagree in virtue of the non-literally expressed content expressed by (2a) and (2b): 
The parties to the dispute in (2) disagree in virtue of the fact that the speaker of (2a) 
believes that there is exactly one proton in the nucleus of a helium atom, while the speaker 
of (2b) believes that there are exactly two protons in the nucleus of a helium atom. They 
not only believe those propositions, but they also communicate them, and therefore 
correctly perceive themselves to disagree with each other. (2013, p.12) 
So, despite the fact that (2a) and (2b) literally express compatible contents, the speakers 
nonetheless communicate incompatible contents, albeit non-literally. In this respect, (2) 
constitutes a genuine disagreement. 
According to Plunkett and Sundell, we can best capture what it is for two speakers to 
genuinely disagree by the lights of a general principle, Disagreement Requires Conflict in Content 
(DRCC), which states: 
If two subjects A and B disagree with each other, then there are some objects p and q 
(propositions, plans, etc.) such that A accepts p and B accepts q, and p is such that the 
demands placed on a subject in virtue of accepting it are rationally incompatible with the 
demands placed on a subject in virtue of accepting q. (Perhaps, though not necessarily in 
virtue of q entailing not-p.) (2013, p.11) 
The primary virtue of this principle is that it is agnostic about the content of moral judgment. So 
though Hare, Smith, and H&T each have their own views about the content of moral judgment, 
they can all accept a principle like DRCC. 
The special interest of the dispute in (2) above is that the two speakers engaged in that 
dispute do not literally express the incompatible contents that legitimate their dispute as a genuine 
disagreement. The two speakers express this disagreement non-literally, via implicature: The non-
literally expressed content of (2a) is the belief there is exactly one proton in the nucleus of a 
helium atom; the non-literally expressed content of (2b) is the belief there are exactly two protons 
in the nucleus of a helium atom. Hence the two really do genuinely disagree, but not at the level 
of literally expressed content (as SMS theorists suppose). 
The dispute in (2) delivers two important lessons about disagreement and meaning, 
according to Plunkett and Sundell. The first lesson is that we should be wary of the quick 
connection we commonly draw between disagreement and the canonical (or non-canonical) 
nature of a dispute. This connection is a dangerous one to make in that some non-canonical 
disputes might, as (2) purports to show, evince genuine disagreement: 
. . . [2] demonstrates the danger of assuming, based on the existence of disagreement, that 
the relevant dispute involves the literal (semantic) expression of incompatible contents. 
In other words, it demonstrates that non-canonical disputes can reflect genuine 
disagreements. And the types of non-canonical disputes that can do so—disputes centered 
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on information conveyed via implicature (or presupposition, or connotation, or a host of 
other communicative mechanisms)—are hardly exotic to philosophers of language. This 
by itself is enough to block especially quick or simplistic instances of inferences of shared 
meaning from facts of disagreement. (2013, p.13) 
So one take-away message from (2) is that our intuitions about genuine disagreement do not 
necessarily track cases of canonical dispute.36  Indeed, many cases of non-canonical dispute 
similar to (2) are cases in which speakers disagree even though they literally express compatible 
contents. 
 The second lesson to learn from (2) is that two questions are often conflated by theorists: 
1. Is dispute x a genuine disagreement? 
2. How is the content of that disagreement expressed in dispute x, i.e. are the contents 
literally expressed in dispute x incompatible? 
SMS proponents are committed to running these two together. First, the intuition that 
dispute x is genuine is vindicated by the fact that the speakers engaged in x—say A and B—
express different contents. Second, the content of that disagreement is literally expressed. If it 
was not literally expressed, we could hardly understand A and B as genuinely disagreeing, 
according to SMS theorists. According to Plunkett and Sundell, this is a serious mistake on the 
part of these theorists. Any disagreement principle based around incompatible content… 
. . . will entail that for a dispute to express a genuine disagreement, there must be some 
stable subject matter over which the parties disagree. But intuitively, questions about 
whether there is a stable subject matter have nothing to do with the linguistic question of 
whether competing claims about that subject happen to be communicated semantically or 
pragmatically. This intuition is precisely correct, and (2) offers a clear case of how the 
two issues come apart. (2013, p.13) 
In this way, (2) already reveals the danger in drawing quick semantic conclusions from our 
intuitions about certain disagreements.37 
§3.6.2 Metalinguistic Disputes 
Plunkett and Sundell explain that some disputes are non-canonical because speakers 
mean different things by their words. The most obvious examples of this are cases in which 
speakers use words that mean different things in different contexts, i.e. words with context-
sensitive meanings. Take for instance the word ‘tall’. Whether the word ‘tall’ is correctly applied 
to someone is partly determined by whether, for instance, one is speaking about philosophy 
academics or professional basketball players. I say ‘partly’ because: 
                                                     
36 Our intuitions about genuine disagreement might predominantly track cases of canonical dispute, but the 
point here is that there is nothing analytic about this connection. The link between our intuitions about 
disagreement and the canonical nature of certain disputes is a synthetic connection, i.e. one settled by 
explanatory considerations. Theorists who deploy SMS assume the connection is a priori and necessary—
if a dispute is genuine, then it must be canonical. 
37 It may be important to underscore at this juncture that the case described by Plunkett and Sundell in (2) 
is non-canonical because the conflicting content is conveyed by implicature and not literally expressed. 
There is no further reason to suspect that the two mean different things by their words. This itself suggests 
that SMS stands on shaky ground. 
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For the contextualist about this type of expression, the “meaning” of the word does not 
vary in one sense—it has the same character across contexts. But in another important 
sense, the meaning of the word is variable—it picks out different properties (and thus has 
different contents) in different contexts. (2013, p.13) 
So whether a particular person can correctly be called ‘tall’ in a particular context is determined 
by what counts as being tall in light of that context. Someone who can be called ‘tall’ by 
philosophy academic standards may not be ‘tall’ by professional basketball player standards. In 
speaking under the two circumstances, whether one is correct or incorrect in applying the word 
‘tall’ is up to the parameter for tallness in a given context. I might count as ‘tall’ by philosophy 
academic standards, but not by professional basketball player standards. If we have a grasp of 
how this parameter is set, according to Plunkett and Sundell, then we can know how things stand 
in that context given how the word ‘tall’ is used: 
. . . if, for example, we know the threshold for “tallness”—then sentences involving 
expressions like ‘tall’ can provide us with useful information about the heights of people 
and objects around us. There is no reason at all, however, that things cannot work in 
precisely the reverse direction. If we can hold the relevant height facts constant, then 
expressions involving gradable adjectives like ‘tall’ can provide us with useful 
information about the context. The latter kind of usage is described in Barker (2002), who 
calls it a sharpening or metalinguistic usage of a term. (2013, p.13) 
Barker (2002) offers an example of this kind of metalinguistic usage: 
Normally, [3] will be used in order to add to the common ground new information38 
concerning Feynman’s height: 
[3] Feynman is tall. 
But [3] has another mode of use. Imagine that we are at a party. Perhaps Feynman stands 
before us a short distance away, drinking punch and thinking about dancing; in any case, 
the exact degree to which Feynman is tall is common knowledge. You ask me what counts 
as tall in my country. “Well,” I say, “around here, ...” and I continue by uttering [3]. This 
is not a descriptive use in the usual sense. I have not provided any new information about 
the world, or at least no new information about Feynman's height. In fact, assuming that 
[‘tall’] means roughly ‘having a maximal degree of height greater than a certain 
contextually supplied standard’, I haven’t even provided you with any new information 
about the [satisfaction conditions] of the word [‘tall’]. All I have done is given you 
guidance concerning what the prevailing relevant standard for tallness happens to be in 
our community; in particular, that standard must be no greater than Feynman’s maximal 
degree of height.39 (2013, p.14) 
                                                     
38 I understand Barker here to mean the common ground of information that is accessible to all speakers 
engaged in the conversation. The speakers engaged in the discussion are deciding about whether Feynman 
can be called ‘tall’ in the present conversational context. Whether he can be called ‘tall’ or not is determined 
by the information collated from all speakers engaged in that conversation. Given that information, they 
can decide on a relevant standard for height (in that context) and then say whether he meets that standard 
or not, i.e. whether he can be called ‘tall’ or not. So, what Barker means here by ‘common ground’ is likely 
just shared conversational context. 
39 I have tried to clear up any confusion between use and mention here by using tall and ‘tall’ as appropriate. 
I also replaced ‘truth conditions’ with ‘satisfaction conditions’, given that the latter is more accurate to what 
Barker means to say, i.e. he means to say something about the relevant conditions under which ‘tall’ can 
be correctly applied. 
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Plunkett and Sundell suggest that we extend Barker’s example to a case where speakers disagree 
about the contextually appropriate usage of the word ‘tall’: 
In his (2002), Barker does not consider cases where speakers disagree about the 
information communicated by this type of usage. But it is easy to see how his example 
could be extended in that way. After all, another party to the conversation might simply 
object and say “no, Feynman is not tall”. Just as the original utterance conveyed 
information not about Feynman’s height but rather the appropriate usage of ‘tall’, so too 
would the ensuing dispute be a matter not of factual disagreement over Feynman’s height, 
but rather opposing views about the contextually appropriate usage of ‘tall’. Barker uses 
‘metalinguistic’ to refer to the type of sharpening use at play here. Accordingly, we call 
the corresponding disputes over the correctness or appropriateness of those types of 
usages metalinguistic disputes. (2013, p.14) 
For this extension of Barker’s case, there are widely-settled facts about whether it would be 
appropriate to call Feynman ‘tall’ in various contexts. The disagreement in this case is about the 
contextually appropriate usage of ‘tall’ and whether indeed Feynman’s height counts as ‘tall’ in 
light of this standard, i.e. what standard for tallness is appropriate under that context). The relevant 
facts about Feynman—his height, the average height of people in various regions, and so on—are 
fixed. So the dispute over which characterization is best is a disagreement that would be settled 
relatively straightforwardly, e.g. by the average height in the room. In other cases, things are not 
so easy. Some metalinguistic disputes are cases in which speakers (at least in part) disagree about 
the parameters that ought to govern the propositions expressed in a dispute. Plunkett and Sundell 
call such cases ‘metalinguistic negotiations’ and offer a few examples that evince this kind of 
dispute. 
§3.6.3 Metalinguistic Negotiation 
 The first example of metalinguistic negotiation that Plunkett and Sundell introduce 
imagines two speakers—Oscar and Callie—who, in cooking a meal together, come to exchange 
the following words about a chili they are preparing for a dinner party: 
 (4) (a) That chili is spicy! 
  (b) No, it’s not spicy at all. 
According to Plunkett and Sundell, the relevant parameter for spicyness is not antecedently settled. 
The most natural way to understand Oscar and Callie’s dispute is not in terms of “advancing 
competing factual claims about some independently determined threshold,” but rather as 
negotiating about what that threshold should be under the circumstances—they want to settle on 
an appropriate level of spice, one that is amenable to the collective palate of the dinner guests 
(2013, p.15). So what makes Oscar and Callie’s dispute a genuine disagreement is that they 
disagree about the parameters for spicyness that ought to govern the use of the term ‘spicy’. Much 
hinges on this disagreement in that whether the chili counts as ‘spicy’ or not has practical 
implications for whether they ought to add more spice or not: 
For Oscar and Callie, as for many of us, an agreement amongst all the cooks in the kitchen 
that the chili can be described as “spicy” plays an important role in collective decision-
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making. In particular, it plays an important role in decision-making about whether to add 
more spice. This may have nothing at all to do with what is analytic about ‘spicy’. Rather, 
it derives from sociological facts about how people in kitchens act when their creations 
earn that label. Why should Callie have to refrain from further seasoning when the chili 
cannot even be described as “spicy”? (2013, p.15) 
Intuitively, Oscar and Callie genuinely disagree and the best explanation of this intuition, Plunkett 
and Sundell say, is captured by viewing them as engaging in metalinguistic negotiation. The 
alternative view, which centres on incompatibility at the level of literally expressed content, 
cannot capture this intuition about Oscar and Callie given that the two do not express incompatible 
contents. Rather, the two disagree about the appropriate use of that term, given their competing 
understandings of what parameters ought to govern the use of the word ‘spicy’: 
Why are such exchanges perceived as disputes, when the speakers fail to assert 
inconsistent propositions—in fact via their assertion of those propositions—they also 
pragmatically advocate for the parameter settings by virtue of which those propositions 
are asserted. The claim that one “spicyness” threshold is preferable to some competing 
“spicyness” threshold is very much the kind of thing over which two speakers can 
disagree. (2013, p.15) 
To show this, Plunkett and Sundell suggest we imagine Oscar and Callie as having a 
straightforward canonical dispute about the same topic, in terms of two competing plans for going 
forward: 
(4) (Plan A) Use the word ‘spicy’ such that it does apply to their chili, or… 
(Plan B) Use the word ‘spicy’ such that it does not apply to their chili.40 
Oscar and Callie must decide, practically-speaking, which function ought to play the role of 
mapping the correct uses of the term ‘spicy’, and as such whether their chili is in the extension of 
that term.41  If the dispute is characterized this way, Oscar and Callie clearly have a genuine 
disagreement by the lights of the standard way of understanding disagreement, embodied in DRC  
(2013, p.16). Moreover, Plunkett and Sundell explain: 
. . . given the right context—for example, a context where we must coordinate our chili 
seasoning, or thermostat adjusting, or our basketball picks, or our progressive taxation 
brackets—such disagreements can be very much worth having. (2013, p.16) 
§3.6.4 Content and Character, Sense and Reference 
A key feature that the ‘spicy’ case shares with those glossed previously is that it centres 
on a term that is context-sensitive. In every case, what is up for debate is whether a word ought 
to denote one function or another, given two competing contextually-set parameters for the use 
                                                     
40 I use the notion of a plan in a broad and non-technical sense here. I do not commit to, for instance, 
Gibbard’s account of normative judgment as “plan-laden”, i.e. as in Gibbard (2012). 
41 This species of dispute is common, according to Plunkett and Sundell: “We think that metalinguistic 
disputes of [this type] are common. Indeed, we think such usages extend well beyond the kitchen, to 
disagreements about what should count as “tall” during our basketball draft, or “cold” in our shared office, 
or “rich” for our tax base. In any such case, speakers each assert true propositions, but they express those 
true propositions by virtue of the fact that they set the relevant contextual parameters in different ways.” 
(2013, p.15) 
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of that word. 42  As Plunkett and Sundell note, the preceding examples of metalinguistic 
negotiations are “concerned with ‘meaning’ in the sense of content, but not character” (2013, 
p.16). Plunkett and Sundell follow Kaplan (1989) in making this distinction. According to him, 
an expression has a meaning in a given context in two different senses. First, an expression has a 
meaning in virtue of its content, “what it picks out, relative to the context,” i.e. what Frege calls 
the reference of an expression (2013, p.8). Second, an expression has a meaning in virtue of its 
character, i.e. “its linguistically encoded, contextually invariant meaning” (2013, p.8). So far, we 
have looked at cases that involve terms that vary at the first level, at the level of content or 
reference. For example, recall the case about whether Feynman is ‘tall’. Suppose that two 
speakers use the term ‘tall’ to denote different heights, respective to the different average heights 
in their communities: 
. . . consider a contextualist view of ‘tall’ according to which speakers use the term to 
pick out different height-properties relative to a context. If such a view is right, then 
speakers in different contexts “mean” different things by the word in one sense [i.e. 
content or reference] but not another. In particular, for those speakers the word ‘tall’ has 
different contents, but nevertheless it has the same character: something like having a 
maximal degree of height greater than the contextually supplied standard. (2013, p.8-9) 
The idea of metalinguistic negotiation can explain these cases. We can readily view two speakers 
as genuinely disagreeing even if they use terms with different meanings at the level of character 
or sense.43 
§3.6.5 Negotiation Over Character, not Content 
Plunkett and Sundell argue that the idea of metalinguistic negotiation can capture some 
disputes in which speakers use terms to mean different things, given the different character they 
associate with their words. Plunkett and Sundell bring this out with an example described by Peter 
Ludlow in a 2008 paper in which two sports radio hosts engage in a heated debate over whether 
the racing horse Secretariat is an ‘athlete’ or not.44 The two express their sentiments at in the 
following simple exchange of words: 
 (5) (a) Secretariat is an athlete. 
 (b) Secretariat is not an athlete. 
In this case, it is unlikely for the dispute between the two hosts to be resolved by some fact about 
Secretariat. For example, we could not reasonably expect the dispute to be resolved by pointing 
out how fast Secretariat can run, or how many podium finishes he has achieved. In fact, Ludlow 
                                                     
42 I use the Fregean term ‘function’, though Plunkett and Sundell put this differently, in terms of “how to 
fix parameter settings for bits of context-sensitive terminology.” (2013, p.16) 
43 Plunkett and Sundell choose to follow Kaplan (1989), but qualify that they do not commit to his picture: 
“Our argument does not require us to endorse the specifics of Kaplan’s picture as against competing ones, 
such as those offered by Lewis or Stalnaker. Rather we use his terminology to mark the relevant distinctions 
where necessary, however those distinctions are ultimately to be understood.” (2013, p.8) 
44 See Ludlow (2008), p.118. 
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claims that we could suppose that the two hosts know everything there is to know about 
Secretariat and yet this knowledge would not settle their dispute. We could suppose that they… 
. . . mutually know all the facts about Secretariat’s speed, strength, etc., and what races, 
awards, medals he won, etc., just as Oscar and Callie mutually know all the facts about 
the chemical hotness of the chili (2013, p.16). 
In spite of knowing all this, it would be reasonable to expect the two to persist in disagreeing. The 
basic question, according to Plunkett and Sundell, is how we can account for this intuition about 
the dispute: How could the two genuinely disagree even though they mutually know all the facts? 
Plunkett and Sundell claim that we can preserve the intuition that the two radio hosts 
genuinely disagree about whether Secretariat is an athlete (despite knowing all the relevant facts) 
by viewing the two as disagreeing about the relevant character of the term ‘athlete’—something 
that they communicate in their dispute metalinguistically, rather than literally. So one way to 
preserve the intuition that (5) is a genuine disagreement is to start with how the two speakers are 
disposed to (or at least typically do) apply the term ‘athlete’. If we have this information, then we 
are likely to be in a good position to understand why the two conflict despite knowing all the facts 
about Secretariat. If the two categorically apply the word ‘athlete’ differently, this would explain 
their disagreement: 
Suppose then that one speaker, the speaker of (5a), systematically applies the term ‘athlete’ 
in such a way as to include non-human animals. The other speaker, the speaker of (5b), 
systematically applies the term ‘athlete’ in such a way as to never include non-human 
animals. This holds true even when all of the relevant factual information is on hand, 
including, as noted, the facts about Secretariat’s speed, strength, etc. (2013, p.16) 
If we know as much about the two, then we know the two are apt to mean different things by 
‘athlete’. Ludlow concludes just as much. According to him, the two radio hosts mean different 
things by ‘athlete’ because they disagree about the function that ‘athlete’ ought to denote, say 
athlete1 or athlete2, in that conversation: “What is at issue is how the term ‘athlete’ should be used 
in this context. In other words, the dispute is about the character of the expression ‘athlete’” 
(2013, p.17). According to the speaker of (5a), ‘athlete’ ought to denote function athlete1 that 
maps Secretariat to TRUE. According to the speaker of (5b), ‘athlete’ ought to denote function 
athlete2 that maps Secretariat to FALSE. The centre of their dispute is best captured as a kind of 
negotiation over two plans for going forward. Either accord with the interpretation of ‘athlete’ 
advanced by (5a), or accord with the interpretation of ‘athlete’ advanced by (5b): 
(5) (Plan A)  Make ‘athlete’ denote athlete1. 
(Plan B)  Make ‘athlete’ denote athlete2. 
In this respect, (5) is a sort of practical dispute about what to do, to make ‘athlete’ mean one thing 
or the other, and thus to apply ‘athlete’ to some things and not others, like Secretariat.45  
                                                     
45 Plunkett and Sundell classify similar disputes about concept choice under the heading ‘conceptual ethics’. 
According to them, a dispute falls under this heading just in case it centres on matters about how a term 
ought to be used, i.e. about what function (concept) a word ought to denote. In Ludlow’s case, the dispute 
centres on whether ‘athlete’ ought to denote one function or the other, but many philosophical debates have 
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Notice that insofar as the speakers of (5a) and (5b) use ‘athlete’ with different meaning 
(in terms of character), they both express true propositions. The important feature—the one that 
vindicates the intuition about disagreement—is the fact that they disagree about the appropriate 
characterization of ‘athlete’ under the circumstances, i.e. the one that ought to determine whether 
it would be correct or incorrect to apply the term ‘athlete’ to Secretariat (at least in the shared 
conversational context). On Ludlow’s view, the two “pragmatically advocate for the concept that 
they are using and in virtue of which they assert those propositions” (2013, p.17). In sum, the 
dispute between the two radio hosts counts as a genuine disagreement (in spite of their exhaustive 
shared knowledge about Secretariat) because the two disagree about whether ‘athlete’ ought to 
denote one function (athlete1) or another (athlete2) in that conversation. 
According to Plunkett and Sundell, Ludlow’s case is revealing for at least two reasons. 
First, the case is remarkably familiar: 
Many of us are familiar with disputes about whether Missouri is in the “midwest”, or 
whether Pluto is a “planet”, or whether the American federal anti-drug effort constitutes 
a “war”. In each case, the relevant facts—the location of Missouri, the size and orbit of 
Pluto, the contents of the relevant anti-drug policies—are mutually known among the 
parties to the dispute. And yet it seems that the disputes are, or at least have the potential 
to be, genuine disagreements in any plausible sense of the term ‘genuine disagreement’. 
It may not matter very much which states we choose to include in the midwest. But it can 
matter a great deal whether a policy is meant to address a social ill or advance our cause 
in a war. As in the case of Oscar and Callie’s debate about the “spicyness” of their chili, 
metalinguistic negotiations influence and advance more general processes of collective 
decision-making and action. (2013, p.17) 
Second, Ludlow’s case is revealing because it highlights the normative character of many similar 
disputes: 
It is likely that the reason why the two speakers bother to go in for this argument in 
conceptual ethics (an argument about how to use the term ‘athlete’) is because they 
ultimately have different normative views about how to live and what to do.46 In this case, 
perhaps the speakers have different normative views about what sorts of creatures are 
deserving of which sorts of recognition and rewards. One might therefore be tempted to 
ask: is this normative issue (rather than “merely linguistic” issue about how to use the 
word ‘athlete’) not really what their disagreement is about? (2013, p.17) 
Plunkett and Sundell grant that disputes are motivated by the background normative views that 
speakers have, and indeed, this background is often not expressed pragmatically or semantically 
by speakers when they converse with one another. Imagine for example that two people, Martha 
and George, are shopping for a car and come to argue over whether Subarus are good cars (2013, 
p.17). In this case, the exchange is motivated by a practical decision that Martha and George need 
to make. They need to decide what sort of car they ought to buy together. Plunkett and Sundell 
                                                     
a similar format, e.g. whether ‘good’ ought to denote a function in line with say, consequentialist or 
deontological ethical principles. An extended discussion of conceptual ethics can be found in a two-part 
publication by Alexis Burgess and David Plunkett in Philosophy Compass, titled “Conceptual Ethics I” and 
“Conceptual Ethics II” (2013). 
46 Where ‘normative’ is used broadly to cover both moral and non-moral cases, i.e. ‘normative’ here could 
be used to speak about a purely practical issue as well. 
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say that though this information is certainly relevant in that it explains how the two have arrived 
at the present dispute, it is not strictly-speaking the immediate topic of that dispute. The immediate 
topic is what makes a Subaru a good car in terms of some functional definition of ‘good car’, e.g. 
most reliable, most safe, or most horsepower, or whatever. In any case, what function they pick 
for ‘good car’ (i.e. what function ‘good car’ denotes) is up to them. Likewise, in the example 
Ludlow imagines, the background motivation behind the dispute about Secretariat is not the 
immediate topic of that dispute: 
In the case of Martha and George, we wouldn’t be required to build into the content that 
they express (pragmatically or semantically) the background conditions that explain why 
they are having this linguistic exchange. It would be just as mistaken to do so in the case 
of metalinguistic negotiations such as the Secretariat case. (2013, p.18) 
According to Plunkett and Sundell, the cases they describe share three key features: 
1. They are non-canonical: the speakers involved literally express mutually consistent 
contents. 
2. They are non-canonical in virtue of variation in meaning: the speakers express 
mutually consistent contents because they do not mean (in the relevant sense) the 
same things by their words. 
3. They nevertheless serve as expressions of genuine disagreement: the speakers 
involved do accept (and communicate) incompatible contents, and thus satisfy DRCC 
(2013, p.18). 
As such, the preceding examples, as examples of metalinguistic disputes: 
. . . demonstrate not only that speakers who genuinely disagree with each other need not 
literally express incompatible contents, but that they need not even mean the same things 
by their words. They might employ context-sensitive terms with the same character but 
with different contents, as with ‘spicy’. Or they might employ ordinary expressions with 
entirely distinct characters, as with ‘athlete’. (Of course, in the typical case, when the 
characters are distinct, the contents will be distinct as well.) Either way, the connection 
between genuine disagreement and sameness of meaning is broken. From the single 
premise that some linguistic exchange reflects a genuine disagreement between the 
speakers involved, nothing follows with respect to the semantics of the expressions 
employed in the exchange. (2013, p.18) 
§3.6.6 Normative Disputes 
Plunkett and Sundell claim that some normative or evaluative disputes, i.e. disputes that 
involve ought statements or categorical imperatives, can be best explained when viewed as 
metalinguistic negotiations. According to them, the case imagined by Ludlow about Secretariat 
glossed already is one such example. In this case, the dispute between the two radio hosts about 
whether the race horse Secretariat is an ‘athlete’ could plausibly be viewed as a kind of normative 
dispute. This is because ‘athlete’ functions as a normative or evaluative term (i.e. a “thick” 
normative concept) in that whether Secretariat is an athlete or not implies whether he deserves 
praise or not. 
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Ludlow’s case can be used as a model for detecting disputes that are metalinguistic 
negotiations. Any suitably similar case, according to them, should have two features in common: 
“(a) they would be taken to involve metalinguistic usage (a distinctive mechanism) and (b) they 
would be analysed as centring on a question of conceptual ethics (a distinctive normative topic 
[i.e. about what function a word ought to denote])” (2013, p.19).47 According to Plunkett and 
Sundell, at least two cases support their claim that the metalinguistic view can be extended to 
explain the normative or evaluative cases that metanormative theorists (Hare et. al.) are concerned 
with. 
Remember that, according to Plunkett and Sundell, the Moral Twin Earth argument 
advanced by H&T and other similar arguments depend on the assumption that all genuine 
disagreements are canonical disputes in which speakers use terms with the same meaning to 
literally express conflicting contents. On account of the counterexamples above, this assumption 
is on shaky ground: some disagreements are expressed non-literally, in non-canonical disputes. 
As such, it looks as though the move from disagreement to shared meaning is too quick. 
Nonetheless, there is one way that proponents of SMS might curb this worry. So far, we have 
only discussed non-normative disputes. The cases that SMS theorists are interested in are 
normative disputes—disputes that involve normative expressions like ‘morally right’ and ‘wrong’. 
Is there something special about these normative or evaluative cases that vindicates the 
assumption about shared meaning? 
§3.6.7 What counts as ‘torture’? 
 Let’s suppose that two speakers, Ben and Tracy, come to exchange their views about 
what practices they believe constitute torture. When they arrive at the topic of waterboarding, the 
two express their views in the following simple dispute: 
(6) (a) Waterboarding is torture. 
(b) Waterboarding is not torture. 
Ben and Tracy diverge in their functional definitions of torture. Ben, the speaker of (6a) “follows 
the United Nations in defining torture as any act inflicting severe suffering, physical or mental, 
                                                     
47 The reader may wonder if it needn’t be exhausted by (a) and (b). Couldn’t there be some underlying 
normative question that explains why the normative issue about concepts arises? Plunkett and Sundell’s 
example about whether Subarus are good cars is designed to address this worry. According to them, that 
dispute is motivated by a background normative issue, but this issue is not the immediate topic of that 
dispute. Plunkett clarifies this point using a slightly different example in a 2015 paper: 
First, there are the reasons why two speakers enter into a dispute, or, similarly, what reasons they 
have for pursuing it. Second, there is the immediate topic of disagreement. For example: suppose 
Anil and Seth are at the bike shop trying to figure out which bike Seth should buy. They are arguing 
about whether or not a bike at the store looks cool. They are arguing about this because they each 
have a view about which bike Seth should buy and so their argument is a way of arguing about 
that broader topic. But the immediate topic of disagreement is more limited: it is about whether 
the bike looks cool or not. With this in mind, return to my proposal about the Secretariat case. 
What Sundell and I propose is that the immediate topic of disagreement in the Secretariat case is 
the following normative issue: which concept should be used in this context, by being paired with 
the term ‘athlete’. (Plunket 2015, p.844-845) 
   
 
64 
in order to obtain information or to punish,” whereas Tracy, the speaker of (6b) “follows former 
U.S. Justice Department practice in defining torture as any such act inflicting pain rising to the 
level of death, organ failure, or the permanent impairment of a significant body function” (2013, 
p.19). Given their respective views on torture, Ben is disposed to use the word ‘torture’ as it 
applies to waterboarding among other practices, whereas Tracy is disposed to use the word 
‘torture’ as it applies to many practices, though not waterboarding. According to Plunkett and 
Sundell, even if we assume that Ben and Tracy mean quite different things by ‘torture’, there is 
still room to understand the two as genuinely disagreeing: 
Even if we suppose that the speakers mean different things by the word ‘torture’, it is 
clear that we have not exhausted the normative and evaluative work to be done here. After 
all, in the context of discussions about the moral or legal issues surrounding the treatment 
of prisoners, there is a substantive question about which definition is better. By 
employing the word ‘torture’ in a way that excludes waterboarding, the speaker of (6b) 
communicates (though not via literal expression) the view that such a usage is appropriate 
to those moral or legal discussions. In other words, she communicates the proposition 
that waterboarding itself is, in the relevant sense, unproblematic—a proposition that is, 
we submit, well worth arguing about. (2013, p.19) 
This case is suitably analogous to Ludlow’s case, according to Plunkett and Sundell, because it 
has two features in common. First, it would be reasonable to understand the two speakers, Ben 
and Tracy, as using ‘torture’ metalinguistically to express their conflicting beliefs about whether 
waterboarding is torture. Second, the two could be understood as engaging in conceptual ethics, 
given the conflict expressed in their metalinguistic use48 of the word ‘torture’. The topic that their 
dispute centres on is the question of whether ‘torture’ ought to denote Ben’s concept of torture, 
the function torture1, or Tracy’s concept of torture, torture2. With Ludlow’s case in mind, a 
detailed account of how this goes should be quite familiar. 
According to the speaker of (6a), ‘torture’ ought to denote function torture1 that maps 
waterboarding to TRUE. According to the speaker of (6b), ‘torture’ ought to denote function 
torture2 that maps waterboarding to FALSE. Given the different functions they use ‘torture’ to 
denote, the dispute between the two can be best understood as a negotiation over two plans for 
going forward—either accord with the interpretation of ‘torture’ advanced by (6a), or accord with 
the interpretation of ‘torture’ advanced by (6b): 
(6) (Plan A) Make ‘torture’ denote torture1. 
(Plan B) Make ‘torture’ denote torture2. 
Like Ludlow’s case, (6) is a practical dispute about what to do, to make ‘torture’ mean one thing 
or the other, and thus to apply ‘torture’ to waterboarding or not. According to Plunkett and Sundell, 
the Moral Twin Earth scenario can be explained in a similar manner, as a negotiation over the 
function that ‘good’ ought to denote. 
                                                     
48 Plunkett and Sundell use ‘metalinguistic use’ as a technical term to describe cases in which a speaker 
uses a word in a certain way to non-literally express a belief about what function that word ought to denote. 
In this case about torture, each speaker uses the word ‘torture’ to express their belief that ‘torture’ ought to 
denote a function that either maps waterboarding to TRUE or to FALSE. I detail these functions below. 
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§3.7 Back on Twin Earth 
Recall the Moral Twin Earth scenario described by H&T. In the scenario, we are to 
imagine a distant Moral Twin Earth, identical in every which way to Earth, save for the fact that 
Moral Twin Earthers use the word ‘good’ in line with a set of natural (functional) properties, Td, 
that play into a deontological ethical theory, whereas Earthers use the word ‘good’ in line with a 
different set of natural (functional) properties, Tc, that play into a consequentialist ethical theory.49 
Plunkett and Sundell put this more simply: 
Suppose that by ‘morally right’ Earthlings meant something akin to “maximizing overall 
aggregate utility”. That is: suppose that some form of analytic utilitarianism is true of the 
term ‘morally right’ as used by Earthlings. In contrast, suppose that some form of analytic 
Kantianism is true of the term ‘morally right’ for Twin Earthlings, such that, for Twin 
Earthlings, what their term ‘morally right’ means is something akin to “being in accord 
with the Categorical Imperative”. (2013, p.20) 
If the Twin Earther were to visit Earth and speak with an Earther about whether various things 
are ‘morally right’, we would intuitively expect the two parties to genuinely disagree. According 
to H&T, we could only understand the Earther and Twin Earther as genuinely disagreeing if we 
suppose they mean the same thing by ‘morally right’—otherwise the two would only speak at 
cross purposes. This is where H&T (and others) misstep, according to Plunkett and Sundell. We 
can understand the Earther and Twin Earther as genuinely disagreeing without supposing they 
mean the same thing by ‘morally right’. 
Plunkett and Sundell argue that we can understand the Earther and Twin Earther as 
genuinely disagreeing even if they mean different things by ‘morally right’. This is because, 
according to them, “at least some of the disputes involving moral terms between Earthlings and 
Twin Earthlings may be metalinguistic” (2013, p.20). These cases would be better explained by 
Plunkett and Sundell’s view, as metalinguistic negotiations. So if Plunkett and Sundell are right, 
we do not need to assume anything about shared meaning to make sense of disagreement. We can 
capture our intuitions about disagreement in some cases without resorting to the claim that 
speakers mean the same thing by their words. Plunkett and Sundell imagine a dispute between the 
Earther and Twin Earther that, according to them, supports this contention. 
Suppose that the Twin Earther—let’s say Chris—visits Earth and comes to exchange 
moral views with his new Earther friend, Bob. At one point, they have the following dispute: 
(7) (a) Lying with the aim of promoting human happiness is sometimes morally right. 
In fact it often is! 
(b) No, you are wrong. It is never morally right to lie in order to promote human 
happiness. 
                                                     
49 Plunkett and Sundell choose to use the word ‘morally right’ whereas Horgan and Timmons choose to use 
the word ‘good’ here. From what I understand, nothing turns on using one or the other. In this section, I 
follow Plunkett and Sundell and use ‘morally right’ to avoid confusion. 
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Imagine that Bob, given his consequentialist leanings, is the speaker of (7a), and that Chris is the 
speaker of (7b), given his deontological leanings. According to Plunkett and Sundell, we can 
understand (7) as a genuine disagreement without supposing that ‘morally right’ means the same 
thing. It seems that we can suppose that ‘morally right’ means different things, respective to Chris 
and Bob’s different moral views, without endangering the intuition that they genuinely disagree. 
According to Plunkett and Sundell, the Moral Twin Earth dispute they propose is a 
suitable analogue to Ludlow’s case and thus can be explained via their metalinguistic strategy. 
Remember that, on their view, two features mark a suitable analogue. First, that dispute must 
involve speakers who use terms metalinguistically, i.e. they use a term (e.g. ‘athlete’) in a way 
that conveys (non-literally) the function they believe that word ought to denote. Second, the topic 
of that dispute centres on whether in fact that word ought to denote one function or another. The 
dispute they envision on Moral Twin Earth exhibits both features. First, Bob the Earther and Chris 
the Twin Earther can be understood as using the term ‘morally right’ metalinguistically, and 
second, they can be understood as doing so precisely because they have a tacit disagreement that 
clearly falls under the umbrella of conceptual ethics, i.e. they disagree about the function that 
‘morally right’ ought to denote: 
Just as in [the Secretariat case], we might see Bob the Earthling and Chris the Twin 
Earthling as engaged in a (perhaps tacit) disagreement about which concept is the right 
one to use in this context. In this context, the issue is arguably about what concept to use 
in figuring out how to live and in guiding one’s plans about what to do. (2013, p.20) 
Plunkett and Sundell continue: 
More specifically, it has something to do with which concept should play a functional 
role that concerns matters of how we navigate our decisions about how to treat others, 
what to hold each other responsible for doing, and how to live more generally. The 
disagreement might take place for much the same reason people care about which concept 
is expressed by ‘torture’: given a certain socio-historical setting—a setting in which 
certain words (largely independent of which specific concepts they express) fill specific 
and important functional roles in our practices—participants might care a great deal (and 
genuinely substantive results could hang on) which concept/word pairings we employ in 
a given context. The debate between Bob the Earthling and Chris the Twin Earthling 
would ultimately turn on substantive normative matters, namely, the substantive 
normative issue of (roughly) which is the better concept to employ in figuring out what 
to do. Nevertheless, it would not turn on the substantive normative issue that Horgan and 
Timmons (and perhaps Bob and Chris) seem to think is at issue, namely, what is morally 
right, in accordance with a meaning of ‘morally right’ shared between the speakers. (2013, 
p.20) 
Following suit with the preceding examples of metalinguistic negotiation, we can spell out the 
details of this dispute as involving a kind of practical choice between two plans for going forward, 
respective to the different functions that Chris and Bob believe ‘morally right’ ought to denote.50 
                                                     
50 At this point it is important to reiterate that the aim of extending Plunkett and Sundell’s analysis to cases 
like Moral Twin Earth is not to offer a competing explanation for any disagreement we can imagine, but 
rather to show that some philosophers, like Horgan and Timmons, make a mistake when they draw a 
necessary link between disagreement and shared meaning. Our intuitions about genuine disagreement in 
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Given the dispute described by Plunkett and Sundell, it is likely that ‘morally right’ 
denotes two distinct functions for Chris and Bob. For Chris, the Twin Earther, ‘morally right’ 
denotes the function morally right1 which maps lying with the aim of promoting human happiness 
to FALSE. For Bob, the Earther, ‘morally right’ denotes the function morally right2 which maps 
lying with the aim of promoting human happiness to TRUE. Given the different functions they 
have in mind, there are at least two plans for going forward—they could either align the meaning 
of ‘morally right’ with Bob’s function, morally right1, or with Chris’s function, morally right2: 
(7) (Plan A) Make ‘morally right’ denote morally right1. 
 (Plan B) Make ‘morally right’ denote morally right2. 
Here, Chris and Bob have a practical choice to make between two plans going forward. As 
Plunkett and Sundell say, much hinges on what they choose to do. What we should do with our 
lives and how we should treat others is a non-trivial matter. What function ‘morally right’ denotes, 
whether that be morally right1 or morally right2 (or something else), has implications for moral 
talk and practice. This, for Plunkett and Sundell, highlights the viability and importance, 
moreover, of bringing metalinguistic negotiation into metanormative discourse. As Plunkett and 
Sundell have shown, some genuine normative disagreements may be expressed in non-canonical 
disputes, disputes that, like those in the cases outlined previously, would be better explained by 
viewing them as metalinguistic negotiations.51 
 In the remainder of this chapter, I extend Plunkett and Sundell’s view about 
metalinguistic negotiation to try to explain my Meaning Twin Earth scenario. If Plunkett and 
Sundell’s view can be extended to capture this case, then one could potentially object to the 
Meaning Twin Earth argument by claiming that our intuitions about the Meaning Twin Earth 
scenario can be explained without invoking the thesis that meaning is normative. 
§3.8 Meaning Twin Earth 
 Remember that the scenario I introduce in Chapter Two imagines a distant Meaning Twin 
Earth, identical to Earth in every which way, save for the fact that its inhabitants use the word 
‘means’ as it plays into a theory of meaning distinct from the one that Earthers ascribe to. These 
Twin Earthers apply the word ‘means’ in accordance with an individualist theory of meaning, 
                                                     
these normative or evaluative cases can sometimes be better explained by Plunkett and Sundell’s method, 
i.e. via metalinguistic negotiation. As Plunkett and Sundell explain: 
Our goal here is not to advocate, once and for all, for this particular analysis in this particular 
domain. The important point is that an analysis of disagreement between Bob and Chris as 
concerning conceptual ethics before they meet, and concerning conceptual ethics and expressed 
via metalinguistic negotiation once they do—is more than sufficiently plausible to undercut quick 
inference to the best explanation intuitions about their disagreement to semantic conclusions about 
what Earthlings and Moral Twin Earthlings mean by the relevant moral terms. (2013, p.21) 
51 I say ‘better explained’ because the shared meaning strategy (SMS) cannot even get started in these cases. 
If speakers mean different things by the words they use to communicate a dispute, then we cannot make 
sense of them as genuinely disagreeing—at least on that view. But, as Plunkett and Sundell demonstrate, it 
does seem that some of these non-canonical disputes are cases of people who genuinely disagree and this 
evidence counts against SMS. 
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regulated by some natural (functional) properties, Mi, whereas Earthers apply the word ‘means’ 
in accordance with a communitarian theory of meaning, regulated by some natural (functional) 
properties, Mc. Simply put, Twin Earthers think that what someone means is primarily determined 
by that speaker’s idiolectic understanding of what his or her words mean, whereas Earthers think 
that what someone means is primarily determined by the linguistic community that that speaker 
is part of. Given this difference, the two parties would be apt to ascribe meaning differently in 
various cases. I described a rather difficult case of this sort in Chapter Two. 
Recall that in the Meaning Twin Earth scenario, we imagined a lifelong solitary 
individual named ‘Robinson Crusoe’ on Earth who is the sole inhabitant of an isolated island. 
Miraculously, the young Crusoe was washed ashore here shortly after his birth. In order to survive 
on the island, Crusoe has developed a primitive system for identifying one of the staples of his 
diet, blackberries. Whenever he encounters such a berry, he exclaims “Blackberry!”. Now 
whether Crusoe can be said to mean something by his words may be the subject of debate, and in 
particular it may be the subject of debate between a Twin Earther and Earther, if they were to 
encounter one another. 
Imagine that a Twin Earther, let’s say Greg, were to visit Earth and speak with an Earther, 
Alice, about whether Crusoe speaks meaningfully when he says “Blackberry!” (or anything for 
that matter). In their conversation, suppose that Alice and Greg come to exchange their views on 
the matter in a simple dispute: 
(8) (a) Crusoe does not mean blackberry by “Blackberry!” 
(b) Crusoe means blackberry by “Blackberry!” 
In Chapter Two I suggested that the most plausible assessment of a dispute of this sort between 
the Earther and Twin Earther, the speakers of (8a) and (8b), would be to say that they genuinely 
disagree and thus mean the same thing by their respective terms for meaning ascription (i.e. the 
English ‘means’ and the Twin English ‘means’), otherwise they would speak at cross purposes. 
The basic lesson we have learned from Plunkett and Sundell is that this move from disagreement 
to shared meaning could be dubious. As we saw in the above discussion, we can apparently 
explain the intuition that an Earther and Twin Earther disagree about what is ‘morally right’ 
without resorting to the claim that they mean the same thing by that expression. Can this same 
strategy be applied in the meaning case? 
Let’s suppose that, in accordance with Plunkett and Sundell’s strategy from 
metalinguistic negotiation, Alice the Earther (8a) and Greg the Twin Earther (8b) mean different 
things by ‘means’ given the conflicting semantic theories they accept as governing meaning 
ascription. In particular, they use ‘means’ to denote two distinct functions, respective to each 
theory: According to Alice the Earther, the speaker of (8a), ‘means’ denotes the function means1 
which maps Crusoe’s meaning blackberry by “Blackberry!” to FALSE. According to the Greg 
the Twin Earther, the speaker of (8b), ‘means’ denotes the function means2 which maps Crusoe’s 
meaning blackberry by “Blackberry!” to TRUE. Between these two interpretations, Alice and 
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Greg have a practical choice to make. They could either align the meaning of ‘means’ with Alice’s 
function, means1, or with Greg’s function, means2: 
(8) (Plan A) Make ‘means’ denote means1. 
 (Plan B) Make ‘means’ denote means2. 
Despite the fact that they mean different things by ‘means’, there is sufficient room to claim that 
the two genuinely disagree. There is a substantial question about what function ‘means’ ought to 
denote and much hinges on the function that Alice and Greg select in this case. In particular, the 
function they select determines whether Crusoe speaks meaningfully or not when he utters things 
such as “Blackberry!”, and as such, whether we can understand him or any lifelong solitary 
individual as having a language. So contrary to my assessment of the scenario in Chapter Two, it 
looks as though there is a way to understand an Earther and Twin Earther as having a genuine 
disagreement without supposing they mean the same thing ‘means’. In the next section I argue 
that though this explanation via metalinguistic negotiation is attractive, it cannot work in the case 
of meaning. 
§3.9 Why Metalinguistic Negotiation Can’t Explain Meaning Twin Earth 
I argue that metalinguistic negotiation cannot explain Meaning Twin Earth because in 
this special case, the two speakers must possess a common understanding of the meaning of 
‘meaning’ in order to genuinely disagree. There is a limit to metalinguistic negotiation that is 
embodied by the Meaning Twin Earth scenario: we could not understand two speakers as having 
a genuine disagreement about what someone means by their words when they issue meaning 
ascriptions in which ‘means’ is used, without supposing that the two share a common 
understanding of what it is to mean something at all, for it is this understanding that enables those 
speakers to communicate that disagreement in the first place. The case about meaning that I 
envision is rather special in that meaning itself is the subject of debate. If we apply metalinguistic 
negotiation in this case, as I described earlier, this dispute becomes nonsensical. To show this, I 
return to the case about ‘spicy’ and then to my case about ‘means’ vis-à-vis Meaning Twin Earth. 
In the spicy case, Oscar and Callie disagree about whether ‘spicy’ ought to denote one 
function or another. Oscar claims that ‘spicy’ ought to denote function spicy1 that maps their chili 
‘C’ to TRUE. Callie claims that ‘spicy’ ought to denote function spicy2 that maps their chili ‘C’ 
to FALSE. Going forward, they are apt to negotiate over two sorts of plans, one that accords with 
Oscar’s preferences and the other to Callie’s preferences: 
(4) (Plan A) Make ‘spicy’ denote spicy1. 
(Plan B) Make ‘spicy’ denote spicy2. 
In order to negotiate between Plan A and Plan B, the two parties must have a common 
understanding of what they are negotiating about. In particular, they need to share a common 
conception of what Plan A and Plan B amount to, i.e. what it would be for Plan A and Plan B to 
be satisfied—for ‘spicy’ to mean one thing rather than another. A key part of that shared 
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understanding is a shared understanding of what function the meaning predicate ‘means’ denotes. 
So assuming that Oscar and Callie share a common understanding of ‘means’ in the background, 
the two can get on perfectly well in negotiating, even though they do not mean the same thing by 
‘spicy’. This much we can grant for the present scenario but for Meaning Twin Earth, things get 
more difficult. 
In the Meaning Twin Earth scenario, the Earther and Twin Earther—Alice and Greg—
are at odds over whether ‘means’ ought to denote one function or another. According to Alice, 
‘means’ ought to denote means1, which maps Crusoe’s meaning blackberry by “Blackberry!” to 
TRUE. According to Greg, ‘means’ should denote means2, which maps Crusoe’s meaning 
blackberry by “Blackberry!” to FALSE. The two can choose between two plans, one that accords 
with the Alice’s theory of meaning and the other with the Greg’s alternative theory of meaning: 
(8) (Plan A) Make ‘means that…’ denote means1. 
(Plan B) Make ‘means that…’ denote means2. 
Remember that in the ‘spicy’ case, the two parties must have a common understanding of what 
they are negotiating about in order to negotiate between Plan A and Plan B. In particular, they 
need to know what it would be for Plan A and Plan B to be satisfied, for ‘spicy’ to mean one thing 
rather than another. In the meaning case, these same requirements hold true. If Alice the Earther 
and Greg the Twin Earther are to negotiate between Plan A and Plan B, they must assume a 
common grasp of the meaning of ‘meaning’. Here lies the problem: Given that ‘meaning’ itself is 
the subject of dispute and that speakers don’t mean the same thing by ‘meaning’ in the first place, 
the metalinguistic strategy cripples itself in this special case. It is as if, as Wittgenstein once 
remarked, we have tried to saw off the branch on which we sit.52 It is impossible for two parties 
to have a debate about the meaning of ‘meaning’ without the proverbial branch that enables that 
dispute to take place in the first place. So though, at least for the sake of argument, I agree with 
Plunkett and Sundell that metalinguistic negotiation may better explain some disputes, like Moral 
Twin Earth, it cannot capture the focal dispute on Meaning Twin Earth. Two objections might be 
raised against this argument. 
First, it may be objected that given the practical dilemma I pose in (8) above, we could 
suppose that Alice the Earther and Greg the Twin Earther mean the same thing by ‘denote’ and 
yet do not mean the same thing by ‘means’. In other words, the two could be viewed as sharing 
in the notion of reference but not in the notion of meaning. If possible, then the negotiation 
sketched above, between (8a) and (8b) would be a plausible way to view Alice and Greg as 
genuinely disagreeing without meaning the same thing by ‘means’—thus avoiding my criticism 
that the two must share a notion of ‘means’ in order to disagree at all. Though I believe that 
metalinguistic negotiation is a helpful way to view many disputes, I fail to see how the preceding 
rebuttal can save that explanatory strategy in the meaning case. It is hard to imagine how two 
                                                     
52 See Investigations §55. 
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people could have a common grasp of how denotation is fixed without a common grasp of ‘means’. 
Supposing that sense determines reference, if one shares a theory of how reference is determined 
with another, then one can reasonably expect to likewise share a notion of meaning. This, I take 
it, captures the standard position. I do not see how the two could come apart in a way that would 
damage my argument, but I am open to the possibility. If there is a way they could, then this could 
pose a problem for my proposed understanding of Meaning Twin Earth, but the onus is squarely 
on my opponent at this point to come up with the relevant detailed argument 
Second, it might be objected that since Plunkett and Sundell claim that in the non-
canonical case the disagreement concerns a content pragmatically communicated, semantics 
doesn't come into it, so that my objection fails. However, this seems to miss the essential point I 
was making, namely, that in order for metalinguistic negotiation to be possible, those involved in 
the negotiation need to be assumed to have a common conception of what they are negotiating 
about, and that this is precisely what is lacking in the meaning case we are concerned with. 
§3.10 Conclusion 
In this chapter I evaluated whether Plunkett and Sundell’s objection to Moral Twin Earth 
could be convincingly applied against the Meaning Twin Earth argument advanced in Chapter 
Two. I explained that though Plunkett and Sundell’s objection may succeed against H&T’s 
argument in the moral case, it cannot succeed against my analogue of that argument. 
Metalinguistic negotiation may helpfully explain many disputes, including perhaps the one 
imagined on Moral Twin Earth, but it cannot explain Meaning Twin Earth. In the next two 
chapters I evaluate two further objections to H&T’s Moral Twin Earth argument and consider 
whether these objections can be applied against the Meaning Twin Earth argument. 
  






Chapter Four: Copp ‘Milk, Honey, and The Good Life on Moral Twin 
Earth’ 
§4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I outline David Copp’s two objections to Horgan and Timmons’ Moral 
Twin Earth argument from his “Milk, Honey, and The Good Life on Moral Twin Earth” (2000) 
and argue, in turn, that each of these objections does not pose a threat to the Meaning Twin Earth 
argument presented in Chapter Two. 
§4.2 Milk, Honey, and The Good Life on Moral Twin Earth 
Copp (2000) claims that the Moral Twin Earth argument advanced by Horgan and 
Timmons (1992a) fails to undermine synthetic ethical naturalism. Copp proposes two replies 
against Horgan and Timmons (H&T): The first accepts the intuition that the two gather from their 
scenario and claims that this intuition can be explained without abandoning naturalism. The 
second revises H&T’s assessment of the scenario using a broader interpretation of Putnam’s work 
in order to escape H&T’s conclusion. Each of Copp’s replies functions as an independent 
objection, though Copp admits the latter is the more formidable of the two: A Putnam-style moral 
semantics can explain Moral Twin Earth and so “naturalists can begin again to issue visas for 
travel to Moral Twin Earth” (Copp 2000, p.134). 
§4.3 Brief Review 
Recall that on reflection, the Moral Twin Earth scenario elicits linguistic intuitions that 
are significantly different from the intuitions we have about the classical Twin Earth scenario 
introduced by Putnam (1975). In the scenario that H&T describe, our linguistic intuition is that 
the Earther and the Twin Earther genuinely disagree when they use the term ‘morally right’ to 
exchange their moral views, where the use of ‘morally right’ is regulated by different functional 
properties in each case, respective to their different moral theories. For the Earther, the use of 
‘morally right’ is causally regulated by some natural (functional) properties, in line with his 
normative ethical theory Tc; for the Twin Earther, ‘morally right’ is causally regulated by some 
alternative natural (functional) properties, in line with his normative ethical theory Td. Given this 
difference, it is easy to come up with examples of disputes that may occur between the two—
disputes in which the Earther and Twin Earther express different moral judgments, and use the 
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word ‘good’ to communicate these views to each other.53 Plunkett and Sundell (2013) suggest the 
following dispute: 
(7)  (a) Lying with the aim of promoting human happiness is sometimes morally right. 
In fact it often is! 
(b) No, you are wrong. It is never morally right to lie in order to promote human 
happiness. 
Intuitively, (7) expresses a genuine disagreement. H&T argue that our linguistic intuitions about 
disagreements such as this, which take place in their Moral Twin Earth scenario, count as evidence 
against Boyd-style synthetic ethical naturalism, or what they call ‘causal semantic naturalism’ or 
‘CSN’. According to them, these naturalist theories imply (absurdly) that the Earther and Twin 
Earther simply speak at cross purposes on account of their meaning different things by their moral 
terminology (i.e. which refer to different properties, respective to Tc and Td). Copp argues that 
there are at least two ways that Boyd and the other synthetic naturalists can avoid H&T’s 
conclusion. 
§4.4 Copp’s First Reply: Accommodating Moral Twin Earth 
In his first reply to H&T, Copp concedes the general intuition that the two extract from 
their Moral Twin Earth scenario. The challenge for the synthetic ethical naturalist is to offer a 
story that captures this intuition: “the intuition that the Earthlings and Twin Earthlings have 
substantive moral disagreements, and not merely verbal disagreements, is robust and widely 
shared. For this reason, naturalism must try to accommodate the intuition in some way” (2000, 
p.119). One way that the naturalist can do this, according to Copp, is by showing how there is a 
sense in which the Earther and Twin Earther can be viewed as meaning the same thing and as 
genuinely disagreeing despite the fact that the two mean different things in the “philosophically 
preferred” sense (on account of their terms referring to different properties). This is made possible 
by deploying a weaker notion of shared meaning that Copp argues can still capture our intuitions 
about the scenario. 
Copp claims that we can understand the Earther and Twin Earther as meaning the same 
thing and as genuinely disagreeing even if they use ‘morally right’ to refer to different natural 
(functional) properties: “even if the Earthling term “wrong” expresses a property that is distinct 
from the property expressed by the Twin-Earthling term “wrong” – which, of course, is what 
H&T think that any form of synthetic moral naturalism would be committed to saying in a relevant 
Moral Twin Earth thought experiment – it still might be the case that the Earthlings and Twin 
Earthlings disagree morally in the situation we have imagined” (2000, p.120). According to Copp, 
this is possible because, given the construction of the scenario, we can reasonably expect moral 
terms to be roughly inter-translatable between English and Twin English, even if they mean 
                                                     
53 You could use ‘morally right’ or ‘morally wrong’ or indeed some other moral predicate, but for our 
purposes nothing in particular hinges on this. 
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different things in the “philosophically preferred” sense of referring to different properties. Copp 
says that we can gather this much from the scenario because H&T describe in detail the various 
ways in which Earthen and Twin Earthen moral discourse is uniformly similar, e.g. that moral 
and twin-moral terms are used in similar ways to apply to similar sorts of actions, that Twin 
Earthers are disposed to perform the sort of actions that they apply ‘morally right’ to, etc. Given 
these details, Copp says it is highly likely that the best translation of the Twin Earther’s term 
‘morally right’ is indeed the Earther’s term ‘morally right’ (and likewise for ‘wrong’, etc.).54 H&T 
mention this in their original discussion; they explain that a group of explorers from Twin Earth 
would be likely to translate twin-moral terms in just this way, and these explorers would likely 
be correct in doing so (2000, p.121, Horgan and Timmons 1992a, p.164). According to Copp, we 
only need inter-translatability at this general level in order to treat the Earther and Twin Earther 
as meaning the same thing (on this weaker notion of ‘same meaning’) and thereby as genuinely 
disagreeing. Copp introduces a useful analogy to show how his preferred notion of shared 
meaning is the best we can expect to use successfully in many cases, including the one described 
by H&T: 
To understand this point, it needs to be understood that translation is more like trying to 
find someone who looks enough like you to pass muster in a police lineup than it is like 
trying to find your identical twin. Many people lack identical twins, of course, and many 
words lack precise synonyms in certain other languages. So it is possible that the English 
term “wrong” is the best translation into English of the twin-English term “wrong” even 
though, by stipulation, the terms express different properties. If this is so, then even 
though corresponding moral and twin-moral terms express different properties and 
therefore have different “meanings” in the philosophically preferred sense of the term, 
there is also a sense in which they might have the same “meaning”.55 (Copp 2000, p.121-
122) 
The main point for Copp is that if we understand ‘same meaning’ in this other sense—in terms of 
rough inter-translatability—we can view the Earther and Twin Earther as meaning the same thing 
by the English ‘morally right’ and the Twin English ‘morally right’ and therefore as disagreeing, 
despite the stipulated difference in reference between those terms. 
According to Copp, we could not reasonably expect there to be a perfect translation 
between twin-moral and moral terms in the philosophically preferred sense that H&T propose. 
The best we can do, Copp claims, is to look for the closest translation of the English term ‘morally 
right’ in Twin English. Given the description of the scenario, the closest thing is the Twin English 
term ‘morally right’, which plays a very similar though not identical role (twin-moral terms denote 
different properties than moral terms do). This much, Copp says, should highlight that H&T are 
too quick to “take our intuitions in the Moral Twin Earth scenario to be strong evidence that 
                                                     
54 Notice that the best available translation here could still, in absolute terms, be a bad one. For example, 
the best discus thrower in the philosophy department may not be much of an athlete. In this case, Copp 
must mean something stronger by ‘best’ than ‘best available’, otherwise even though the best translation of 
‘F’ might be ‘G’, there might be no plausible sense in which they can be taken to mean the same thing. 
What Copp needs to clarify for us is when a candidate translation “passes muster” to use his own term. 
55 My emphasis. 
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corresponding English and Twin English moral terms [must] express the same property” if the 
Earther and Twin Earther are to be understood as meaning the same thing by those terms (2000, 
p.124). As Copp has demonstrated, there is room to argue that the contrary is true: “there is an 
interpretation of our intuitions on which they are compatible with the thesis that corresponding 
terms in their languages express distinct properties. Our intuitions can therefore be accommodated 
by semantic theories of the kind that are in question” (Copp 2000, p.124). If Copp is right, then 
there is an avenue of escape for the naturalist. If the less robust notion of shared meaning that 
Copp introduces is sufficient for capturing the disagreement between the Earther and the Twin 
Earther, then the naturalist can head off the H&T challenge: There is a sense in which the two 
parties mean the same thing and therefore genuinely disagree, even if they strictly speaking do 
not refer to the same properties in using their words (and thus do not mean the same thing in the 
philosophically preferred sense assumed by H&T).56 I argue that this first reply from Copp is 
unconvincing on the grounds of two objections. 
§4.4.1 First Response: Can We Dispose of the Principle that Meaning 
Determines Reference? 
Copp’s first reply amounts to the suggestion that if we use a less robust notion of meaning, 
we can view the Earther and Twin Earther of the Moral Twin Earth scenario as meaning the same 
thing and as genuinely disagreeing, even though strictly-speaking moral and twin-moral terms 
refer to different properties. The cost of this reply is that we must dispose of something like the 
general principle that meaning determines reference, e.g. Frege’s principle that ‘sense determines 
semantic value’. This can be shown by subtly reframing Copp’s first reply. Basically, Copp argues 
that if we dispose of the idea that sense determines reference, then we can view the Earther and 
Twin Earther as meaning the same thing by ‘morally right’ even though by stipulation the English 
‘morally right’ and the Twin English ‘morally right’ refer to different properties. But, in 
supposing that (1) the two speakers mean the same thing by ‘morally right’ (in each of their 
languages) and that (2) the two expressions do not share in reference, it must be the case that (3) 
                                                     
56 It is worth pointing out that there is another potential line of objection against Copp that takes the form 
of an ad hominem: Notice that Copp’s preferred notion of shared meaning could potentially undermine 
Putnam’s original Twin Earth argument. In Putnam’s classical scenario, the Earther and Twin Earther could 
not plausibly be viewed as genuinely disagreeing, given that the two use the term ‘water’ in their respective 
languages to denote different properties, i.e. H2O and XYZ. As such, the two could only speak past one 
another, intuitively speaking. If we deploy Copp’s preferred notion of ‘shared meaning’ here from the first 
reply, this causes problems: On this notion, we can view the Earther and Twin Earther as meaning the same 
thing and as genuinely disagreeing, contrary to Putnam’s assessment. This is plausible because, on Copp’s 
view, the English term ‘water’ would be the best translation of the Twin English term ‘water’. As in Horgan 
and Timmons’ case, this much can be gathered from the construction of the scenario. So given that the 
relevant terms are roughly inter-translatable, there is a sense in which the Earther and Twin Earther can be 
viewed as meaning the same thing and genuinely disagreeing. It is very unlikely, as will be highlighted in 
the second reply, that this is part of Copp’s agenda. If Copp wishes to retain a Putnamian account of 
meaning, he cannot use the notion of ‘shared meaning’ that his first reply depends on. Likewise, if the 
reader is persuaded by Putnam’s classical Twin Earth argument, then the reply should also be abandoned. 
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the meaning of ‘morally right’ does not determine which property that expression refers to. 
Ceteris paribus this is a bad thing, even if it allows us to meet the Moral Twin Earth argument. 
I argue that we should reject Copp’s first reply because we should, in general, aim to 
preserve the principle that meaning determines reference, not because we must necessarily 
preserve the Fregean notion of sense, but because giving it up would mean giving up any kind of 
view that, like Frege’s, bases the compositionality of meaning on the compositionality of 
reference. Doing this would seriously limit our options for saying anything systematic about the 
intuitive notion of meaning and in particular, about the compositionality of meaning.57 As such, 
we could only accept Copp’s first reply at the cost of losing the ability to deal with more 
fundamental issues that have to do with the compositionality of meaning and reference. So 
crucially, the objection here stands even if we do not accept every detail in Frege’s account of 
sense.58 This is accentuated by the fact that Russellian accounts of meaning that attempt to 
effectively dispense with the Fregean notion of sense (and thus the principle that meaning 
determines reference) do not do well in accounting for the compositionality of meaning.59 
§4.4.2 Second Response: Disagreeing for ‘Most Practical Purposes’? 
Even if Copp can address the problems that arise from disposing of the idea that meaning 
determines reference, the notion of genuine disagreement that Copp ends up with is insufficient 
for capturing the intuition that the Earther and Twin Earther genuinely disagree. Essentially, what 
Copp’s first reply amounts to is the thought that although two speakers do not genuinely disagree, 
for most practical purposes, we can treat them as if they mean the same by ‘morally right’ and 
disagree. In this respect, Copp is effectively saying that nothing bad will happen if we pretend 
that the two speakers genuinely mean the same thing. However, this can be conceded by H&T 
without damaging their argument. That is, they can concede that the Earther and Twin Earther 
can, for most practical purposes, be treated as if they genuinely disagree. Unfortunately for Copp, 
this does not enable the synthetic naturalist to escape H&T’s conclusion. The real challenge for 
the naturalist is to capture the intuition that the Earther and Twin Earther are actually disagreeing, 
                                                     
57  In order to show the importance of the principle that meaning determines reference or that sense 
determines semantic value, in a brief appendix at the end of the dissertation, I provide a reminder of Frege’s 
reasons for introducing the notion of sense. To repeat, the objection to Copp is not that he would be 
committed to giving up a Fregean notion of sense, but that in giving up the principle that meaning 
determines reference, he would be giving up the possibility of any theory which, like Frege’s, builds an 
account of the compositionality of meaning/sense on the basis of the compositionality of reference/semantic 
value. See Appendix: Frege on Meaning, Reference, and Compositionality, p.162-168. 
58 It may be objected that this reply begs the question against accounts of meaning that are built around a 
term’s functional role. I have been careful to avoid doing this. I have not argued that functionalist accounts 
of meaning must fail if they dispose of the principle that meaning determines reference. Instead I have 
simply argued that there are good reasons, detailed in the Appendix, for retaining that principle. It is 
certainly open for an account of meaning to dispose of the principle anyway. What I have attempted to 
emphasise is that this may cause some problems down the line, especially with regards to capturing the 
compositionality of meaning. 
59 See Miller 2007 p.72-79 for a detailed exposition of these issues for Russellian theories of meaning. 
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given the stipulated details about the Moral Twin Earth scenario. Copp simply fails to answer this 
challenge.60 
§4.5 Copp’s Second Reply: ‘A Theory of Error’  
In his second reply to H&T, Copp argues that synthetic ethical naturalism can 
accommodate our intuitions about Moral Twin Earth by drawing on some strategies used by 
Putnam. The aim of this reply, according to Copp, is not strictly-speaking to defend synthetic 
ethical naturalism against all possible objections, but simply to defend the view that a Putnamian 
semantics can be used in explicating synthetic ethical naturalism.61 By adapting some of the 
moves that Putnam uses in various non-moral examples, Copp claims that he can forestall the 
worry he expects most philosophers to have about his first reply: 
The first reply to Horgan and Timmons’s argument will seem unsatisfying to many 
philosophers, including, presumably, Horgan and Timmons. For as far as the first reply 
goes, even if the best English translation of what the Twin Earthlings say in the lying 
example is that lying would be “wrong”, it is nevertheless true in the example that, in 
saying that lying would be twin-wrong, the Twin Earthlings attribute to lying a property 
that the Earthlings do not deny it to have when they say that lying would not be wrong. 
As far as the first reply goes, the English term “wrong” has a different meaning in the 
philosophically preferred sense from the corresponding Twin English term. It may seem 
to many philosophers that any theory with this implication is unacceptable. For it may 
seem intuitively clear that the Earthlings disagree with the Twin Earthlings precisely 
about the truth of the proposition about lying expressed by the Twin Earthling sentence, 
“Lying is wrong”. It may seem clear that the Earthlings are denying exactly what the 
Twin Earthlings affirm when they say lying would be “wrong”. (2000, p.124) 
On Copp’s view, a Putnamian moral semantics can explain this intuition. 
Copp argues that we can capture the intuition that (1) the Earther and Twin earther refer 
to the same property by their moral and twin-moral terms (the English ‘morally right’ and the 
Twin English ‘morally right’), and that (2) the two genuinely disagree insofar as they use that 
same term to express conflicting propositions about whether, for example, lying is morally right, 
i.e. (7) above. We can achieve this by paying careful attention to some of the strategies used by 
Putnam in certain non-moral examples. Copp expands on this thought in the following passage: 
[A Putnamian moral semantics] can accommodate the [above] intuition by deploying 
strategies some of which Putnam himself uses to explain the possibility of errors of 
various kinds in non-moral examples, together with a distinction that Putnam draws 
between speakers’ referential intentions and their interests. The resulting semantics 
implies that corresponding Earthling and Twin Earthling moral and twin moral terms in 
Twin Earth scenarios express the same property if they express any property at all. It 
                                                     
60 It is no response to argue that Copp might be working with a ‘mundane’ notion of meaning entirely 
dissociated from systematic semantic theorising: for one thing, a systematic semantic theory which 
dissociated itself from the intuitive notion of meaning in this way would be in danger of depriving itself of 
a subject matter, given that one central point of such a theory is to clarify our ordinary notion. 
61 As Copp puts it: 
I should stress that my goal is simply to defend synthetic moral naturalism against the Moral Twin 
Earth argument. I do not aim to defend it or Putnamian semantics against all worries that could be 
raised. Accordingly, I aim merely to show that a plausible articulation of Putnamian semantics 
could be used in explicating synthetic moral naturalism. (2000, p.125) 
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therefore would imply that in the lying example either the Earthlings or the Twin 
Earthlings are mistaken. It would also imply that there is no coherent Moral Twin Earth 
scenario of the sort described by Horgan and Timmons. That is, in any coherent scenario 
of the kind described by Horgan and Timmons, the semantics would imply that 
corresponding Earthling and Twin Earthling moral and twin moral terms express the same 
property. This is the second reply to the Moral Twin Earth argument. In discussing it, we 
obviously need to leave behind the special stipulation of the Master scenario that 
Earthling and Twin Earthling moral and twin moral terms express different properties. 
(Copp 2000, p.124-125) 
The price of this Putnamian approach, according to Copp, is that we must admit that one of the 
two parties is mistaken, i.e. either the Earther or Twin Earther makes a mistake in their judgements 
about what’s ‘morally right’ in the Moral Twin Earth scenario.62 
§4.5.1 Fallback Conditions and Referential Intentions 
Putnam understood that his semantic theory had limits. He understood that the meaning 
of a word is not always fixed by some hidden structure at, say, the level of chemical composition. 
In some cases there is more than one such structure, in others there is no hidden structure at all. 
Putnam recognized that there are many cases where this occurs, for example: 
Some diseases, have turned out to have no hidden structure (the only thing the paradigm 
cases have in common is a cluster of symptoms), while others have turned out to have a 
common hidden structure in the sense of an etiology (e.g. tuberculosis). Sometimes we 
still don’t know; there is a controversy still raging about the case of multiple sclerosis. 
(Putnam 1975, p.160) 
The way that Putnam dealt with these cases was to point out how certain ‘fallback conditions’ 
come into play whenever no hidden structure can account for the meaning of a word. So in these 
cases, some alternative conditions determine the meaning of that term, e.g. some superficial or 
functional properties. Putnam describes a few such cases to bring this out. 
Suppose that I point to a glass containing a clear liquid and state that “This liquid is 
‘water’”. According to Putnam, this ostensive definition of ‘water’ (like many others) comes with 
certain empirical presuppositions. For one, my definition presupposes that the liquid in the glass 
is the same type of liquid that speakers in my linguistic community, including myself, apply the 
                                                     
62 Copp ultimately argues that the ethical naturalist, as a kind of realist, should concede that one of the 
parties in the Moral Twin Earth scenario is mistaken. The alternative is to admit that (roughly) both parties 
say something that is true when they say that lying is ‘morally right’ and that lying is not ‘morally right’. 
This would be unpalatable for any realist for it would imply that moral relativism is true—something the 
realist has a deep antipathy towards and will avoid at all costs. This heads off the potential charge that 
altering the scenario in the way Copp suggests would be ad hoc. According to him, there is sufficient room 
to understand Moral Twin Earth in this additional way, though Horgan and Timmons apparently fail to 
realise this. Copp takes this to be the main error in Horgan and Timmons’ assessment of the scenario. 
Horgan and Timmons (2000) sum up this ‘error’ on their own terms: 
In his second reply to the Moral Twin Earth argument, Copp emphasizes that Putnamian semantics 
has the resources for explaining certain types of error in belief about the subject matter associated 
with the relevant terms under scrutiny. He thinks that our Moral Twin Earth argument works by 
not allowing that a moral community can have false beliefs about the referents of their moral terms 
and by not allowing that they make mistakes in what they take to be instances of actions having 
certain moral properties. (2000, p.147) 
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word ‘water’ to. If this presupposition is false and the glass contains, say, gin rather than water, 
then certain fallback conditions come into play and “I do not intend my definition to be accepted”: 
In general Putnam says, ostensive definition has certain empirical presuppositions and 
when these presuppositions are false, “a series of, so to speak, ‘fallback conditions’ 
becomes activated” . . . for natural kind terms, “if there is a hidden structure, then 
generally it determines what it is to be a member of the natural kind, not only in the actual 
world, but in all possible worlds.” He adds that “the local water, or whatever, may have 
two or more hidden structures – or so many that ‘hidden structure’ becomes irrelevant, 
and superficial characteristics become the decisive ones”. (Copp 2000, p.125, Putnam 
1975, p.160) 
Similar conditions determine meaning for words like ‘milk’ and ‘jade’. In these cases, there 
simply is no hidden structure shared by all samples of milk or jade and so, according to Putnam, 
the superficial characteristics become decisive and determine meaning for the words ‘milk’ and 
‘jade’. In the case of ‘milk’, the word ‘milk’ refers to any liquid that shares the common functional 
and genetic property of being “a liquid produced by the mammary glands of a female mammal 
that has recently given birth, in order to nourish its young” (2000, p.126). In the case of ‘jade’, 
the word ‘jade’ refers to any stone that possesses the shared disjunctive property of being a stone 
with the chemical composition of either jadeite or nephrite. For either word, there is no shared 
hidden structure that grounds meaning: 
Both jadeite and nephrite fall in the extension of the term “jade”. There is no hidden 
structure shared by all samples of jade. All samples do have the disjunctive property of 
being either jadeite or nephrite, but this of course does not mean that there is a common 
structure in any relevant sense. Now, just as there are different kinds of jade, there are 
various kinds of milk, each with a somewhat different chemical composition. Cow milk 
is chemically different from goat milk. But, even though there is not a chemical 
composition shared by all milk, there is a “hidden structure” shared by all milk, for all 
kinds of milk have the functional and genetic property of being, roughly, a liquid that is 
produced by the mammary glands of a female mammal that has recently given birth, in 
order to nourish its young. (2000, pp.125-126) 
Ultimately, according to Putnam, the meaning of ‘milk’ is linked to the referential intention we 
use that word with; it is linked to the intention to refer to whatever liquid is suitably similar to the 
local samples, to “refer to whatever has the relevantly same nature as the local samples, given 
that milk has a shared nature at the level of functional and genetic properties” and no hidden 
structure at the level of chemical properties (2000, p.126). 
The reason that the functional and genetic properties are semantically relevant (i.e. 
meaning determining) in the case of ‘milk’ as opposed to some alternative properties is because 
it is these properties that secure the extension of ‘milk’ that we want to capture. Because milk 
does not have a shared nature at the chemical level, our use of the term ‘milk’ must track some 
feature shared at an alternative level. There must be some other similarity between our uses of 
that term that determine its meaning. Now what similarity (or similarities) is relevant is 
determined by what we want ‘milk’ to mean, i.e. our referential interests in using that word. If we 
believe that ‘milk’ refers to the kind of liquid produced by female mammals shortly after birth, 
then we should intend to refer to whatever shares that functional and genetic similarity. These 
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properties become the decisive ones that determine the meaning of ‘milk’. If on the other hand 
we believe that ‘milk’ refers to more things, like say coconut milk or soy milk, then we should 
intend to refer to whatever kind of liquid shares, for instance, certain superficial properties with 
the local samples of what we call ‘milk’, more broadly construed (e.g. or maybe the slightly off-
white liquid that goes well with Cheerios or Weetbix). So, given different interests, different kinds 
of properties become the relevant ones for meaning.63 
§4.5.2 Back to Twin Earth 
Recall that, according to Putnam, the Twin Earth scenario he describes yields the general 
linguistic intuition that whatever Twin Earthers call ‘water’ on Twin Earth (the liquid composed 
of the molecular compound XYZ) is not the same thing as what Earthers call ‘water’ on Earth 
(the liquid composed of the molecular compound H2O), i.e. the referent of the Twin English word 
‘water’ (XYZ) is different from the English word ‘water’ (H2O). The basic reason that we have 
this intuition about the scenario, according to Copp, is that we use the term ‘water’ with the shared 
referential intention to refer to the liquid with the same hidden structure as the local samples 
around us (2000, p.127).64 Like the preceding examples, we use the word ‘water’ with a certain 
referential intention. We use the word ‘water’ with the general intention to refer to whatever has 
the same hidden structure as the watery stuff around us, i.e. the stuff that we use the word ‘water’ 
to refer to. 
The key difference when we talk about ‘water’—as opposed to any of the other preceding 
examples—is that water does in fact have a hidden chemical structure that is common to all 
samples, the chemical compound H2O. The difficulty for the other cases mentioned is that not so 
much is true for things like jade and milk. Milk and jade do not have a common hidden structure 
and so the meaning of the words ‘milk’ and ‘jade’ cannot mean what they do in virtue of some 
story about their hidden structure at the level of, say, chemical composition. The stuff that we call 
‘milk’ and ‘jade’ do not share anything uniformly at the chemical level, and so ‘milk’ and ‘jade’ 
must have a meaning that is determined by some alternative story. Putnam’s point is that we can 
give a semantics for these terms by falling back to the referential intentions with which we use 
those words. As Putnam has argued and Copp has underlined, ‘milk’ and ‘jade’ mean what they 
do because we use those words with the intention to refer to whatever stuff is suitably similar at 
the level of some superficial or functional properties. As we know, there is no hidden structure 
                                                     
63 Notice that all that has been said about what properties are semantically relevant is compatible with there 
being multiple similarities or shared properties for any given term. So even if there are many properties that 
are shared, the ones that are relevant is a matter that is determined by our interests. In this respect, we have 
a kind of practical choice to make between whether to make one or another set of properties the decisive 
ones that determine the meaning of a word. In any case, Copp’s point is that our referential intentions play 
a basic role in determining meaning, no matter what the content of those intentions is, i.e. what properties 
we intend to refer to. So for ‘milk’, it could easily be some alternative set of properties that determine 
meaning, depending on what our interests are. 
64 As Copp puts it, “the intention with which we actually use the term “water” on Earth is to refer to 
whatever liquid has the same basic nature as the stuff around us” (2000, pp.126-7). 
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shared by all samples of milk or jade, so some other properties must determine the meaning of 
the terms ‘milk’ and ‘jade’. Given that no such hidden structure exists, we must “fall back” to 
some alternative similarity, in terms of some other shared properties between what we call ‘milk’ 
and ‘jade’ respectively. On Putnam’s view, we can figure out what properties are semantically 
relevant by appealing to the referential intentions that we use those words with. Whatever those 
properties are is determined by what we want to do with those words, with what we want them to 
pick out and with our broader interests in doing so. In any case, according to Copp, these examples 
reveal a kind of constraint that should be placed on any plausible semantic theory. It is that any 
such theory must “incorporate a theory of error”: 
In Putnam’s view, for example, the referent of a term, such as “water”, is determined by 
the actual nature of the stuff that is in the local samples, not by our beliefs about the nature 
of the stuff. If our beliefs about the nature of the stuff are mistaken, we can make mistakes 
in using the term. A plausible theory obviously must allow for such mistakes. (2000, 
p.127) 
Copp argues that the same constraint holds for any suitable Putnamian moral semantics. That is, 
any suitable semantics of that sort must have the resources to account for the possibility of 
mistakes: 
It is the moral facts together with our referential intentions that determine the extension 
of “wrong”. If our moral views are mistaken, then we might make mistakes in calling 
actions “right” or “wrong”. Or if there are certain false presuppositions of our usage, then 
fallback considerations would come into play. The theory needs to allow for such 
mistakes as well. (2000, p.127) 
Copp argues that these sorts of considerations open up space for a reply to H&T. 
§4.5.3 Making Room for Error 
Copp’s main charge against H&T is that their argument neglects the fact that, loosely 
speaking, moral terms could be more like ‘milk’ and ‘jade’ than they are like ‘water’.65 If Copp 
is right, then ‘morally right’ could, under some circumstances, trigger the sort of fallback 
conditions that determine the meaning of ‘milk’ and ‘jade’ (i.e. some alternative properties 
relevant to our referential intentions). As mentioned above, the circumstances that Copp has in 
mind are cases in which we apply the term ‘morally right’ to convey a moral view that is mistaken. 
H&T fail to make room for the possibility that one of the two parties, the Earther or Twin Earther, 
in their scenario could make a mistake in applying ‘morally right’ as he or she does. In addition, 
they do not realize that a Putnam-inspired moral semantics can readily account for this possibility. 
This is the key problem for H&T: 
The most important error in [Horgan and Timmons’] reasoning is that it does not take 
proper account of the strategies that are available to Putnamian semantics for dealing with 
                                                     
65 I say ‘loosely speaking’ because, as Copp grants and most agree, moral terms are normative whereas 
terms like ‘milk’ and ‘jade’ are not. Copp’s point is that the way that meaning is determined for moral terms 
might be more like the way it is determined for terms like ‘milk’ or ‘jade’ rather than ‘water’. The use of 
moral terms may not meet Putnam’s ‘gold standard’ of being causally regulated by some hidden structure 
at the molecular level. 
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mistakes. Speaking of “wrong actions” might be like speaking of “unicorn horns”. Calling 
a lying action “wrong” might be like calling some gin “water”. Or denying that a lying 
action is “wrong” might be like denying that female dogs give “milk”. (2000, p.128) 
The second problem for H&T is that they do not respect the fact that, on Putnam’s view, 
what similarities are ‘semantically relevant’ is a matter settled by our referential intentions and 
interests: 
The second error is that the reasoning does not take into account the fact that, for Putnam, 
some similarities among the items that are included in the extension of a term by speakers 
might be irrelevant to determining its extension. Putnam says that “important” similarities 
are what matter and, he says, the notion of importance is “interest relative”. (2000, p.128) 
For example, when it comes to the meaning of ‘milk’, the similarities that are semantically 
relevant are the functional and genetic properties that are shared by the local samples of milk. 
The reason that these are the relevant similarities is that, when we use the word ‘milk’, we have 
a certain interest—to refer to whatever has the relevantly same nature as the local samples that 
we call ‘milk’ .66 Consequently, Copp explains, the meaning of ‘milk’ has this referential intention 
built-in. The lesson from this example (and others), according to Copp, is that “in in applying the 
semantics, we need to fix on respects of similarity that are semantically relevant, given speakers’ 
intentions and interests” (2000, p.128). In light of this lesson, we should respect the fact that moral 
terms are also used with certain referential intentions and interests. 
Copp claims that we need to settle two “key matters” about moral terms, as they are used 
in H&T’s scenario, before a Putnamian semantics can hope to capture the meaning of those terms: 
First is the content of speakers’ referential intentions in using corresponding English and 
Twin English moral and twin moral terms. Second is the kinds of similarities that would 
be semantically relevant, given the interests with which speakers use these terms. (2000, 
p.129) 
According to Copp, both matters are settled by the details that H&T build into the Moral Twin 
Earth scenario “together with our semantic intuitions and Putnam’s theory” (2000, p.129). First, 
H&T assume that the relevant terms in English and Twin English are distinctively moral terms—
terms that are distinct in kind from, say, the classificatory terms of the social sciences or the terms 
of etiquette (2000, p.129). Second, H&T assume that Earthers and Twin Earthers have 
corresponding referential intentions when they use moral terms like ‘morally right’ to convey 
their respective moral views: 
. . . by construction of the Twin Earth example, Earthlings and Twin Earthlings have 
corresponding intentions and interests in using the corresponding moral terms in their 
                                                     
66 Again, what counts as ‘relevantly same nature’ is determined by our general semantic interest to refer to 
some things and not others when we use words. When we use the word ‘milk’ for instance, we use that 
word with the referential intention to pick out whatever it is that speakers in our community use that word 
to refer to, i.e. anything that is suitably similar to the local samples of milk. If we wanted to pick out some 
other things, like almond milk or coconut milk, then we would pick some other properties as being the 
“relevantly same” or suitably similar ones that determine the meaning of ‘milk’. The way the relevantly 
similar properties are chosen is therefore a kind of two-step process: First, decide what interests you have 
in using a word; second, pick the properties of similarity that are relevant, given those interests. 
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languages, and the relevant intentions and interests of the Earthlings in the example are 
the same as our intentions and interests in the actual world in situations in which we use 
the term “wrong” or its equivalent. (2000, p.129) 
Given that H&T build both features above into their description of the Moral Twin Earth scenario, 
Copp says we can apply Putnam’s semantics and rely on our intuitions about the scenario in light 
of applying that semantics. Copp’s focus, in line with the cases he mentions above, is on the 
“corresponding intentions and interests” that the Moral Earther and Moral Twin Earther share. 
The details of what these corresponding intentions and interests are can be brought out by looking, 
as Putnam did for ‘water’, at the presuppositions that we use those terms with, e.g. in ostensively 
defining the sort of actions that are ‘morally right’ and ‘wrong’. 
§4.5.4 The Putnamian Approach to Moral Twin Earth 
Copp suggests that we start by asking “What is presupposed in “ostensive definitions” of 
moral terms?” (2000, p.129). Remember that, according to Putnam, ostensive definition depends 
on certain empirical presuppositions and that when these are false, certain fallback conditions 
come into play (2000, p.129). When I point to a glass filled with a clear liquid and utter the word 
‘water’, I presuppose that the clear liquid in the glass is in fact the stuff that my linguistic 
community and I intend to use the word ‘water’ to refer to. If my presupposition was false and 
the glass contains gin rather than water, then as Putnam put it, “I do not intend my definition to 
be accepted.” Copp argues that similar presuppositions ground the use of moral terms. He brings 
this out in the following passage: 
Suppose, then, that an English speaker on Earth is teaching a child about right and wrong 
beginning with the lesson that lying is wrong. Suppose he says, “Lying is wrong”. This 
teaching does not presuppose that the speaker believes lying to be of the same kind or 
even the same moral kind as most of the acts that the speaker and most speakers in his 
linguistic community have been calling ‘wrong’. For he might be a non-conformist who 
disagrees with most speakers in his community about which kinds of acts are wrong. A 
non-conformist does not have different linguistic or semantic intentions from moral 
conformists. His moral terms do not have different meanings. And his belief that most 
people are mostly mistaken about which acts are wrong would not undermine his view 
that lying is wrong. So he would not have the intention to withdraw his teaching if it 
turned out that lying is not of the same (moral) kind as most of the acts that most speakers 
in his linguistic community have been calling ‘wrong’. If he is sincere, then of course he 
would intend to withdraw his teaching if he came to believe that lying is not wrong. And 
if he is sincere, he would be committed to withdrawing his teaching if he came to believe 
that lying is not of the kind, or does not have the property, that he and most speakers in 
his linguistic community intend to refer to in using “wrong”. This is the kind we call 
“wrong action”, and the property is the one we call “wrongness”. As Mackie might say, 
it is the property of “not-to-be-doneness”. (2000, pp.129-130) 
According to Copp, the example implies that ostensive definition for moral terms presupposes 
that there are moral properties or kinds, such as ‘not-to-be-doneness’, that speakers in my 
community intend to refer to in using their moral terms such as ‘morally right’ and ‘wrong’. If 
that presupposition is false, e.g. there is no ‘not-to-be-doneness’ property, then Copp says, “we 
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would not engage in moral discourse or moral teaching” (2000, p.130). Here the problem for H&T 
comes to the forefront. 
 The example that Copp describes suggests that our use of moral terms, like our use of 
any other sort of terms, involves certain presuppositions about our referential intentions and 
interests. When we use the expression ‘morally right’, we intend to refer to things that have the 
property that most speakers in our community intend to refer to in using that expression, i.e. the 
property being morally right or being to-be-done.67 H&T seem to grant this in the similarities they 
describe between Earth and Twin Earth. According to Copp, this is the key similarity that enables 
the proponent of a Putnam-style moral semantics to escape H&T’s conclusion. Given the scenario, 
it is open for this objector to claim that, the Earther and Twin Earther use ‘morally right’ in their 
respective languages with the same referential intention, to refer to whatever has the property that 
speakers in their community intend to refer to in using the expression ‘morally right’. It is because 
they share this referential intention that their moral terms are moral terms at all.68 The two use 
their orthographically identical terms with the intention to refer to the same property, though 
disagree about what things actually have this property. So, contrary to H&T’s argument, there is 
room to understand the Earther and Twin Earther as genuinely disagreeing: 
. . . in using “wrong”, an English speaker intends to refer to actions that are of the kind, 
wrong, or that have the property of being wrong or of being not-to-be-done. And speakers 
of Twin English would have to have the same intentions. If they did not, the relevant 
terms in their language would not be moral terms. If speakers used a term, “twong”, for 
example, with the intention merely to refer to the same kind of action that most speakers 
in the linguistic community have in fact been calling “twong”, then “twong” would not 
be a moral term. It might be a term of etiquette with a meaning similar to “impolite” or a 
descriptive classificatory term in the way that “skipping” is a descriptive term for a kind 
of action. But it would not be a moral term. (2000, p.130) 
The key point here is that the semantic account ascribed to the realist by H&T treats ‘wrong’ as 
being like ‘twong’. As Copp points out, this is a mischaracterization of what the realist should 
say about the referential intentions governing moral discourse. On a proper Putnamian semantic 
view, the one the realist ought to adopt, moral terms such as ‘morally right’ and ‘morally wrong’ 
possess a meaning that is determined by what the speakers of a community intend to use those 
terms to refer to—and not simply what they in fact call ‘morally right’ and ‘morally wrong’. So, 
if the realist adopts this kind of view, he or she can explain the kind of mistakes that Putnam and 
Copp describe and also capture the intuitions elicited from the Moral Twin Earth scenario. 
                                                     
67 Of course, the speakers of a community may on occasion make mistakes in how they use their moral 
terms. 
68 Copp likens his position to a claim that Mackie makes about the intentions that speakers have in using 
moral terms in his Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977). See Copp 2002, p.130 n42 and Mackie 1977, 
p.33. 
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§4.5.5 The Story So Far 
So far, Copp has argued that a Putnamian view can capture our intuitions about Moral 
Twin Earth by viewing the Earther and Twin Earther as having corresponding referential 
intentions when they use the moral terms of their respective languages. In fact, according to Copp, 
the two must have corresponding referential intentions if the terms they use are moral terms at all. 
This must be the case because moral discourse, like any other kind of discourse (e.g. about natural 
kinds, about etiquette, etc.), presupposes that its terms are used with certain referential intentions. 
As Copp has explained, what distinguishes moral terms from other kinds of terms is that moral 
terms are used with the intention to refer to actions that have certain properties, say, of “being 
right” or “being to-be-done”.69 Copp’s point is that this stipulation is built into H&T’S scenario. 
By construction the scenario, Twin Earth moral discourse is uniformly similar in all regards with 
Earthen moral discourse, so Earthers and Twin Earthers must have corresponding referential 
intentions when they use their respective moral terms. This much could potentially be shown by 
supposing that the contrary is true. 
Imagine that the Twin Earther uses the putative moral terms of his language with a sort 
of deviant referential intention: Suppose that the Twin Earther uses the term ‘morally right’ with 
the intention to refer to whatever actions are of the kind or have the property of requiring 
exceptional physical fitness. Given that he has this intention when he uses that term, he applies 
‘morally right’ to actions such as climbing Mt. Everest, competing in a triathlon, and so on. On 
Copp’s view, this would imply that the Twin Earther does not genuinely engage in moral 
discourse when he uses the term ‘morally right’. Whenever the Twin Earther uses this term, he is 
not speaking about the subject matter of moral discourse. His so-called “moral terms” are not 
strictly speaking moral terms at all. Now if this Twin Earther were to exchange “moral views” 
with the Earther described by Horgan and Timmons, we could not reasonably call their exchange 
a genuine disagreement. Intuitively, the two could only speak at cross purposes whenever they 
exchange their sentiments about what things are ‘morally right’ in their respective languages: The 
Earther uses ‘morally right’ with the intention to refer to actions that have the property of being 
morally right or being to-be-done whereas the Twin Earther uses ‘morally right’ with the intention 
to refer to actions that have the property of requiring exceptional physical fitness. 
§4.5.6 Shared Interests 
According to Copp, we can reasonably expect the Earther and Twin Earther to also share 
the same interests in using moral terms. Remember that for Putnam, what properties are 
semantically relevant is a matter determined by our general interests in using a word, i.e. in terms 
of the role we want that word to play. So given whatever interests we may have in using a 
particular word, we adopt the referential intentions that will satisfy those interests. Given different 
                                                     
69 I preserve the scare quotes that Copp uses when he mentions these properties. 
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interests, our words would mean different things. When it comes to the moral terms involved in 
the Moral Twin Earth scenario, Horgan and Timmons presuppose that the Earther and Twin 
Earther have the same interests when they use the moral terms of their respective languages. In 
particular, they use moral terms with the aim of playing a practical role—to evaluate actions, 
deliberate, and make decisions about what to do: 
. . . Twin Earthling judgments about what is “right” and “wrong” play the same role in 
Twin Earthling reasoning, deliberation, and decision making about what to do that 
Earthling judgments about what is “right” and “wrong” play in the reasoning, deliberation, 
and decision making of Earthlings. For example, the Earthlings and Twin Earthlings are 
normally disposed to do what they take to be right or twin-right, respectively; they 
normally take considerations about right or twin-right, respectively, to be especially 
important in deciding what to do, and so on. The Twin Earthlings’ beliefs about twin-
right and twin-wrong, like the Earthlings’ beliefs about right and wrong, are normative 
beliefs. Moreover, “wrong” is the primary negative term of act evaluation in the Twin 
Earthlings’ moral code just as the Earthling term “wrong” is the primary negative term 
of act evaluation in the Earthlings’ moral code. (2000, p.131) 
According to Copp, these features explain the intuition about why the Earther and Twin Earther 
genuinely disagree in the lying case: 
These facts about the example explain, I think, why we have the intuition that the 
Earthlings and Twin Earthlings disagree in the lying case about the truth of the 
proposition that lying is wrong. Moreover, they point us in the direction of the interest 
speakers have in using the term “wrong” in English, or the corresponding term in Twin 
English. Their interest is to pick out the kind of action or property of actions, whatever 
that might be, that is of primary importance morally in deciding which actions to avoid – 
the kind that is especially to be avoided, or the property of being morally “to-be-avoided” 
or “not-to-be-done”. (2000, p.131) 
Given that the relevant intentions and interests correspond in the right way, Copp claims that, for 
any coherent Moral Twin Earth, a Putnamian semantics will imply that English and Twin English 
moral terms mean the same thing. (2000, p.131) After all, in Horgan and Timmons’ scenario, all 
of the relevant similarities are in place: 
. . . by construction of the example, there is no morally relevant difference between the 
two worlds. People in the different worlds have different moral theories, of course. But 
Earthlings and Twin Earthlings are rational to the same degree and have the same abilities, 
vulnerabilities, needs and desires, and causal laws are the same on the two planets. Hence, 
any coherent moral theory would say if wrongness is instantiated on the one planet it is 
instantiated in the other, and vice versa, and that the kinds of actions that are wrong on 
the one planet are wrong on the other, and vice versa. But if the worlds are the same in 
all morally relevant respects, and if corresponding terms in the languages spoken on the 
two worlds are used with relevantly the same referential intentions, and if people’s 
interests are the same in using these terms, then the terms would be assigned the same 
meaning in Putnamian semantics (2000, p.132). 
This, Copp says, is enough to refute Horgan and Timmons’ argument without explicating either 
a complete Putnamian story about moral terms or a complete defence of synthetic moral 
naturalism (2000, p.133). Once we are clear about the referential intentions governing moral 
discourse, we can see the Earther and Twin Earther as genuinely disagreeing. 
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In closing, Copp suggests that his Putnamian view can be extended to Twin Earth 
scenarios involving non-normative terms. To show this, Copp envisions a kind of “Milk Twin 
Earth”: 
It might be useful here to consider a Twin Earth scenario involving a term that is not 
normative in order to show that the issues raised for Putnamian semantics by the Moral 
Twin Earth argument can also arise for non-normative terms. Suppose, then, that 
Earthlings are acquainted with human milk, cow milk and goat milk and call each of these 
liquids “milk” in English. They are not acquainted with sheep milk. Twin Earthlings are 
acquainted with human milk, cow milk, and sheep milk and call each of these liquids 
“milk” in Twin English. But they are not acquainted with goat milk. Both Earthlings and 
Twin Earthlings are aware that female dogs that have recently given birth secrete a fluid 
that is drunk by their young. Earthlings say in English that this is “milk” while Twin 
Earthlings say in Twin English that it is not “milk”. Twin Earthlings deny that it is “milk” 
because they believe that all twin-milk is white and they have observed that the relevant 
secretion of female dogs is yellow. Earth and Twin Earth are otherwise as similar to each 
other and as similar to the actual world as is compatible with the differences already noted. 
(2000, p.132) 
Following suit with our intuitions about the lying example, Copp supposes that we would be 
inclined to judge that ‘milk’ means the same thing on Earth and Twin Earth, though Earthers and 
Twin Earthers disagree about whether the liquid secreted by female dogs shortly after birthing is 
milk or not. According to Copp, his Putnamian view can capture this intuition. 
First, we know by construction of the scenario that Earthers and Twin Earthers have 
corresponding referential intentions and interests when they use the word ‘milk’. Second, we 
know that the liquids in question (to which ‘milk’ is applied) share no common chemical 
composition, though they do share the functional and genetic property of being a liquid (roughly) 
produced by a female mammal after birthing to nourish its young (2000, p.133). This property is 
the semantically relevant one, Copp says, because it is the property that is the focus of both the 
Earther and Twin Earthers’ interests in using the term ‘milk’ in their respective languages—as 
such, this property is the key one that figures into the corresponding referential intentions when 
Earthers and Twin Earthers use the term ‘milk’ (in English and Twin English). According to Copp, 
this implies that the terms in English and Twin English mean the same thing. In addition, because 
the relevant functional/genetic property is in fact possessed by the liquid secreted by female dogs, 
the Earther is correct to apply the English term ‘milk’ as he does. On the other hand, the Twin 
Earther is incorrect to apply the Twin English term ‘milk’ as he does. So despite the fact that the 
Twin Earther believes that this liquid is not milk, because it is yellow and not white, this fact does 
not rule out the relevant functional/genetic property as the referent of ‘milk’ (2000, p.133). Again, 
as Copp notes, any coherent semantics must have room for mistaken beliefs about extension and 
this is the point that causes problems for Horgan and Timmons in their treatment of Moral Twin 
Earth. 
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§4.6 The “Copp/Milk” Objection to Meaning Twin Earth 
The argument that Copp uses to undermine Horgan and Timmons’ Moral Twin Earth 
argument might appear to be available to undermine the Meaning Twin Earth argument outlined 
in Chapter Two. If a suitably similar argument can be drawn, then there would be a way for an 
anti-normativist to avoid the conclusion that our intuitions about the Meaning Twin Earth scenario 
are best explained by the normativity of meaning. By using an analogue of Copp’s objection, one 
could explain the intuitions about the Meaning Twin Earth scenario without assuming that 
meaning is normative. In brief, an anti-normativist could claim that ‘means’ is like ‘milk’ and that 
an analogous explanation can be given along the lines that Copp suggests. I will now move on to 
consider this line of argument. 
§4.6.1 ‘Means’ and ‘Milk’ 
First, it is important to notice that an anti-normativist cannot simply apply Copp’s main 
line of objection to reject my normativist argument about Meaning Twin Earth. If ‘means’ is 
treated like ‘good’, then the anti-normativist has already conceded the conclusion that I want to 
draw, that ‘means’ is a normative term. After all, in Copp’s discussion of Moral Twin Earth, Copp 
argues that a proper appreciation of the role played by referential intentions in Putnamian 
semantics leads to the conclusion that moral terms stand for normative properties. Other sorts of 
terms, like ‘milk’ and ‘jade’ for instance, refer to non-normative properties. Copp does not 
formally argue this point because he does not need to, given his purposes. Copp’s goal is simply 
to demonstrate that a Putnamian semantics can vindicate our intuitions about Moral Twin Earth. 
This he can do without saying anything specific about the normative status of terms like ‘morally 
right’ or ‘wrong’. Nonetheless he does assume that these terms are normative in kind. As I have 
mentioned, the anti-normativist and myself are most interested in this feature with respect to 
meaning, i.e. in whether the term ‘means’, as it is used to ascribe meaning to a speaker and his 
utterances, is likewise normative. The main point of my argument in Chapter Two is that it is, 
given that the best explanation of our intuitions about the Meaning Twin Earth scenario involves 
the idea that meaning is normative. The anti-normativist wants to reject this, but the onus of proof 
is on him to show that the contrary is true. I have already made a preliminary case for how a 
normativist view can readily explain our intuitions about Meaning Twin Earth.70 
One way that the anti-normativist about meaning might try to proceed at this point is by 
employing Copp’s strategy, which as we’ve seen can also be used to explain Twin Earth scenarios 
about non-normative terms. I will argue that the anti-normativist about meaning cannot do this 
without begging the question against his normativist opponent. 
                                                     
70 In Chapter Six I develop the case for this point further. 
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§4.6.2 ‘Means’ and Dispositionalism 
 Given the strategy suggested by Copp, the anti-normativist can construct an analogous 
argument to the effect that any Twin Earth scenario about ‘means’ can be explained without 
assuming that ‘means’ is normative. Naturally, the anti-normativist can do this is by assuming 
that meaning ascription or ‘means’ refers to some alternative (non-normative) properties 
analogous to the functional and genetic properties that Copp uses to explain his ‘Milk’ Twin Earth. 
The best candidate for that role would be some dispositional properties, in line with a 
dispositionalist account of meaning.71 This would be the best candidate for the anti-normativist, 
given that Copp assumes that moral terms stand for normative properties—which is in line with 
the point I eventually want to make and the point that the anti-normativist does not want to 
concede, given the trouble it may cause for naturalism or other views. If the anti-normativist takes 
‘means’ to stand for some dispositional properties, then he can explain a speaker’s meaning in 
terms of whether those properties are instantiated or not, i.e. whether the speaker in fact possesses 
a particular disposition to use an expression in a certain way. Of course, there is reason to be 
sceptical about whether dispositionalism can succeed in meeting the paradigm objections vis-a-
vis finitude and circularity, but for now let’s assume these worries can be met.72 I argue that, even 
if we set aside these problems for dispositionalism, the anti-normativist cannot use 
dispositionalism to foil my thesis via an application of the strategy that Copp suggests for ‘milk’. 
§4.6.3 Meeting the Copp-Milk Objection 
In order to meet the Copp-Milk objection, it will be crucial to keep an eye on the ground 
rules vis-a-vis what is permissible for my opponent and I to argue without begging the question 
against one another. In addition, it will be crucial to keep an eye on my general argumentative 
strategy. Once these are in clear view, I will argue that the best the anti-normativist can do against 
my argument is to force a stand-off. This stand-off is not sufficient to meet the challenge of my 
argument and so at this point the anti-normativist does not have access to a successful objection. 
Here I first gloss my general argument and then explain the key rules that the anti-normativist and 
I must abide by with respect to this argument. 
§4.6.4 General Strategy 
In Chapter One, I discussed two constraints on any adequate account of meaning, 
following KW’s argument for meaning scepticism in Kripke (1982). On the first constraint, any 
adequate theory of meaning must give an account of how reference is determined, i.e. what makes 
                                                     
71 Again, Copp assumes that moral terms stand for normative properties. The anti-normativist wants to 
avoid this and so the best alternative, in line with a naturalist framework, is to say that ‘means’ stands for 
some dispositional properties. 
72 The final line of objection, in Kripke (1982) and popular elsewhere, is that dispositionalism cannot 
capture the normativity of meaning. This line of objection would, in this context, beg the question against 
the anti-normativist. 
   
 
90 
it the case that ‘+’ refers to the addition function and not the quaddition function, as KW’s sceptic 
proposes. On the second constraint, any adequate theory of meaning must account for the basic 
normative character of meaning. The overall aim of my thesis is to provide some evidence for the 
claim that this second constraint is legitimate and imposes a genuine adequacy constraint on 
accounts of meaning, something that a theory may fail to meet. My anti-normativist opponent 
claims that the imposition of this second constraint is in fact not justified. 
§4.6.5 Ground Rules 
First, I cannot simply assume that dispositionalism fails with respect to the first constraint, 
i.e. the determination of reference. I cannot do so because this would beg the question against 
dispositionalism. The strategy I use does not need to this because the ultimate upshot of this 
dissertation is that we have evidence that the second constraint functions as a further constraint 
on any adequate theory of meaning. Second, my opponent cannot assume that dispositionalism is 
a plausible semantic theory, given my challenge with respect to the second constraint. If my 
opponent does so, he begs the question by either assuming that the second constraint is illegitimate 
or that dispositionalism can meet the second constraint. 
At this point, it is open for the anti-normativist to suggest that if dispositionalist can meet 
the first constraint, then the Copp-Milk line of argument can be used to block my argument with 
respect to the second constraint. This would be problematic for me, because it would establish 
that the second constraint, contrary to what I have argued so far, does not impose a check on 
accounts of meaning above and beyond the first constraint. Fortunately for my argument, this is 
not the kind of objection that the anti-normativist can gather from Copp’s original discussion. 
What the anti-normativist can argue is that ‘means’ is like ‘milk’ and that Copp’s objection can 
therefore be used against my argument. The problem for the anti-normativist is that this assumes 
that ‘means’ is like ‘milk’ and this assumption is off-limits. The anti-normativist cannot make 
this assumption without begging the question against my claim about the second constraint, i.e. 
that the second constraint imposes an additional constraint on accounts of meaning, including 
dispositionalism. Thus the anti-normativist cannot block my application of Moral Twin Earth to 
the meaning case by using the Copp-Milk objection without in this way begging the question. So 
even if Copp’s argument damages the Moral Twin Earth argument proposed by Horgan and 
Timmons, this same argument cannot damage my application of that argument to the case of 
meaning via Meaning Twin Earth. Another way to put this point might be as follows. 
The anti-normativist can certainly avail himself of the following conditional: 
(1) If meaning properties are dispositional properties, then Copp’s strategy yields a way 
for the intuitions about Meaning Twin Earth to be captured without invoking the 
normativity of meaning. 
However, in order for the anti-normativist to detach and reach the conclusion, i.e.: 
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(3) Copp’s strategy yields a way for the intuitions about Meaning Twin Earth to be 
captured without invoking the normativity of meaning 
The anti-normativist would need (2): 
(2) Meaning properties are dispositional properties. 
In the present context, the anti-normativist cannot do this without begging the question. The 
availability of (2) presupposes either that meaning is not normative, or that meaning is normative 
in a way that dispositionalism can capture.73 
§4.6.6 Connection with Plunkett and Sundell 
In closing, it is worth pointing out the similarity between my response to the Copp-Milk 
objection and my reply to Plunkett and Sundell. In both cases, there are special features about 
meaning that leave my argument intact even if the relevant objection succeeds against the Moral 
Twin Earth argument from Horgan and Timmons. 
In considering Plunkett and Sundell’s line of argument, I suggested that metalinguistic 
negotiation cannot capture the disagreement between the Earther and Twin Earther about the 
meaning of ‘meaning’ because that dispute depends on having a shared notion of ‘meaning’ (at 
least provisionally) in order to communicate that disagreement. We cannot make this assumption 
in attempting to extend metalinguistic negotiation to the case of meaning, so any attempt to make 
this extension will fail. The Earther and Twin Earther must mean the same thing by ‘means’ even 
if they disagree about whether ‘means’ ought to denote (roughly) an individualist or 
communitarian theory of meaning—or indeed any other theory of meaning. So though Plunkett 
and Sundell’s strategy may succeed in capturing numerous other cases of genuine disagreement, 
Meaning Twin Earth turns out to be a limiting case for that strategy. 
In Copp’s case, the analogous argument inspired from the ‘milk’ scenario cannot succeed, 
given the aim of my thesis and the ground rules that my opponent and I must abide by. Copp’s 
strategy cannot succeed if it is applied to the meaning case because it would require the question-
begging assumption that there is no constraint in addition to the constraint about the determination 
of reference—one that an account of meaning, like dispositionalism, might fail to meet. This 
assumption is question begging because it amounts, as I have explained, to a flat rejection of my 
argument that Kripke’s second constraint (about the normativity of meaning) constitutes a 
genuine and independent constraint on any theory of meaning. As such, there is no clear way for 
the anti-normativist to apply Copp’s proposed line of argument against my thesis without begging 
the question. 
                                                     
73 It may be objected that dispositionalism can view the normativity of meaning as strictly referring to 
‘Norm Relativity’, but this would essentially involve a rejection of ‘Normativity’, i.e. the view that meaning 
properties are essentially prescriptive or action-guiding in the way that the Meaning Twin Earth scenario 
suggests. See §1.7-1.7.1. 




In this chapter I have argued that Copp’s line of objection of the Moral Twin Earth 
argument has no straightforward application to the use of Meaning Twin Earth as a device for 
providing evidence that meaning is normative. In the next chapter, I move on to consider another 
prominent line of objection to Moral Twin Earth that is developed by David Merli in his “Return 
to Moral Twin Earth” (2002). 
  






Chapter Five: Merli ‘Return to Moral Twin Earth’ 
§5.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter I evaluate David Merli’s three objections against Horgan and Timmons’ 
Moral Twin Earth argument from his paper “Return to Moral Twin Earth” (2002). I outline each 
of these objections and argue that each fail to debunk the Moral Twin Earth argument and by 
proxy my Meaning Twin Earth argument. 
§5.2 Describing Moral Twin Earth 
In his first response to Horgan and Timmons (H&T), Merli claims that the intuitive force 
of the Moral Twin Earth argument hinges on an ‘underdescription’ of the Moral Twin Earth 
scenario (MTE) and in particular, the workings of twin-moral practice. Once we explore how the 
scenario can be suitably clarified, Merli says, it turns out that H&T’s argument is faulty. To show 
this, Merli revisits the MTE argument and highlights what that argument must do in order to 
succeed. First, recall that the general aim of H&T’s argument is to demonstrate that causal 
semantic naturalism (CSN), or what Merli calls ‘naturalistic moral realism’ (NMR) is unlikely to 
succeed. H&T argue that NMR cannot capture our linguistic intuitions about some cases of moral 
disagreement. In particular, NMR’s semantic theory cannot explain the intuition that the Earther 
and Twin Earther of the MTE scenario genuinely disagree in spite of the fact that their moral 
terms, the English ‘morally right’ and Twin English ‘morally right’, refer to distinct natural 
(functional) properties. NMR implies that these two parties could not disagree; they would simply 
speak at cross purposes, given that their terms mean different things. This seems patently false, 
according to H&T. Therefore, our linguistic intuitions about the MTE scenario count as evidence 
against NMR: the two parties are best viewed as meaning the same thing and as genuinely 
disagreeing; NMR suggests otherwise and thus we should abandon NMR given that it generates 
unintuitive results in moral disagreements such as the one showcased in the MTE scenario. 
According to Merli, the success of this argument against NMR depends on the satisfaction of two 
key conditions: 
1. First, we have to think that we have a real moral dispute (that is, about what’s right) 
with the twin-moralists. We have to think that our terms mean what theirs do. (If we 
don’t, the realist’s purported admission of equivocation seems intuitively plausible.) 
2. Second, it has to be true that twin-moral terms really are hooked up in the right way 
(i.e. by causal regulation) to natural properties that don’t stand in this relation to our 
moral terms. (If not, then the realist can happily agree with our linguistic intuitions, and 
there’s no objection.) (2002, p.214) 
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Merli argues that the MTE scenario cannot be explicated in a way that meets both conditions 
simultaneously. 
The main issue, as Merli sees it, is that H&T fail to describe in sufficient detail what twin-
moral practice is like: 
The problem is that we don’t know very much about what twin-moral practice looks like. 
We know that twin-moral terms play roughly the same formal role as our moral terms: 
they evaluate actions, their application is connected to patterns of praise and blame, and 
so on. (2002, p.214) 
In particular, we do not know enough about the content of twin-moral practice, Merli continues: 
What kinds of acts are labelled ‘wrong’ by our alien evaluators, and why? What kind of 
justifications are offered in defence of these assessments? What broad theoretical 
commitments inform their reasoning? (2002, p.215) 
According to Merli, the answers here (in terms of the requisite details about twin-moral practice) 
could unseat our initial intuitions about MTE. Can H&T provide these details in a way that leaves 
our original intuitions intact? 
§5.3 Merli’s Dilemma for H&T 
There are two ways, Merli says, that H&T can attempt to spell out the requisite details 
about the content of twin-moral practice: First, H&T can try to meet the first constraint above by 
ensuring that we have strong intuitions that twin-moral terms mean the same thing as their Earthen 
moral counterparts and that, as such, the Earther and Twin Earther are most plausibly viewed as 
genuinely disagreeing. H&T are able to do this by constructing MTE in a fashion that is exactly 
like Earth in every way possible, including the stipulation that “twin moralists make the same 
kinds of judgments with ‘right’ that we do, appeal to the same kinds of justifications in defending 
those judgments, and so on” (2002, p.215). According to Merli, if H&T opt for this route, then 
“the twin-moral term ‘right’ couldn’t refer to a different (functional) natural property given that 
the same relation fixes reference in both places” (2002, p.215). If H&T meet one constraint, they 
cannot meet the other. This is the case because, generally speaking “[a] term will refer to a 
property in virtue of some fact about the world, the term, and its use; if Moral Twin Earth is just 
the same as our own planet, then their terms cannot but refer to the same properties” (2002, p.215). 
This is problematic for H&T because the realist, the proponent of NMR, can say that H&T’s 
stipulation about difference in reference between moral and twin-moral terms cannot hold. If 
MTE is identical with Earth in all of the ways mentioned above, which fix the reference of the 
relevant terms, according to Merli, then those terms must share the same reference and there is 
then no bar to the realist claiming that the Earther and Twin Earther genuinely disagree. 
Consequently, H&T cannot meet the first constraint without conceding to the realist that their 
claim about reference is mistaken. 
The second way that H&T can answer to Merli’s worry about the workings of twin-moral 
practice is by addressing the second constraint. H&T can do this by showing how twin-moral 
   
 
95 
practice is substantively different from Earthen moral practice (2002, p.215-6). According to 
Merli, if H&T explain how the content of twin-moral practice differs from that on Earth, then it 
will be clear how ‘morally right’ and ‘wrong’ etc. can denote different properties, as H&T 
stipulate. The trouble with this path for H&T is that, according to Merli, stipulating these 
differences about twin-moral practice will undermine our collective intuition about shared 
meaning (2002, p.216). If these differences are substantial enough, then Merli says, we may even 
be inclined to retract our original intuition about twin-moral semantics. After all, one of the main 
reasons that we have the intuitions that we do about twin-moral semantics is that we imagine 
Twin Earthers as using terms like ‘morally right’ and ‘wrong’ in roughly the same way that we 
do (2002, p.216). If we suppose the contrary is true and that the twin-moralizers use their terms 
quite differently, then H&T’s assessment would lose its intuitive force: 
Suppose that we learn that . . . there are significant differences between our uses of the 
term and theirs (differences, say, not just in the extensions of the terms but the kinds of 
reasons they give and accept, and so on). Twin moralists apply ‘right’ to acts we’re sure 
are abhorrent, they offer completely different kinds of justifications for their claims, they 
see our reasons as irrelevant, and so on. (2002, p.216) 
In this case, according to Merli, it would be fair to say that we’d either retract or at least weaken 
the intuitions that H&T capitalize on: 
It seems to me that then we’d either withdraw our initial judgment that we share terms 
with the twin-moralists, or at least offer it with less conviction. The content of the twin-
moral practice will affect our judgments of shared meaning. (2002, p.216) 
If twin-moral practice turned out to be radically different from our own, we may be inclined to 
judge that twin-moral terms do not mean the same thing as our terms.74 In this respect, the second 
option for H&T does not fare any better than the first. If H&T build the appropriate details into 
MTE to make twin-moral practice sufficiently different from moral practice on Earth, then it 
seems that twin-moral terms could not mean the same thing as Earthen moral terms do. So even 
though H&T can meet Merli’s second constraint, it seems that this must come at the cost of failing 
the first constraint, and likewise for the converse claim. If H&T meet the first constraint, then it 
seems that they cannot meet the second. Merli summarizes this dilemma: 
The basic strategy is simple: first, we press Horgan and Timmons for a more detailed 
account of the workings of Moral Twin Earth, and then argue that either (a) the 
differences in content between moral and twin-moral practice are significant enough to 
undermine our conviction in the synonymy of moral and twin-moral terms; or (b) the 
similarities are sufficient to ensure that, according to the realist’s view of reference, twin-
moral terms refer to the same properties as our own moral terms. (2002, p.216) 
This is the main dilemma for H&T, and the first of the three objections that Merli levels against 
the MTE argument. In the following I detail how Merli argues that this dilemma cannot be met 
                                                     
74 This could potentially be shown even if the terms play a roughly similar role. The translation of the twin-
moral term ‘morally right’ might be a very bad translation of the English ‘morally right’. I made this same 
point about the notion of meaning deployed by Copp (2002) in his first reply to H&T. The closest thing to 
‘best discus thrower’ in the philosophy department might have never picked up a discus before. 
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by H&T and how this dilemma figures into a wider argument in defence of realism and especially 
NMR. 
§5.4 Merli’s First Objection 
Merli delivers his first objection to H&T in two parts: The first part focuses on a 
concession that Merli says H&T must make in order for their argument to succeed. This 
concession, according to Merli, is H&T’s assumption that moral discourse on Earth is causally 
regulated by one set of natural properties, despite the wide range of moral views that Earthers 
espouse. The second part of Merli’s objection suggests a holistic response to H&T, inspired by 
other realist responses to familiar worries about realism’s ability to explain moral disputes. 
§5.4.1 Merli’s Target: H&T’s Univocity Concession 
The main target of Merli’s first objection is H&T’s concession that one set of natural 
properties causally regulates the use of moral terms by Earthers, despite any variance across the 
moral views of individuals on Earth. H&T effectively assume that speakers with quite different 
kinds of normative commitments are, on each planet, “hooked up in the right sort of way to the 
same cluster of properties, even though they make different moral judgments, offer different sorts 
of justifications, and so on” (2002, p.217). This, Merli says, amounts to the concession to the 
realist that, on Earth for example, “the conversations between Kant and Mill, between Christian 
and cannibal, and between moral communities of various places or times” can all be captured by 
the semantic theory proposed by NMR (2002, p.217-8). This concession is a generous one and 
can help NMR explain moral disputes here on Earth (and potentially elsewhere) in that “whatever 
its details turn out to be, [NMR’s theory of meaning] can preserve univocity between speakers 
with diverse views on topics such as the divine right of kings, the permissibility of chattel slavery, 
the obligations to segregate people of different races, and the proper social role of women—or so 
our assumption lets us say” (2002, p.218). This is an impressive claim, according to Merli, 
“precisely because of the range of actual-world moral disagreement” (2002, p.218). Merli uses 
H&T’s concession to reinforce his general worry about H&T’s ability to meet the two conditions 
he cites for the success of their argument. 
§5.4.2 Radical Differences 
Merli argues that when we take H&T’s concession seriously, it shows that the two authors 
are under immense pressure to specify the details of twin-moral discourse in a way that is radically 
different from our own moralizing if they are to foil NMR’s semantic view. H&T must do this 
because otherwise NMR can readily capture the MTE scenario in the same manner as moral 
dispute here on Earth, given H&T’s concession for the sake of argument (i.e. that NMR’s theory 
of meaning can preserve univocity and capture disagreement across the diverse moral views of 
individual speakers). H&T need to describe twin-moral discourse in a way that NMR cannot 
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capture. The only way for H&T to do this, as mentioned, is to make twin-moralizing radically 
different from our own practice. As Merli puts it: 
. . . there’s pressure on Horgan and Timmons to make the details of twin-moralizing much 
different from those of our own moral discourse; in an important sense it must be like 
nothing we’ve ever seen before. If it gave us only the views of a past time-slice of our 
moral discussions, or views that we see as fringe participants in our own conversations, 
then the realist could reply, plausibly, that the twin-moralists offer no more of a challenge 
to her view of meaning than do the Earthen interlocutors we’re assuming don’t cause 
problems. (2002, p.218) 
H&T face similar troubles in meeting Merli’s second condition. 
§5.4.3 Meeting the Second Condition 
If H&T describe twin-moral practice in some way radically different from that on Earth, 
it is unclear how that description could also meet Merli’s second condition. That is, it is unclear 
how these details about MTE could also guarantee that twin-moral terms are causally regulated 
by some natural properties that do not stand in the same relation to the moral terms used by 
Earthers. 75 In this case, it looks as though H&T are forced onto the other horn of the dilemma. If 
twin-moral terms are used in such a radically different way, completely alien to the way their 
Earthen counterparts are used, it would be implausible to view moral terms and twin-moral terms 
as being univocal: 
Imagine our response on encountering some radically foreign culture whose evaluative 
practices are quite different from our own. We could understand their terms as meaning 
‘right’ and ‘wrong’, or we could think that they have different concepts that play roughly 
the same role that the concepts of right and wrong play in our discussions. We might 
think that they evaluate action in terms of honor, or fierceness, or some untranslatable 
notion that (at least generally and for the most part) carries with it the kind of endorsement 
that rightness-judgments have in our own case.76 We can still apply our moral notions to 
their actions—that is, we can judge that they’re doing wrong—and we might think they 
have reason to take up our way of doing things, but all of this is compatible with thinking 
that their evaluative terms don’t mean what ours do. (2002, p.218-9) 
So though it would be at least prima facie plausible to view twin-moral terms as meaning the 
same because of some formal resemblance with moral terms on Earth, this resemblance cannot 
ground the intuition about univocity given how radically different twin-moral practice must be in 
order to draw the scenario as one that NMR’s semantic theory cannot explain (2002, p.218). Twin-
moral practice simply could not bear such a resemblance if it is different in the way required to 
meet the first condition. 
If Merli is right and the evaluative practices of twin-moralizers in the MTE scenario must 
be so remarkably different from our own, then we cannot reasonably view our counterparts on 
                                                     
75 As Merli says, twin-moral moral terms must be “hooked up in the right way” to properties that don’t 
stand in that relation to the terms of moral discourse on Earth. 
76 The reader may be inclined to think that Earthers and Twin Earthers mean the same thing by ‘right’ and 
‘wrong’ etc. but simply have different standards that regulate their uses of those terms, respective to their 
speaking communities. This is the gist of H&T’s take on dealing with this sort of radical disagreement and 
we will return to this later in evaluating Merli’s objection. 
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MTE as speaking about rightness and wrongness as we understand those concepts in our own 
moralizing (2002, p.219). Consequently, we could not plausibly view moral and twin-moral terms 
as having the same meaning. According to Merli, this is enough to show that H&T’s argument 
does not pose a serious threat or even a unique threat to realism: “ . . . if the realist can account 
for all, or at least enough, of moral disagreement here at home, then Moral Twin Earth poses no 
additional threat. At the very least, it adds to the philosophical debt that must be paid if the 
argument against NMR is to work” (2002, p.220). This debt is formidable enough that, according 
to Merli, it is unclear how H&T could meet it because H&T must show how the following three 
claims are consistent: 
A. The realist can account for shared meaning across diverse Earth contexts. 
B. Moral Twin Earth looks just (or enough) like Earth. 
C. The realist cannot account for shared meanings between Earth and Moral Twin Earth. 
(2002, p.220) 
The prospects for H&T accomplishing this feat are rather dim, according to Merli, and as such, 
H&T’s argument does not pose a serious threat to realism or NMR. At minimum, there is nothing 
new for realist to face in H&T’s argument, i.e. there is no additional challenge that MTE brings 
about in addition to the familiar worries about realism’s ability to explain ‘garden-variety’ cases 
of disagreement (2002, p.220). In the following sections, I argue that Merli’s first objection is 
unconvincing. 
§5.4.4 Moral Twin Earth is Still a Problem, Even if Based on Familiar 
Worries 
First, it is important to note that H&T’s Moral Twin Earth argument is a formidable 
challenge that the realist must meet even if the challenge is based on familiar worries about 
realism’s ability to capture our intuitions about some cases of disagreement. The fact that H&T’s 
worries are connected to some older ones does not lessen the impact of those worries against the 
realist. In fact, H&T are forthright about this aspect of their argument. 77 So the ‘discovery’ that 
H&T’s challenge is not a thoroughly novel one is not itself a point against that challenge. The 
realist still needs to address the challenge, even if it is a reconfigured version of familiar anti-
realist worries. 
                                                     
77 H&T claim that their argumentative strategy is designed to revive certain anti-realist worries expressed 
in classical arguments made in the past. H&T’s argument is that these old problems can re-emerge for 
modern realism, though in a different form (via the MTE scenario). If H&T are right and these old problems 
can still be posed against modern realism, then the realist cannot simply say that these old problems have 
been dealt with already. The realist needs to show how these old problems, in their reconfigured form, are 
not decisive against modern realist views like CSN. If H&T can show, for example, that something like a 
revised version of Moore’s OQA can be raised against CSN, then this is a serious problem for CSN—a 
project developed at least in part to meet the worries embodied by the OQA. If H&T are successful, then 
realism has failed to address a problem that it, loosely speaking, thinks it has addressed. For an overview 
of this general argumentative strategy, see H&T 2013. 
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Second, the realist should be especially concerned with H&T’s challenge insofar as that 
challenge is specifically designed to call NMR into question. Hare developed an argument based 
on similar concerns in the past, as pointed out in Chapter Four, but that argument targeted the 
analytic versions of naturalism of yesteryear and not the synthetic versions popular today, like 
NMR. H&T’s argument is better equipped to deal with these synthetic renditions of naturalism 
insofar as the two authors target the sort of semantic theory that underpin these modern versions 
of NMR (i.e. based around recent developments in the philosophy of language, as outlined in 
Chapter Two). The most that Merli admits is that H&T succeed insofar as the general worries 
they cite do indeed bring realism’s prospects for dealing with disagreement here on Earth into 
question. 
§5.4.5 How Can Realism Meet H&T’s Challenge? 
In wondering about how the realist might respond to H&T’s challenge, Merli asks 
whether H&T actually need to make the generous concession that NMR can account for shared 
meaning across diverse Earth contexts. After all, H&T may only concede this much to realism for 
the sake of argument. Moreover, Merli wonders whether reflection about MTE really does show 
that “even Earthian dispute, as the realist construes it, is equivocal” (2002, p.220). If it does, then 
realism is under pressure to demonstrate that it can “[preserve] univocity in garden-variety cases 
of moral disagreement” (2002, p.220-221). Merli argues that the realist’s prospects for achieving 
this are reasonably good, so long as the realist takes a holistic approach to the issue with an eye 
on some related problems for realism in moral epistemology. This is the second part of Merli’s 
first objection. Before addressing this part of the objection, we need to carefully consider whether 
H&T really need to make the concession that Merli cites. I argue that they do not. 
§5.4.6 H&T Do Not Need to Make the Univocity Concession to NMR 
Ultimately, H&T do not need to concede that NMR can capture the univocity of moral 
terms across diverse uses of those terms on Earth. As such, there is a way that H&T can avoid 
Merli’s objection, though potentially at some cost to the intuitive force of their argument.78 The 
key point is this: The ‘Earth’ described by H&T is very much like actual Earth, but there is a key 
difference—the Earthers that inhabit the Earth described by H&T uniformly subscribe to a 
consequentialist ethical theory. This much is not obvious about actual Earth, though we can 
imagine (roughly) what Earth would be like if this was true and this is enough for H&T’s purposes; 
all they need to do is provide a thought experiment that generates intuitions at odds with NMR. 
                                                     
78 Merli notes that H&T apparently view their argument as delivering a kind of “knockout punch” to CSN, 
partly because they concede realism can capture the univocity of moral terms on Earth despite the various 
moral views that individuals espouse. Merli takes H&T to suggest, by making this concession, that they 
believe their argument will succeed regardless of whatever happens with respect to actual disagreement 
here on Earth (2002, p.217, fn11). Moreover, Merli takes the concession to imply that H&T view 
themselves as advancing a new challenge to realism. As we have seen in §5.4.4, this is strictly-speaking 
not true. 
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According to H&T, this assumption about Earth and the similar assumption about Twin Earth 
yields intuitions at odds with those about Putnam’s classical scenario, as we saw in Chapter Two. 
If this is not enough to generate those intuitions, then H&T may be able to revise the scenario in 
some way that does yield those intuitions. 
One of the main reasons that H&T’s argument is so compelling is because it demonstrates 
that even if NMR can explain univocity on Earth, it cannot explain univocity in the MTE scenario. 
So though H&T ultimately want to show that NMR is in trouble in that it is unlikely to be able to 
capture actual disagreement on Earth, the MTE scenario is a powerful way to show this by making 
the major concession to realism that it does. As I have pointed out, H&T do not need to make the 
concession that they do, though this concession highlights the fact that does not successfully avoid 
the kind of objection that Moore raised against its analytic predecessors. That said, there may be 
some other ways to weaken the force of the concession without also weakening the strength of 
the argument. The easiest way for H&T to do this would be to revise their scenario in a way that 
makes less of a concession to the realist, e.g. by imagining less variance in the moral judgments 
of Earthers. Before we do this much, it is worth emphasizing again that H&T do not take their 
scenario to be about the actual planet Earth but instead some idealized (albeit very close) version 
of it. In this respect, the concession that Merli cites about actual disagreement on Earth may not 
actually reflect the concession that H&T make in the scenario. So given that H&T’s ‘Earth’ isn’t 
or doesn’t have to be the actual Earth, the concession that Merli mentions simply drops out as 
irrelevant. 
§5.4.7 Disagreement on ‘Earth’ and Revising the MTE Scenario 
One avenue of escape for H&T would be to simply drop the sort of variance that they 
imagine occurs on Earth and Twin Earth. H&T could suppose for instance that Earthers use moral 
terms in a perfectly uniform way given that they, let’s say, have arrived by consensus at some 
common moral theory like the consequentialist theory Tc. The difference with the original case is 
simply that all Earthers have perfect agreement about what moral terms mean and how they are 
to be applied to various actions, persons, etc. In short, Earthen moral discourse is perfectly 
regulated by Tc and as it turns out, there is no deviance from what Tc prescribes.79 This would 
weaken the force of the concession to realism in that it would not amount to much to admit that 
                                                     
79 The possibilities are endless here. For instance, H&T might imagine that there is a ‘Planet Singer’, a 
planet where all of its inhabitants perfectly subscribe to everything that Peter Singer has to say about moral 
matters, and ‘Planet Korsgaard’ and so on. This would get us more toward the kind of thought experiments 
that have been popular in the discussions about Putnam’s classical case, i.e. about ‘Mars’ and ‘Twin Mars’ 
and so on. A good survey of the key papers in this area is Pessin and Goldberg The Twin Earth Chronicles 
(1996). Introducing these more complicated versions may make things more difficult at the level of getting 
clear intuitions from ordinary folks, but they may nonetheless be able to fend off realist objections like the 
one Merli proposes here. 
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realism can capture the univocity of moral terms across a discourse that is perfectly uniform.80 
Now if we assume that there is a Twin Earth with exactly the same kind of phenomena, except 
for the fact that Twin Earthers use of ‘morally right’ is causally regulated by a property whose 
functional essence is captured by the deontological theory Td, then the realist is still in trouble. In 
this case, H&T have not conceded that realism can explain univocity on actual Earth, where 
people accept various moral views, though they do concede that realism can explain univocity on 
this imagined Earth, where Earthers uniformly accept exactly one moral view. The force of this 
argument is not as strong as the original one proposed by H&T, though it can still generate the 
same problem for NMR in that NMR’s semantic theory is not equipped to explain how an Earther 
and Twin Earther could mean the same thing and disagree about what is ‘morally right’ in spite 
of the different properties that the English ‘morally right’ and the Twin English ‘morally right’ 
refer to. 
Though the above argument may still work against NMR, this comes at some penalty to 
the strength of the argument, i.e. by conceding less to NMR and by stretching the imagination 
with the assumption that Earthers and Twin Earthers have perfect consensus about moral matters 
on each of their planets. As I have suggested, H&T can re-imagine the scenario to be about two 
planets that are substantially different from Earth, but this comes at the cost that our intuitions 
may not be as clear as they are in the original scenario.81 
The reason that Putnam’s classical Twin Earth scenario is so powerful is because it 
imagines Twin Earth as part of our actual world, albeit a distant part of it that we are not yet 
familiar with. The intuitions about that case are compelling largely because Putnam relies on 
familiar data about Earth. The same can be said of H&T’s Moral Twin Earth. The reason that 
H&T’s scenario is powerful is because we have basic convictions about how moral disagreement 
works here on Earth. If H&T stray too far from Earth, it becomes less clear how those convictions 
determine the assessment of the scenario. Nonetheless, there may be some simple ways that H&T 
can reimagine the scenario without stretching our intuitions too much, as I have suggested above, 
though it is unclear whether this is really necessary. We have already seen that Merli simply 
misinterprets H&T’s original scenario as being about actual Earth. The result of the scenario 
certainly causes some problems for realism, but this result does not necessarily hinge, as we have 
seen, on a scenario that is about Earth as we know it. With some slight alterations—or maybe just 
clarifications—the scenario can still work against NMR without conceding anything about actual 
disagreement here on Earth. 
                                                     
80 Granted, there is a way to view this scenario as weakening the challenge against naturalistic realism in 
that it reconstructs an actual moral dispute—something that isn’t a new challenge for the realist. However, 
merely pointing this out does not constitute an answer to the challenge. 
81 There may still be a better formulation out there that fares better than the scenario I have quickly sketched 
here. As I have noted, there are infinite ways for making minor alterations to the scenario and so there may 
be some scenario that can work against CSN at no (at least obvious) penalty to the force of our intuitions. 
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In the second part of the objection, Merli argues that realism can meet H&T’s challenge 
even if the two authors do not concede that realism can explain the univocity of moral terms on 
Earth. According to him, the realist can meet H&T’s challenge without this concession because 
realism’s prospects for preserving univocity are, by its own lights, reasonably good, given how 
realism can address some related problems in moral epistemology. 
§5.4.8 A Holistic Strategy for Preserving Univocity 
Merli argues that any realist answer to H&T’s challenge needs to target the general 
worries behind that challenge (i.e. worries about the ability of NMR’s semantic theory to explain 
moral disagreement). The realist can address these worries, Merli says, by taking a more holistic 
approach with an eye on three problems that embody these worries. The first he calls the 
‘univocity problem’: “how can a naturalistic account of our moral discourse earn the right to say 
that our terms mean the same thing in the mouths of speakers with such serious differences?” i.e. 
between two speakers who accept radically different moral views, like consequentialism and 
deontology, and use ‘morally right’ to apply to widely different things (2002, p.221). The second 
problem Merli calls the ‘practical role problem’: “how can the [realist] answer to the univocity 
problem—in terms of a view of reference, for example—allow for the distinct practical and 
evaluative role of moral discourse?” (2002, p.221). The third and final problem Merli calls the 
‘moral inquiry problem’: “the problem of showing how an account of the univocity of moral terms 
can preserve and legitimize (at least parts of) the procedures we use in our moral inquiry” (2002, 
p.221). These three issues are closely connected, Merli says, in that “[e]ven if NMR can give an 
answer to the univocity problem, it hasn’t really made much progress until it can show how its 
answer is compatible with preserving the practical role of moral discourse and giving us a 
satisfying picture of moral investigation” (2002, p.221). The best way that the realist can address 
the three, Merli claims, is by addressing the “underlying unease that drives them,” by showing 
how a suitable realist theory of reference can preserve basic facets of our moralizing (2002, p.221). 
In effect, Merli is advocating a kind of holistic approach for the realist, whereby the semantic, 
psychological, and epistemological questions above must be answered simultaneously by one 
kind of package theory. 
§5.4.9 Picking a Suitable Theory of Reference 
In order to highlight the importance of treating the above three problems simultaneously, 
Merli imagines how a simple theory of reference could fail to generally address the underlying 
worry embodied by them. For example: 
If the reference of moral terms were fixed by some kind of initial baptism, then we 
wouldn’t be able to entertain certain seemingly important questions—for example, were 
the ancestors wrong to apply the term as they did initially? A view like this seems to 
undermine our means of ethical inquiry, since the answers to moral questions seem to be 
decided by causal-historical facts that appear to be irrelevant. (2002, p.221) 
Moreover, a similar issue crops up with respect to the practical role problem: 
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Suppose that we learn that our terms stand in the right sort of relationship with a single 
cluster of natural properties. This discovery, by itself, doesn’t do anything to vindicate 
the evaluative or practical role of these terms. In fact, that role is undermined by the 
thought that our moral terms are held hostage to historical contingencies that seem not to 
matter in our moral deliberations. (2002, p.221) 
The realist needs to pick a semantic theory that addresses these three issues at the same time and 
which yields the right answers, as dictated by the intuitive facets of our moralizing: “whatever 
approach we take to the question of reference must not settle the wrong questions, or dictate the 
wrong means of investigating these questions” (2002, p.222). Moreover, the realist must pick a 
theory that allows “room for an account of why these properties (the ones picked out by moral 
terms, according to the account of reference under scrutiny) are interesting and relevant to our 
practical decision-making” (2002, p.222). In particular, Merli says, “it can’t preclude adequate 
answers to the practical role problem or the moral inquiry problem” (2002, p.222). Any adequate 
realist semantic theory must, in addition to addressing the univocity problem, keep a closer eye 
on the “practical and evaluative role of moral discourse” and “the procedures we use in moral 
inquiry” in order to address the general worry behind H&T’s challenge (2002, p.221). Merli 
believes that the prospects for such a theory are good, but what would such a theory look like? 
§5.4.10 Convergence and an End-of-the-Day Moral Theory 
The realist can begin to construct the kind of package theory that Merli suggests by 
aiming at issues about reference in connection with questions about how we deliberate about 
moral matters and about what our moral theory would look like at the end of inquiry, i.e. in terms 
of an idealized end-of-the-day moral theory. According to Merli, this connection is important 
because it could helpfully explain “how natural properties could play certain action-guiding roles, 
and because it helps to preserve the relevance of our procedures of moral inquiry” (2002, p.223). 
This would in turn help in addressing the univocity problem because, according to Merli, the 
univocity of moral terms can be grounded by the findings of these continued procedures: 
If the correct account of our moral properties—the referents of our moral terms—were 
given by the end-of-the-day moral theory, then the issue of shared meaning comes down 
to, or at least essentially involves, the question of convergence.82 On such a view, we 
share meanings in virtue of the kinds of shared canons of evidence and argument, and 
deference to future theory, that would, under slightly idealized conditions, result in a 
convergence of our moral opinions. (2002, p.223) 
So ultimately, according to Merli, the univocity of moral terms can be explained by the realist in 
terms of the properties our end-of-the-day moral theory would arrive at after undergoing 
prolonged and serious moral inquiry “under slightly idealized conditions” (2002, p.223). Let’s 
unpack this a bit. 
First, Merli is essentially saying that when we use moral terms, we are actually referring 
to whatever properties those terms would refer to at the end of moral inquiry (in line with whatever 
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theory we would have at the end of inquiry). How does this help with the univocity problem and 
stave off worries about realism’s ability to explain moral disputes? Let’s take an example: 
Suppose that Peter Singer and Christine Korsgaard currently disagree about why certain sorts of 
actions are ‘morally right’, given the different ethical theories they accept. On Merli’s suggested 
view, the realist can view Singer and Korsgaard as meaning the same thing by ‘morally right’ 
insofar as the two would ultimately converge (along with everyone else) on a common moral 
theory at the end of moral inquiry. According to Merli, the realist can be reasonably optimistic 
about the prospects for this convergence and consequently, he or she can legitimately treat 
‘morally right’ as used by Singer and Korsgaard (or indeed anyone else) to mean the same thing, 
despite the radically different moral views they currently espouse.83 
Second, the sort of serious moral inquiry that Merli has in mind is “our prolonged 
attempts at reasoned inquiry into pressing questions” about what we ought to do, e.g. how we 
ought to treat other human beings and animals, whether it is ever permissible to tell a lie that 
would increase overall human happiness, etc. (2002, p.222). According to Merli, the realist can 
treat moral inquiry as a process in which we eventually arrive, in time, at some properties that 
ultimately ground our collective judgments about the sort of actions that are morally right and 
wrong. So in retrospect, Merli says, these properties are the ones that “we’ve been referring to all 
along” (2002, p.222). This strategy may be familiar to the reader in that this is what Boyd 
ultimately opts for in his semantic theory: “[i]t’s not by accident that Boyd proposes a version of 
the causal theory of reference that invokes what we end up saying rather than some initial baptism” 
(2002, p.222). The advantage of this approach is that it can readily address the practical role 
question, as suggested above, by leaving “room for an account of why these properties (the ones 
picked out by moral terms, according to the account of reference under scrutiny) are interesting 
and relevant to our practical decision-making” (2002, p.222). A semantic theory along these lines 
can capture the practical role of moralizing “by taking our deliberations about them to be part of 
the process that reveals . . . the reference of moral terms” (2002, p.222). As Merli notes, there is 
no guarantee that the end-of-the-day properties (identified with rightness etc.) will always be 
relevant to our deliberations or will always motivate agents to do what they judge to be right, etc., 
but in any case, “it makes it likely that these [moral] judgements will continue to play their distinct 
practical role in our deliberations” (2002, p.222-3). 
§5.4.11 Two Advantages of Merli’s Strategy 
There are two further advantages to the above strategy, according to Merli. The first is 
that it “fits neatly into common and appealing ways of thinking about shared meaning in cases of 
nonmoral terms” (2002, p.223). For example, for these nonmoral cases “we think that speakers 
share terms across changes in theories, or despite nonstandard beliefs involving the term. The 
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main reason for this, according to Merli, is that these cases involve “the idea of deferring to the 
right authorities, or to the right kinds of reasons and evidence” (2002, p.223). Suppose for 
example that someone—let’s say Frank—does not know that water is essentially composed of the 
chemical compound H2O and yet is otherwise familiar with water as the stuff that fills lakes and 
rivers, etc.. Now imagine that an atomic scientist, Maria, has an exchange with Frank about 
whether the liquid in a glass in front of Frank is water or not. Maria and Frank each use the term 
‘water’ in discussing whether it is water in the glass or not, though Maria is very familiar with the 
fact that ‘water’ is in fact constituted by the compound H2O. Maria and Frank mean the same 
thing by ‘water’ in that they both are referring to the same thing, the liquid composed of the 
compound H2O. In this respect, they may perfectly well disagree about whether the liquid is 
‘water’ or not without talking past one another. After some time, Frank is likely to defer to Maria’s 
judgment, say, by learning that she is an atomic scientist. He is likely to do this because Maria is 
the right kind of authority—she knows what constitutes water and how to go about testing whether 
the liquid is in fact water or not. According to Merli, things go similarly for moral terms and for 
moral disputes. We use terms like ‘morally right’ across various theories and nonstandard beliefs 
in our moral thinking. Nonetheless we mean the same thing when we use ‘morally right’ and other 
moral terminology in that we use those terms to ultimately refer to what, at the end of the day, 
our moral theory would consist in. We can explain the univocity of moral terms by appealing to 
moral convergence because our end-of-the-day moral theory plays the role of informing our 
decision-making in moral matters. Consequently, Merli says, there is a “continuity between the 
moral and nonmoral cases,” which fits nicely with NMR’s view that moral terms and nonmoral 
terms are far less different than H&T and other anti-realists suggest (2002, p.223). 
The second advantage of Merli’s proposed strategy is that it “takes some of the intuitive 
sting out of judgements of equivocality” (2002, p.223). Merli argues that this is the case because 
on his suggested tack, “disputes that looked as though they were genuine turn out to be merely 
verbal only when it turns out that the parties involved would not, under suitably idealized 
circumstances, move toward agreement” (2002, p.223). According to Merli, this is exactly the 
kind of outcome that should call into question our initial assessments about some disputes that 
may have appeared as univocal and genuine. Let’s look back toward the dispute imagine by H&T 
in their MTE scenario. In H&T’s case, we may be willing to drop our initial conviction that the 
Earther and Twin Earther mean the same thing by ‘morally right’ and so genuinely disagree if, 
for instance, it turned out that the two parties would not move toward agreement in their moral 
thinking. So using this strategy, the realist may be able to neutralize H&T’s argument by showing 
how the assumed univocity between the Earther and Twin Earther is on shaky ground. 84 
Alternatively, if the Earther and Twin Earther are likely to converge, then the realist can treat the 
                                                     
84 This issue is centre stage in Merli’s second objection and we will focus on it later in evaluating that 
objection. 
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two as meaning the same thing by ‘morally right’, despite their differing current views about the 
things that are ‘morally right’, because eventually they will converge on what ‘morally right’ 
applies to. Given that they will converge on this theory at the end of inquiry, their uses of ‘morally 
right’ in each of their respective languages actually refer to the properties settled on by that end-
of-the-day idealized theory. 
§5.4.12 Why Merli’s Strategy is the Best Defence for NMR 
Merli’s suggested route here is incomplete in that it is only, as he says, a gesture toward 
the best kind of semantic view for the realist. Nonetheless, it is the most promising direction the 
realist can go in: 
NMR’s most promising strategy is to invoke the limit of moral inquiry as a resource to 
use in answering the problems we’ve been discussing. This offers us a way of preserving 
the univocity of moral terms across disputes while retaining recognizable forms of moral 
inquiry and making room for the practical role of moral judgment. If this is the right 
approach to the univocity problem, then the realist’s hope for account for shared moral 
terms rests with the convergence of moral inquiry under suitably idealized conditions. 
(2002, p.223) 
If the realist focuses on the prospects of an end-of-the-day idealized moral theory, Merli says, 
things should go rather well. Merli bases this optimism on two premises. First, he says moral 
inquiry is relatively young, and second, there are some examples of moral progress. Of course, 
Merli qualifies, we cannot reasonably expect perfect convergence or consensus across moralizers: 
Just as the views of flat-earthers or creation scientists don’t count against the idea of 
scientific progress, the obdurate moral commitment of, say, white supremacists may not 
be evidence against the prospects of moral progress. In addition, if we had independent 
reason to think that moral properties had causal powers, then we might think that 
convergence is made more likely by the influence these have on our inquiries. (2002, 
p.224) 
Naturally, some philosophers are rather pessimistic about our prospects for moral convergence 
and settlement on an end-of-the-day moral theory. After all, some topics of moral dispute are 
deeply entrenched. Merli concedes this but claims that, in time, moral scrutiny will push us toward 
convergence “because of the appeal of some well-worked-out moral views[,]” even if that process 
takes a very long time (2002, p.224-5). 
With all of the preceding bits in place, the reader should have at least a rough idea of how 
Merli’s rather broad first objection goes. In order to get crystal clear on how this objection goes, 
let’s step back a moment and gloss what Merli has argued and where that leaves H&T’s argument 
against NMR. Merli’s main charge in the first objection is that H&T fail to describe in adequate 
detail the workings of twin-moral discourse in their Moral Twin Earth scenario. According to 
Merli, the argument collapses if we remedy this issue. When we fill in the details, we can preserve 
univocity only at the expense of having the Moral Earther and Moral Twin Earther refer to the 
same properties by their moral terms, while if we make these properties radically different we 
lose the intuition that those terms are univocal between the Moral Earther and Moral Twin Earther. 
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Merli advances this argument further by suggesting that tying reference to idealized moral inquiry 
can give the realist a credible way of capturing genuine moral disagreement. According to Merli, 
NMR has good prospects for expecting convergence on an end-of-the-day idealized moral 
theory.85 So though any exchange between Earthers and Twin Earthers would be rather taxing at 
first, we could expect the two populations to converge toward a common end-of-the-day moral 
theory, even if that theory looks unlikely and distant today. In fact, as Merli has noted, this should 
sound quite familiar given the state of moral matters here on Earth, where we are split between a 
few deeply entrenched ethical views, each backed by (roughly) equally plausible and strong 
intuitions about why certain kinds of actions are morally right to perform.86 So, at minimum, there 
does not seem to be, as Merli argues, any new problem for realism presented in H&T’s scenario. 
The way the realist can face H&T’s challenge is, as suggested here, by viewing the Earther and 
Twin Earther as using terms that are univocal in virtue of the fact that the two parties are apt to, 
in time, converge in their moral theories so that their use of moral terminology is actually 
regulated by one set of properties, specified in whatever shared moral theory they would both 
assent to at the end of inquiry.87 
§5.4.13 Responding to the Second Part of Merli’s Objection 
I will now argue that the second part of Merli’s objection cannot succeed in that it implies 
the highly questionable view that some radical disagreements are cases in which the parties 
involved will converge in their moral views. This is highly questionable in that there are no good 
independent reasons for viewing the speakers involved in such disputes as likely to converge. In 
fact, H&T anticipate and effectively dispel this strategy in their 1996 paper, “From Moral Realism 
to Moral Relativism in One Easy Step”. 
In their 1996, H&T argue that moral realism is untenable because it is, according to them, 
committed to moral relativism and so cannot explain moral disagreement. One of the examples 
that H&T cite in support of their case is a dispute described by Putnam in his 1981. In the case 
that Putnam describes, Putnam and his colleague Robert Nozick have a political disagreement 
about whether welfare spending is morally permissible or not: 
One of my colleagues is a well-known advocate of the view that all government spending 
on ‘welfare’ is morally impermissible. On his view, even the public school system is 
                                                     
85 At the least, Merli believes there are no good arguments against convergence. See Merli 2002, p.224-
225. 
86 Merli mentions this in motivating his second objection. See Merli 2002, p.226. 
87 The reader may suspect that Merli depends too heavily on this idealization. Merli attempts to forestall 
this worry by qualifying that “we need make our inquirers only idealized enough to consider fully the 
reasons for competing moral views, actual and imaginable” and so there is nothing far-fetched in his 
idealization, or at least nothing more far-fetched than the scenario itself, which imagines that the relevant 
inquirers have considered other moral views, like the twin-moralists’ theory Td, and rejected or accepted 
them (2002, p.228 fn21). 
Merli also ignores any problems that come with the notion of a “limit of inquiry” or “theoretical 
end of the day,” though he is confident that there is a defensible account that could fend off these problems, 
at least for the work he does here (2002, p.228 fn21). 
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morally wrong. If the public school system were abolished, along with the compulsory 
education law (which, I believe, he also regards as an impermissible government 
interference with individual liberty), then the poorer families could not afford to send 
their children to school and would opt for letting the children grow up illiterate; but this, 
on his view, is a problem to be solved by private charity. If people would not be charitable 
enough to prevent mass illiteracy (or mass starvation of old people, etc.) that is very bad, 
but it does not legitimize government action. In my view, his fundamental premises--the 
absoluteness of the right to property, for example--are counter-intuitive and not supported 
by sufficient argument. On his view I am in the grip of a ‘paternalistic’ philosophy which 
he regards as insensitive to individual rights. This is an extreme disagreement, and it is a 
disagreement in 'political philosophy' rather than merely a ‘political disagreement’. (1996, 
p.25) 
In H&T’s assessment of this dispute, the two argue that Putnam and Nozick cannot reasonably be 
viewed as likely to converge in their views about the moral permissibility of spending welfare—
or indeed about the permissibility of many other political practices. The two philosophers simply 
accept radically different standards for what counts as ‘morally permissible’ and even under 
idealized conditions of convergence more generally, there is no reason to expect the two to 
converge. So even though Putnam and Nozick are clearly competent peers with all of the relevant 
knowledge and though they each aim at having maximally coherent moral and political views, we 
still could not expect them to converge in the way that, for instance, Merli suggests that Earthers 
and Twin Earthers might in the MTE scenario. According to H&T, this sort of move would not 
only be desperate but also ad hoc. This is their assessment of the scenario: 
Here we have two philosophers who have apparently thought through the implications of 
their own moral outlooks, have gotten clear about relevant (available) factual information, 
aiming at unity and coherence among their respective desires and attitudes, and are at 
loggerheads over the issue of welfare spending. Of course it would be hard to show 
decisively that Putnam and Nozick have both reached a state of reflective equilibrium; 
perhaps they don't have all relevant information (if one includes 'information’ that is not 
available for whatever reason). Nevertheless, when one reflects on this sort of case, 
involving a very high level of philosophical sophistication and moral sensibility, it just 
looks very unlikely that any movement in the direction of yet greater unity and coherence 
will bring the two together on this issue.88 Although one could always insist that one or 
both parties have not yet achieved equilibrium and that they would converge if they ever 
were to reach, this looks like a particularly desperate thing to say here. Rather, it seems 
much more plausible to attribute their differences to significantly different moral 
standards—so different that, insofar as each philosopher's standards are systematizable, 
Putnam's standards conform to a different normative moral theory than do Nozick’s (as 
in the imaginary human/Martian scenario). This diagnosis is basically the one Putnam 
himself gives of the situation. (Horgan and Timmons 1996, p.25-26) 
As H&T propose, the same can be said about the dispute described in the MTE scenario. 
Given that the Earther and Twin Earther have such radically different views about what 
sorts of things are ‘morally right’ and ‘wrong’, NMR’s semantic view cannot reasonably use 
convergence as a basis for viewing the two as meaning the same thing by those terms. We simply 
do not have any good independent reasons—other than preserving NMR—for viewing the two 
parties as converging on some common theory at the end of inquiry. So what this discussion 
                                                     
88 My emphasis. 
   
 
109 
reveals is that, ultimately, our linguistic intuitions about the MTE scenario cannot be reasonably 
explained by a realist theory of reference insofar as that theory requires convergence in order to 
explain the univocity of moral terms. As such, this second part of Merli’s first objection cannot 
succeed. So on both fronts, Merli does not have a successful objection against H&T’s challenge. 
Let’s see if the second objection fares any better. 
§5.5 Merli’s Second Objection: “Revising Our Intuitions” 
 In Merli’s second objection, Merli argues that the realist can meet H&T’s challenge by 
demonstrating that our initial conviction about the univocity of twin-moral and moral terms 
should be retracted. This second objection is a departure from the first insofar as it explains how 
this conviction about univocity is misleading and that ultimately, Earthers and Twin Earthers 
should be viewed as having a merely verbal dispute, i.e. as simply speaking at cross purposes. All 
of this, Merli says, can be done on purely realist grounds by focusing on how the Earther and 
Twin Earther arrive at their respective moral theories. Merli motivates this second objection in 
two steps: The first step of the objection introduces a slightly modified MTE scenario that 
imagines how things would pan out between Earthers and Twin Earthers if moral inquiry on their 
planets was continued into the distant future. The key issue here is whether a set of idealized and 
better-informed Earthers and Twin Earthers would view their moral terms as univocal or not: In 
the second step, Merli says that the two would be inclined to view their moral terms as not being 
univocal. Merli argues that we should defer to our judgements to these idealized and better-
informed individuals and so, given their view in this extended scenario, we should go back and 
re-evaluate our own intuitions about H&T’s scenario. According to Merli, doing so will reveal 
that these initial convictions about H&T’s scenario are faulty. In the next few sections, I spell out 
Merli’s second objection in detail and then argue that this objection cannot succeed because Merli 
is unreasonably optimistic about the kind of sway that some idealized thinkers could have on us. 
§5.5.1 Merli’s Second Objection: Step One 
In the first step of the objection, Merli extrapolates how things would go in H&T’s 
scenario if moral inquiry on Earth and Twin Earth was continued in earnest. In short, Merli says, 
imagine that equally rational Earthers and Twin Earthers continue to “make efforts to engage in 
discussion with [their] peers . . . discard moral commitments at odds with more fundamental and 
better-supported views, and so on,” and likewise, “our [Twin Earthen] counterparts do the same” 
(2002, p.226). Naturally, the MTE argument can only work if Earthers and Twin Earthers come 
to different verdicts in their moral inquiries, otherwise the two could not be readily viewed as 
genuinely disagreeing about the sorts of actions that count as ‘morally right’ and ‘wrong’, etc. 
This is guaranteed by the scenario in that Earthers and Twin Earthers must end up saying 
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something to the effect that their respective moral theories, Tc and Td, are the best available 
accounts of morality89: 
. . . it must be true that twin moralists end up saying something like ‘well, it seems that 
deontological theory Td is true; this is the best account of morality’ while the moralists 
here on Earth say the same thing of their consequentialist theory. (2002, p.226) 
This much is assumed by H&T’s original scenario. Merli pushes this a bit further and imagines 
that, down the line, the results of moral inquiry on Earth and Twin Earth end up sharing the same 
status as scientific discoveries like the discovery that the watery substance on Earth is in fact 
composed of the molecular compound H2O.90 This would be how things should naturally go on 
Earth and Twin Earth if moralizing is carried out in the way described, Merli says: 
Earth and Moral Twin Earth [would be] alike in having a maximally stable, well-justified, 
and widely accepted moral (or twin-moral) theory. This, of course makes them different 
from the Earth of today, since, here and now, we’re stuck with a discourse that seems torn 
between several incompatible theories with roughly equal backing from firm intuitions 
and plausible justifications. (2002, p.226) 
Now suppose that Earthers and Twin Earthers were to encounter each other for the first time and 
come to exchange their findings. 
In this case, Earthers and Twin Earthers would likely be rather surprised to discover that 
they have arrived at radically different results in their moral thinking. In particular, Earthers would 
be shocked to learn about the sorts of things that twin-moralizers classify as ‘morally right’.91 For 
example, Earthers might be shocked to learn that, let’s imagine, “twin-moralists [would] favour 
a policy of executing murderers, a practice that they think should be condemned” (2002, p.227). 
Naturally, Earthers would be rather uncomfortable with these sorts of judgments—judgments that 
they would find objectionable given the findings of their own prolonged and serious moral inquiry. 
So in discovering this about their new Twin Earthen peers, Earthers might be inclined to offer 
objections based on those findings. Earthers might, for example, “raise objections based on the 
minimal (or non-existent) deterrent value of executions, the economic cost of such a policy, its 
contribution to scepticism about the justice system, and so on—that is, they appeal to the 
‘forward-looking’ reasons for being suspicious of the death penalty” (2002, p.227). Unfortunately 
for Earthers, their efforts at convincing Twin Earthers would likely be poorly received, given that 
equally well-grounded findings regulate Twin Earthen moral thinking and that Twin Earthers and 
Earthers are equally rational beings. After all, Twin Earthers end up being deontologists in the 
end of their moral inquiry (in line with their theory Td), so it would be very unlikely for Earthers 
to convince these Twin Earthers by giving the kind of reasons that Earthers are inclined to give, 
                                                     
89 Each party believes in earnest that their current working moral theory is the best available one, i.e. as far 
as their serious moral inquiry is concerned so far. 
90 As Merli puts it: “. . . imagine that the results of these [moral] inquiries [on Earth and Twin Earth] are 
widely accepted; these claims, and some of the theoretical apparatus surrounding them, become part of our 
standard lore, just as claims like ‘water is H2O’ have” (2002, p.226). 
91 Twin Earthers would have the same kind of reaction about the sorts of actions that their new Earthen 
peers apply their term ‘morally right’ to. 
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in line with their consequentialist theory Tc. These kinds of reasons will simply not convince the 
Twin Earthers. Twin Earthers might say something like, “We know all that . . . but what has that 
got to do with whether it’s right or not?” (2002, p.227). What can these two parties do in order to 
break the state of being at loggerheads they have found themselves in? Merli imagines how the 
conversation could go from here: 
It’s plausible to imagine that moralists and twin-moralists would attempt to engage in 
serious inquiry to resolve their differences; after all, each group is faced with an equally 
insightful, equally conscientious body of thinkers who have reached different results. In 
the spirit of epistemic humility, our interlocutors should be inspired to re-examine their 
old views and to consider the positions and arguments offered by their new colleagues. 
Suppose that moralists and twin-moralists decided to sit down together to hash out their 
(putative) disagreements. Such an inquiry might result in changes in view on the part of 
one or both parties, or it might leave them both completely unmoved. (2002, p.227) 
Let’s look at both possibilities in detail. 
§5.5.2 What if Earthers and Twin Earthers Change their Views? 
Suppose that, after some heated discussion, Earthers and Twin Earthers decide to change 
their moral views by adopting one or the other’s view, or else by adopting some synthesis of the 
two (2002, p.227). In any case, there would be some change at the level of the moral theories that 
Earthers and Twin Earthers accept, and consequently, there would be some corresponding 
changes in the way moral semantics works in those groups. For instance, Earthers might subtly 
change the way they apply ‘morally wrong’, by applying it to certain extreme or egregious 
examples of individuals being sacrificed for the good of others. Likewise, Twin Earthers might 
subtly change the way they apply ‘morally right’, by applying it to some extreme cases where a 
great number of people would massively benefit at the expense of one individual. So going 
forward, the two populations might end up with some kind of hybrid view, influenced by the 
moral inquiries of each. Merli argues that we could not reasonably believe that Earthers and Twin 
Earthers would undergo this kind of “conversion experience” (2002, p.227). 
According to Merli, it would be more plausible to believe that, if Earthers and Twin 
Earthers end up changing their views, either one group or both groups did not ultimately arrive at 
a fully-coherent theory at the end of moral inquiry. This would be a more plausible view, Merli 
says, in that if either group ended up changing their view, then they must have been less than 
coherent or fully justified, i.e. “precisely because they were susceptible to the justifications for 
some alternative view” (2002, p.227). So if indeed one or both groups found some rationale for a 
different view given their encounter, then Merli says, this is “evidence that their pre-encounter 
position didn’t meet the stipulations of the case, insofar as it wasn’t maximally coherent, stable, 
and so on. A change in view just shows that we weren’t really at the end of the day after all” 
(2002, p.227-228). Let’s see if things go any better if we suppose that our idealized moralizers do 
not change their views when they come into contact with one another. 
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§5.5.3 What if Earthers and Twin Earthers Don’t Change their Views? 
Suppose that, after some prolonged discussion, Earthers and Twin Earthers elect not to 
change their moral views. If this was the case, Merli says, it would be reasonable to expect 
Earthers and Twin Earthers to view one another as using moral terms that do not mean the same 
thing. So though their conversation looked at first pass to be a case of the two genuinely 
disagreeing, that conversation now looks more like a case of merely verbal dispute, i.e.the two 
groups simply speak at cross purposes whenever they use terms like ‘morally right’ to express 
their views to one another. Whatever “disagreement” there was, that disagreement now looks to 
be at cross purposes (2002, p.228). So going forward, Earthers and Twin Earthers are likely to 
admit that they simply mean different things in using their moral terminology and so have an 
intractable disagreement in spite of possessing all of the relevant knowledge about the various 
kinds of actions they call ‘morally right’ and ‘wrong’. As Merli puts it, the two parties cannot 
resolve their disagreement “despite knowledge of all of the relevant facts of the case, they can’t 
really engage in meaningful argument with one another, and they each think the other has offered 
irrelevant reasons for its position” (2002, p.228). From here, Merli explains that one “interpretive 
option” is to view the two parties as simply dismissing one another’s views (2002, p.228). Can 
we reasonably expect that the two parties to treat one another as incompetent, i.e. as not actually 
being peers? 
We could suppose that Earthers believe Twin Earthers are “deeply confused or simply 
incompetent” with moral concepts and likewise, Twin Earthers believe the same kind of thing 
about Earthers, that Earthers must be simply confused or incompetent in using moral terminology 
as they do (2002, p.228). This option is not a feasible one, Merli argues, in that it simply ignores 
the fact that we have assumed (like H&T) that Earthers and Twin Earthers are equally rational 
beings. So in this case, it would be more reasonable and indeed more charitable “for each group 
to think that the other is simply talking about something else” (2002, p.229).92 The only sensible 
thing to do at this point then, according to Merli, is to expect the moral dispute between Earthers 
and Twin Earthers to boil down to an equivocation between the meaning of their respective moral 
terms (2002, p.229). So ultimately, Merli says, Earthers and Twin Earthers need to dismiss the 
idea that ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ mean the same thing in their two languages (2002, p.229). 
§5.5.4 The First Step Summed Up 
The upshot of what we’ve seen so far is that the Earthers and Twin Earthers of Merli’s 
extended scenario cannot be reasonably expected to have a “fruitful discussion” when they 
exchange their moral views with one another (2002, p.229). As we’ve seen, there are at least three 
possible ways the exchange between the Earther and Twin Earther could go. Let’s begin with the 
                                                     
92 Merli notes that he does argue that they do have a disagreement, but that it is “not a disagreement about 
what’s right,” as we have supposed (2002, p.229). 
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third and least attractive possibility we have looked at, ‘possibility (3)’ we’ll call it. First, 
possibility (3) assumes that Earthers and Twin Earthers do not change their views when they 
encounter one another and exchange the moral views that they have come to in their inquiries. 
One way that this might happen is if Earthers and Twin Earthers end up viewing one another as 
either incompetent or confused in the use of moral concepts. This option cannot be a live one, 
Merli argues, because we have already stipulated that the two groups in Merli’s scenario are 
equally rational beings. Given that stipulation, we can at least expect each group to be charitable 
to one another. Earthers might think, for instance, that their Twin Earthen counterparts are simply 
talking about something else when they use the terms ‘morally right’ and ‘wrong’ to apply to 
various things. In other words, Earthers might have the initial impression that the Twin Earthen 
term ‘morally right’ means the same thing as the Earthen term ‘morally right’, i.e. in the way it is 
pronounced and how it is written, etc. Ultimately, it must mean something else given the way that 
Twin Earthers apply this word. As Merli recognizes, it would not take long for the Earthers and 
Twin Earthers to figure out this much about one another. In this case then, possibility (3) is not a 
live possibility. The root of this, as I have explained it that possibility (3) ignores the stipulation 
that the two groups are equally competent and rational. Let’s turn to the two other possibilities, 
possibilities (1) and (2). 
The first option we looked at, possibility (1), suggests that we interpret Earthers and Twin 
Earthers as undergoing a kind of “conversion experience” when they two encounter one another. 
In undergoing this “conversion experience” the two groups would, Merli supposes, end up 
modifying each of their views or else adopt some kind of hybrid theory informed by both of the 
group’s moral thinking (2002, p.227). One ready explanation for this, Merli says, would be that 
the two groups actually arrived at the metaphorical table with less than “maximally coherent and 
stable end-of-the-day” moral theories (2002, p.229). On Merli’s scenario though, we have already 
stipulated that Earthers and Twin Earthers have maximally coherent and stable end-of-the-day 
moral theories. Again, this is built into the scenario, so like possibility (3) above, possibility (1) 
here cannot be a possible way the conversation might go between Earthers and Twin Earthers. 
Let’s look at our final possibility and see why Merli believes that this is the best way to expect 
things to go between the two groups. 
In the second possibility that Merli considers, possibility (2), we are to suppose that 
Earthers and Twin Earthers do not end up changing their views when they come to exchange 
words with one another. We are to assume, in line with the scenario, that the two groups did 
indeed come to the table with “fully coherent and stable end-of-the-day stable” moral theories 
(2002, p.229). In this case, Merli explains, Earthers and Twin Earthers would be disposed to admit 
that their respective moral terms are not in fact univocal. After all, the two groups use their moral 
terminology, as we have assumed, with radically different sorts of properties in mind, in line with 
each of their respective moral theories, Tc and Td. It is no surprise then, at least on Merli’s view, 
that the two groups cannot end up having a genuine disagreement insofar as that disagreement 
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hinges on meaning the same thing by ‘morally right’ and ‘wrong’ etc.93 So in this case, Merli says, 
whatever discussion there is between the two groups about moral matters must ultimately be 
spurious. So even on the best interpretation of Merli’s scenario, Earthers and Twin Earthers end 
up admitting that they mean different things by their moral terms and so cannot really disagree in 
the kind of way that H&T imagine in their scenario. This completes the first step of Merli’s second 
objection and sets us up nicely for the second. 
§5.5.5 Merli’s Second Objection: Step Two 
The second step of Merli’s objection focuses on how the scenario he imagines above 
should influence our current thinking about moral matters and especially about the status of 
H&T’s scenario. According to Merli, we must take the idealized thinkers that he describes in his 
scenario seriously because “the judgments of the idealized moralists (concerning the equivocation 
involved in conversations with the Moral Twin Earthers) give us reason to reject the significance 
of our original intuitions about univocity” (2002, p.229). Merli argues here that because, under 
the idealized conditions above, our better-informed selves would reject the idea that twin-moral 
terms and our moral terms are univocal, then we too should reject that idea and dispose of our 
initial conviction that those terms mean the same thing. This, Merli says, is the most sensible way 
forward because it is reasonable to “grant more authority to one’s moral views after this process 
of inquiry than to one’s current views,” and as such, we have good reason to view those terms as 
indeed equivocal (2002, p.229). 
At this point, the reader may object that Merli cannot simply help himself to the kind of 
expertise that our idealized and better-informed selves would have after a prolonged period of 
serious moral inquiry. In particular, the reader may be suspicious that our idealized selves could 
not have any better semantic expertise than us and so would know no better whether ‘right’ and 
‘wrong’ are equivocal between our moral terms and those of the twin-moralists. Merli heads off 
this objection by insisting that the expertise of our idealized selves is only idealized with respect 
to the kind of moral expertise that they possess. These moralists are better-informed only insofar 
as they have already undergone the process of inquiry suggested by Merli and so they have a 
better grasp of how to apply moral terms correctly: 
Just as experts with some concept in the natural sciences are better positioned to see which 
disputes about that concept are genuine, and which are spurious, our moral experts’ full 
understanding of our concepts—the ones we currently don’t fully understand—allows 
them to see more accurately which moral disputes are genuine. (2002, p.230) 
As Merli explains, our idealized experts are only experts insofar as they better understand how 
are moral concepts can be correctly applied and this is enough for us to take their idealized 
                                                     
93 Merli assumes that genuine moral disagreement requires univocal meaning and so appears to disagree 
with the line developed by Plunkett and Sundell that was considered in Chapter Three. 
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judgments seriously in thinking about MTE. So to review, Merli’s argument takes the following 
format: 
[I]dealized moralists and twin-moralists will see their putative disagreements as 
equivocal. But these idealized interlocutors have the same concepts (or mean the same 
things with their terms) as their present-day counterparts; they’re just better-informed 
about them. Because of this, we have reason to take seriously the judgments of the 
idealized future moralists. Hence we have reason to think that our initial judgment about 
the Moral Twin Earth case—that the disputes are univocal—is faulty. That is, we have 
reason to conclude that, contrary to initial appearances, we didn’t mean what the twin-
moralists meant with their terms (2002, p.230). 
Once this is clear, according to Merli, it should be clear why we have the faulty intuition that 
twin-moral terms must mean the same thing as our moral terms. 
H&T design Moral Twin Earth to be so similar to Earth, especially vis-a-vis the function 
of moral practice, that the univocity of moral terms between the two groups looks guaranteed. 
Once we pay sufficient attention to the details though, Merli says, this guarantee about univocity 
becomes dubious. In particular, if we reflect on how things could proceed for our idealized selves 
(and the idealized twin-moralists), it is clear that these better-informed future moralists would 
reject the claimed univocity. Given this information and given that our better selves would judge 
that twin-moral terms do not mean the same thing as our moral terms, we should retract our initial 
judgment that those terms mean the same thing. We have good reason to make this adjustment, 
Merli argues, because our idealized selves would know better about whether moral terms mean 
the same thing or not in a given dispute, like the one imagined by H&T, given their (post-inquiry) 
moral expertise: 
. . . our first reaction to the Horgan-Timmons case is driven by details of the scenario that 
will, ex hypothesi, be rejected as superficial or misleading by careful inquiry. This, I think, 
explains why we have the intuitions that we do in a way that lets us conclude that such 
intuitions are less significant than they appear to be. (2002, p.231) 
§5.5.6 Why Merli’s Second Objection Cannot Succeed 
 I argue that Merli’s second objection cannot succeed because the extended scenario that 
Merli describes cannot be used to undermine the intuitions that H&T glean from their original 
MTE scenario, i.e. that Earthers and Twin Earthers mean the same thing by ‘morally right’ etc. 
and so genuinely disagree. The main reason that Merli’s scenario cannot do the requisite work for 
Merli is that, even if we accept everything he says up to the second step of the objection (i.e. about 
how his scenario plays out), Merli does not motivate why the idealized moralizers he imagines 
are in any better of a position to tell us how we should intuit H&T’s original MTE scenario. In 
particular, Merli does not provide any reasons for why his idealized moralists and twin-moralists 
possess a certain kind of moral expertise that we do not. As such, Merli does not adequately 
justify why his idealized thinkers would do any better in thinking about the intuitions we ought 
to have about H&T’s scenario—aside from simply begging the question and assuming that these 
idealized thinkers are correct about everything. When Merli brings in the so-called “authority” 
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that these idealized thinkers provide, this does all of the work of the argument. Conveniently, 
Merli does not argue for why these “better-informed” thinkers are better-informed at all, i.e. other 
than assuming that they possess the best end-of-the-day theory and so use moral terms perfectly. 
Moreover, Merli does not tell us anything about the end of inquiry either—about the kind of things 
that idealized moralizers approve of, etc.94 
Merli argues that we should defer to these idealized moralizers, but it seems that there is 
no way to specify what this group of idealized moralizers would ultimately judge without begging 
the question. First, we cannot reliably know (practically speaking) the kind of things that they 
would judge and thus the sort of moral views they would adopt, and second, there are no good 
independent reasons for expecting these idealized thinkers’ views to correspond to or regulate our 
actual moral thinking today. We can only speculate about the sorts of actions that these idealized 
moralizers would generally commend, and likewise we can only speculate about the kind of 
theory that they would end up espousing at the end of the day. We simply do not have the kind of 
epistemic access that Merli seems to assumes we do and so there is serious degree of unwarranted 
faith on Merli’s part in presuming that his idealized thinkers should ultimately determine, for 
instance, how we should respond to H&T’s scenario. As such, Merli’s objection is unconvincing 
insofar as it depends on deferring to the sort of moral judgments these imaginary thinkers 
allegedly have. Moreover, if Merli’s argument here is cogent, it will also imply that the 
disagreement between Putnam and Nozick that we considered earlier isn’t a genuine disagreement. 
This is unpalatable as well and provides further reason to reject Merli’s second objection. Let’s 
see if Merli’s third and final objection can do any better. 
§5.6 Merli’s Third Objection: “Preserving (Nonmoral) Disagreement” 
In Merli’s third and final objection, Merli suggests that NMR can relocate the 
disagreement between Earthers and Twin Earthers in the MTE scenario as a kind of practical 
disagreement about what to do rather than a strictly-speaking moral disagreement about what is 
right. Merli argues that by relocating the disagreement in this way NMR can vindicate our 
collective intuition that the two groups disagree even if NMR cannot view their moral terms as 
univocal. The realist proponent of NMR must cite good reasons for doing this, given our initial 
conviction (in line with H&T’s assessment) that Earthers and Twin Earthers have a moral 
disagreement about whether ‘morally right’ ought to denote one set of properties or another, 
                                                     
94 It may be objected that I have not taken Merli’s main point seriously enough. It would be sensible, one 
could object, to give greater weight to ‘one’s informed, carefully considered opinions than to one’s hasty, 
ill-formed judgments’ and to ‘one’s moral views after this process of inquiry than to one’s current views’ 
(2002, p.229). If indeed, our ‘improved selves’ would ‘reject the idea that moral and twin-moral terms mean 
the same thing’, then this would be problematic for both H&T’s argument and my own, by proxy (Merli 
2002, p.229). The problem with this objection is that it begs the question by simply assuming that, under 
ideal conditions, our ‘better selves’ would view the relevant terms as meaning different things. I am open 
to hear how these ideal conditions could be spelled out in a way that does not beg the question, but the 
current line of objection as it stands is a failure. I am also pessimistic about the prospects for such a 
specification of the relevant conditions, as I explain in the remainder of this section. 
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respective to each group’s normative views, Tc and Td. Merli argues that the proponent of NMR 
does indeed have good reasons for shifting the disagreement in H&T’s scenario because Earthers 
and Twin Earthers are, contrary to our initial conviction, better viewed as having a practical 
disagreement. As such, proponents of NMR can “earn the right to say that there is something at 
issue in cases [like MTE] where radically different evaluative standards come into play” (2002, 
p.232). So even if NMR concedes that Earthers and Twin Earthers are talking about different 
things (different properties) when they use ‘morally right’ in their respective languages, they can 
still be viewed as genuinely disagreeing about what to do (2002, p.232). In the next sections, I 
motivate this final objection from Merli and then argue that this final objection does not pose a 
threat to H&T’s argument. 
To begin, Merli explains how in general terms NMR can shift the disagreement in H&T’s 
scenario even if we grant with H&T that moral and twin-moral terms are equivocal. The first 
challenge for NMR is to show how our initial assessment that Earthers and Twin Earthers have a 
moral disagreement is not the best assessment of that dispute. This is a serious challenge for NMR 
because it is unclear how the two groups could be reasonably viewed as disagreeing if they simply 
mean different things by ‘morally right’. Intuitively, the two could only speak at cross purposes. 
According to Merli, NMR can concede this assessment and yet still capture the disagreement by 
appealing to the different sort of actions that Earthers and Twin Earthers would advocate doing, 
driven by the different normative views they possess. For example, Merli says, “[i]nsofar as 
they’re committed to doing what’s twin-right, the twin-moralists urge us not to lie [even if it 
increases overall human happiness], and good moralists urge just the opposite” (2002, p.232). By 
capitalizing on this aspect of the dispute, Merli claims that NMR can view Earthers and Twin 
Earthers as disagreeing even though the key terms in that dispute are admittedly equivocal across 
the two groups, i.e. ‘morally right’ refers to different things in their respective languages. In fact, 
this kind of disagreement is common here on Earth, Merli says: 
People sometimes agree about what morality requires, and then go on to disagree about 
whether to follow morality’s commands—perhaps because one party thinks that 
considerations of prudence or etiquette carry the day. In these cases, the dispute isn’t 
about what’s right; it’s about whether the properties of morality, prudence, or etiquette 
are the ones that settle what to do. (2002, p.233) 
According to Merli, NMR can view MTE as presenting this kind of disagreement, about which 
normative standpoint—between Tc and Td—should settle what to do. 
§5.6.1 Can Moving the Disagreement Help NMR Defend Against H&T? 
 Merli argues that NMR is in a good position to revise our initial convictions about MTE 
for a few reasons. First, he says “some disagreement is better than none at all” (2002, p.233). So 
the first and most basic point for Merli’s final strategy is that it can preserve the idea that Earthers 
and Twin Earthers have a genuine disagreement about something, that “there’s something to talk 
about when moralists and twin-moralists get together” (2002, p.233). Second, Merli claims that 
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his strategy answers the difficult question of whether the dispute on MTE is “centered on ‘right’ 
or somewhere else” and suggests how our initial convictions about the scenario should not be 
influential in answering that question. Third, Merli’s strategy can explain why “ordinary speakers 
might have trouble distinguishing between dispute about what’s right and dispute about what to 
do” (2002, p.233). According to Merli, ordinary speakers are apt to make this kind of mistake and 
“link a moral term with its broader evaluative accretion” because of the close association between 
“judgments of rightness and motivations to act accordingly” (2002, p.233). After all, these two 
matters typically come together. What NMR needs to show is that the dispute described in the 
MTE scenario between Earthers and Twin Earthers falls under the latter category, i.e. as a 
practical dispute about what to do and not strictly-speaking a dispute about what is right.95 If 
NMR can do this, as I have noted above, then it can meet H&T’s challenge by vindicating the 
intuition that the two groups disagree despite the fact that, on NMR, their moral terms do not 
mean the same thing. According to Merli, NMR can view the two groups as disagreeing because 
they have conflicting views about whether Tc or Td determines how to act. As such, the main 
question that we will be concerned with going forward is this: Can NMR make such a convincing 
case for shifting the disagreement on MTE? Let’s see. 
§5.6.2 Is H&T’s Scenario Better Understood as a Practical Disagreement? 
The main objective for NMR is to spell out an understanding of MTE that supports the 
view that Earthers and Twin Earthers would be best viewed as having a practical disagreement 
rather than a moral disagreement. Merli outlines a few promising ways this can be done that, 
according to him, can each defuse H&T’s challenge against NMR (2002, p.233). The first way 
that Merli proposes takes the two groups as having “clashing attitudes or commitments to action” 
(2002, p.233). On this proposal, NMR can view Earthers and Twin Earthers as disagreeing in that 
they possess different attitudes about what to do: Earthers express an attitude of approbation for 
doing what is in line with their normative theory Tc, whereas Twin Earthers express an attitude of 
approbation for doing what in line with their normative theory Td (2002, p.233): 
Since our two normative theories (Tc and Td) come apart in their assessments, agents who 
are committed to doing what their theory labels ‘right’ will be motivated to act in 
contradictory ways. So dedicated moralists and twin-moralists have a kind of 
disagreement in attitude. (2002, p.233) 
This is enough to save the intuition about genuine disagreement, Merli says, in that Earthers and 
Twin Earthers have a dramatic clash in their different attitudes about what to do. Unfortunately, 
Merli admits, this suggestion is not very helpful unless we know more about the sort of attitudes 
that the two groups differ on (2002, p.233). According to him, the difference in attitudes needs to 
be sufficiently robust to “ensure disagreement” (2002, p.233): 
                                                     
95 One may be apt to object here that disputes about what to do simply are disputes about what is right. I 
return to this point later in evaluating the objection. 
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It can’t be simply that we differ in attitude, the way we might differ in blood pressure; 
this isn’t yet a robust enough notion to ensure disagreement, let alone discussion and 
deliberation about broader normative questions. In order to capture the kind of 
incompatibility we’re after, we’d need some kind of attitude with some ‘outward-
reaching’ force. My pro-stance toward doing the right thing has to conflict with, not 
merely be different from, your endorsement of the twin-right act. That is, I need to do 
more than commit myself to morality’s demands; I need to think that you should do the 
right (instead of the twin-right) thing, as well. (2002, p.234) 
According to Merli, if Earthers and Twin Earthers have such dramatically different attitudes as 
this, then we can reasonably view the two groups as accepting different judgments about the “last 
ought before action” (2002, p.234). 
§5.6.3 The “Last Ought Before Action” 
As we saw earlier, Merli thinks that this kind of disagreement about the “last ought before 
action” is commonplace on Earth in that actual Earthers disagree about the appropriate evaluative 
view or standpoint that settles how to conduct ourselves, e.g. whether morality, prudence, or 
etiquette settles what to do: 
Morality demands one action, while prudence, etiquette, and so on demand others. In 
deciding how to act, we need to know not only what’s right, or what’s prudent—we also 
need to know whether to heed the demands of morality or prudence in those cases where 
the two come apart. (2002, p.234) 
Naturally, people end up saying different things on this topic because they have different takes 
on which evaluative stance should be decisive in determining what to do: “One person might be 
committed to doing the right thing, while another is set on the profitable thing, or the polite thing, 
even if this requires violating moral demands that they recognize” (2002, p.234). Much of our 
deliberation involves this kind of interplay between competing evaluative standpoints. Even our 
internal deliberations involve this interplay, e.g. “we wonder if moral reasons are outweighed, in 
some instances, by other kinds of considerations” (2002, p.234). Once we understand what the 
various options prescribe, we need to decide what evaluative standpoint is most appropriate for 
determining what to do. In the MTE scenario, Earthers and Twin Earthers need to decide whether 
rightness or twin-rightness ought to guide their conduct in going forward—“Should [they] listen 
to morality, or twin-morality?” (2002, p.234). This question, Merli notes, “can’t be answered 
within one [framework] or the other, as both claim to give us the answer of the question of what 
to do” (2002, p.234). 
However, according to Merli, there is room for a potential objection here: Even if we can 
treat Earthers and Twin Earthers expressing incompatible attitudes about what is to be done, that 
dispute can also viewed as equivocal and therefore spurious in that the two groups mean different 
things by ‘to be done’. 
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§5.6.4 Can H&T’s Challenge Be Revised to Target Broader Evaluative 
Discourse? 
H&T’s challenge can rear its head again at this second level for Merli: How can Earthers 
and Twin Earthers genuinely disagree about whether Tc or Td should regulate our behaviour if ‘to 
be done’ refers to different things between the two groups? For instance, if Earthers use ‘to be 
done’ to refer to some prudential properties and Twin Earthers use ‘to be done’ to refer to some 
properties of etiquette, then Merli’s suggested strategy is no help—H&T can simply relocate the 
challenge just as Merli relocates the disagreement. In order to head off this objection, Merli needs 
to show how the dispute he imagines at the practical level, about what to do, can preserve 
univocity and thus avoid the return of H&T’s challenge: “If we want to preserve dispute about 
what to do with our twin-moralist colleagues, we can’t allow for these disputes to be equivocal 
between, say, ourselves and the residents of some Normative Twin Earth” (2002, p.235). Merli 
claims that we can be reasonably optimistic on this front because our general evaluative 
terminology is “not parochial in the way we’re conceding (for the sake of argument) moral terms 
to be” (2002, p.235). The main reason that we can view our general evaluative terms in this way, 
according to Merli, is because the wide range of practical considerations that come up in our 
conversations do not seem to endanger the univocity of those evaluative terms: 
After all, our confidence in the catholic nature of our disagreements about the last ought 
before action is unshaken by the variety of considerations that enter into that discussion. 
Most of us wonder, at one time or another, about what kinds of reasons to follow (moral, 
prudential, aesthetic, and so on). All of these have significant pull on our decisions about 
action. Yet despite the diversity of considerations taken into account in discussing what 
to do, we aren’t really concerned about the univocity of these conversations. Why should 
another normative standpoint, that is, twin-moral discourse, pose any additional threat? 
(2002, p.235) 
As Merli says, if our general deliberations about what to do pose no problem for the univocity of 
general evaluative terms, then it is unclear how MTE could pose some new threat to that effect. 
Merli says a little bit more about why this challenge cannot arise again in this case. 
Merli claims that, in order to stave off the objection that twin-moral discourse poses an 
unique threat against the above strategy, we need to spell out in more detail “what’s involved in 
making a judgment of what to do, all-in” (2002, p.235). Merli says there are two options for 
fleshing these details out: First, NMR can outline “an analogous account of the last ought before 
action” by, for instance, giving “an account of all-in endorsement that construes these judgments 
as being about motivationally inert natural properties” (2002, p.235). Alternatively, NMR can 
“combine [its] view of moral discourse with a different treatment of our talk of what to do” (2002, 
p.235). Merli goes in for the latter option. 
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§5.6.5 Toward an Expressivist View of All-in Endorsement 
The best way that NMR can give a more detailed account of practical judgment, Merli 
says, is to combine NMR with “expressivism about all-in endorsement” (2002, p.236). Merli 
spells this out in a bit more detail: 
According to this view, moral rightness is a matter of natural fact, but an answer to the 
question of what to do—not from a moral or a prudential or perhaps even a rational 
standpoint, but what to do, all-in—is not a factual judgment but an endorsement of one 
course of action or one set of reasons for action. When I get behind doing the right thing, 
I’m expressing my acceptance of certain norms, or urging others to act accordingly, or 
something along these lines. (2002, p.236) 
At first, this move might seem rather bizarre on Merli’s part. How can one adopt NMR and 
expressivism at the same time? And how could adopting expressivism at the practical level help 
NMR meet H&T’s challenge? First, Merli says, most expressivists do not endorse global 
expressivism, i.e. expressivism about every kind of discourse. Instead, most expressivists accept 
expressivism for some domains and realism for other domains, e.g. about natural kinds. In Merli’s 
case, Merli accepts realism when it comes to moral discourse but expressivism when it comes to 
practical or evaluative discourse about all-in endorsement. According to him, this is an appealing 
view for three reasons: 
The first has to do with skepticism about the ability of any substantively constrained 
‘ought’ to play the role of the last ought before action. The second, related consideration 
has to do with the connection between judgments of what to do and motivation. The third 
reason concerns the differences in descriptive content between moral discourse and talk 
of what to do, all things considered. (2002, p.237) 
Let’s look at each of these in detail. 
First, as Merli says, we might be hesitant to identify some evaluative standpoint with the 
last ought before action (2002, p.237). Merli’s main reason for this may be familiar to the reader 
as the driving worry behind Chapter Two: “there’s a kind of open question that can be raised 
about whether or not the deliverances of any of those perspectives settle what to do” (2002, p.237). 
As the reader may recall, H&T’s challenge can be viewed as a revised version of Moore’s classical 
open question argument (OQA), updated to deal with the kind of modern (synthetic) semantic 
theory that NMR goes in for. Of course, H&T’s challenge is directed at NMR’s treatment of moral 
discourse; Merli’s worry is that this challenge can be easily shifted to target evaluative discourse. 
Merli uses an example to bring this out: 
Suppose that we think that what an agent has reason to do depends on his (intrinsic) 
desires, broadly construed. We might admit that a person with wicked desires has reason 
to do horrid things, and that he wouldn’t be irrational for doing them, but we might still 
say, sensibly, that he ought not to. What we’re doing is more than merely point out that 
from the moral point of view, which he cares nothing about, he’s doing something wrong. 
This is something to which he can assent. We’re also saying that this point of view settles 
what to do, that he should (all-in) do what’s right instead of acting as he desires. So it 
seems coherent to think that, when we evaluative others’ actions, we don’t take facts 
about rational requirement to settle the question of what to do, and this indicates that we 
think the two questions are distinct. (2002, p.237) 
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According to Merli, we can repeat this same argument for any “substantively defined evaluative 
standpoint” and so, he says, we are better off viewing the last ought before action as having a kind 
of prescriptive rather than descriptive role (2002, p.237). 
The second reason that Merli moves toward an expressivist view of all-in endorsement 
deals with the connection between motivation and action. One of the key challenges for any realist 
moral theory is to make sense of the connection between an agent’s judging that some action is 
right and his or her being motivated to act accordingly. As Merli says, realists often make “a great 
deal of the fact that sometimes moral judgments don’t motivate agents to act accordingly; as they 
like to point out, the tie between judgment and motive mustn’t be too tight to account for the 
everyday phenomena of our moral experience” (2002, p.238). By contrast, Merli says, “we might 
think there’s a tighter connection between judgments of what to do and motivation” (2002, p.238). 
For instance, we can make better sense of “someone unmotivated to follow through on his moral 
judgments than we can of someone who invokes the last ought before action and then fails to act” 
(2002, p.238). In the moral case, Merli says, it is more plausible to identify moral properties with 
natural properties (i.e. to accept NMR), given the wider gap between moral judgment and 
motivation. In the more broadly evaluative case, though, Merli says that this gap between 
judgment and motivation is much tighter and in that case, it is more reasonable to view all-in 
judgments about what to do as not involving natural properties. 
 Merli’s third reason for opting for an expressivist view about all-in endorsement centres 
on the differences between how we talk about moral discourse and how we talk about what to do 
(2002, p.237). Basically, Merli thinks the former is thickly descriptive while the latter is only 
thinly descriptive. When it comes to our talk about moral discourse, our moralizing is ‘thickly 
descriptive’ because we are very specific about the kinds of considerations that figure into our 
moral judgments (2002, p.238). According to Merli, our “moral judgments can’t be about just 
anything . . . When we think about morality, we have some rough idea of the kinds of 
considerations that are relevant (facts about benefits and harms to creatures like us, for examples) 
and facts that don’t matter (the height of an agent, perhaps)” (2002, p.238). This descriptive 
thickness is important for Merli in that “it suggests that the way to capture what’s distinct about 
morality is by appeal to a certain subject matter or content, not a particular set of formal features” 
(2002, p.238). Unsurprisingly, Merli believes that this aspect of our moralizing should drive us 
toward viewing moral judgments as being descriptive, in line with NMR. Broad evaluative 
judgments on the other hand are ‘descriptively thin’ (2002, p.238): 
. . . people can take all sorts of considerations to settle how to act, and, as long as they 
satisfy certain formal constraints, we can think of them as coherent . . . they’re still 
making a judgment of what to do, unlike the moral eccentric, whose deviance might 
prevent him from taking part in moral discourse at all. (2002, p.238) 
So ultimately, Merli argues, we should opt for an expressivist view of all-in endorsement in that 
the considerations relevant to our broadly evaluative talk are, unlike moral talk, not limited to 
thick descriptive content. 
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§5.6.6 Why Merli’s Third Objection Cannot Succeed 
I argue that Merli’s third argument collapses to at least one of two objections. The first 
objection takes issue with Merli’s interpretation of H&T’s scenario. In this objection, I claim that 
the Earther and Twin Earther of H&T’s scenario cannot be plausibly viewed, on any interpretation, 
as engaging in a practical disagreement about what to do, rather than a strictly-speaking moral 
disagreement about what’s right. Insofar as Merli interprets the scenario in this way, his objection 
cannot damage H&T’s argument. The second objection I propose assumes that the first objection 
can be met. In this objection, I argue that even if Merli can view the disagreement as a practical 
one and bring in expressivism about all-in-endorsement to explain this disagreement, Merli faces 
a dilemma: First, if expressivism can successfully explain the disagreement between the two 
parties, then NMR is unmotivated, since one could then propose an expressivist treatment of 
morality that would be cheaper than NMR on matters of moral metaphysics and epistemology. 
Second, if expressivism cannot successfully explain the disagreement between the two parties, 
then NMR cannot meet H&T’s challenge and Merli’s objection fails. Let’s look at each of these 
two objections in turn. 
§5.6.7 Why Merli’s View of the MTE Scenario is Faulty 
I argue that Merli’s third objection cannot damage H&T’s argument because Merli’s 
interpretation of the MTE scenario involves a substantive departure from the one described by 
H&T. The key point of difference is Merli’s view that Earthers and Twin Earthers stand in a 
practical disagreement about what to do rather than a moral disagreement about what’s right, i.e. 
about what sorts of actions are ‘morally right’. If we return to the details of H&T’s original 
scenario, it is clear that there is no plausible way to interpret the two parties as having this kind 
of disagreement. The main piece in the scenario that blocks this interpretation is H&T’s 
stipulation that Earthers and Twin Earthers assign overriding importance to their considerations 
about moral matters in deciding what to do: 
. . . the uses of [twin-moral] terms on Moral Twin Earth bear all of the ‘formal’ marks 
that we take to characterize moral vocabulary and moral practice. In particular, the terms 
are used to reason about considerations bearing on Moral Twin Earthling well-being; 
Moral Twin Earthlings are normally disposed to act in certain ways corresponding to 
judgments about what is ‘good’ and ‘right’; they normally take considerations about what 
is ‘good’ and ‘right’ to be especially important, even of overriding importance in most 
cases, in deciding what to do, and so on. (1992, p.164) 
Given that their considerations about what is ‘good’ and ‘right’ have this overriding importance, 
the sort of contrast between moral judgments and judgments of what to do all-in on which Merli’s 
third objection depends is simply not available given the way H&T describe the MTE scenario. 
John McDowell makes a similar case against the suggestion that moral reasons might be trumped 
by other kinds of reasons: 
[T]he dictates of virtue, if properly appreciated, are not weighed with other reasons at all, 
not even on a scale which always tips on their side. If a situation in which virtue imposes 
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a requirement is genuinely conceived as such, according to this view, then considerations 
which, in the absence of the requirement, would have constituted reasons for acting 
otherwise are silenced altogether—not overridden—by the requirement (McDowell 1978, 
p.26). 
Moral reasons are a special breed of practical reasons in that, among other things, they have 
overriding importance in our deliberations about what to do. McDowell takes this even further in 
the passage above: moral reasons “silence” other reasons altogether. This key function of our 
moral thinking is the primary reason that, as H&T emphasize, the intuitive data gleaned from 
MTE and from Putnam’s case do not match. As such, any plausible interpretation of H&T’s 
scenario must account for the fact that moral considerations have overriding importance in 
decision making. Merli simply ignores this function of moral vocabulary and because of this, his 
interpretation of the MTE scenario cannot be used to bolster an argument against H&T (given 
that it lacks the key ingredient that yields the linguistic intuitions we have about that case). 
§5.6.8 Why Expressivism Cannot Save NMR 
Let’s assume for a moment that Merli can meet the response spelled out above and that 
the Earther and Twin Earther of H&T’s scenario can be plausibly viewed as having a practical 
disagreement about what to do that contrasts with disagreement over moral rightness. Moreover, 
let’s assume with Merli that expressivism about all-in-endorsement can explain this disagreement. 
If we grant all of this, it turns out that Merli’s prescribed explanation of Moral Twin Earth forces 
a dilemma: On the one hand, if NMR must deploy an expressivist treatment of all-in endorsement 
in order to explain moral disagreement, this would force NMR into a precarious position; NMR 
would need to address the standard objections against expressivism in addition to the standard 
objections against NMR. If NMR must meet the standard objections against expressivism 
(objections that NMR is designed to avoid), it is unclear what motivation there could be for 
accepting NMR over the alternatives. What advantage could NMR have over, say, accepting 
expressivism and at least avoiding the standard objections to realism? Things are no better for 
NMR on the other horn of the dilemma: If we suppose that expressivism cannot explain the 
disagreement between the Earther and Twin Earther, then NMR simply cannot meet H&T’s 
challenge by using an expressivist view of all-in endorsement. 
§5.7 Conclusion 
It seems to me, then, that all of Merli’s objections to H&T’s Moral Twin Earth argument 
in the end fail, so that they are not available to damage my Meaning Twin Earth argument. In the 
next chapter, I go on to flesh out the main options for a theory of normative judgment that would 
explain the intuitions elicited from the Meaning Twin Earth scenario.96 
                                                     
96 It might be argued that I am not justified in presupposing that if Merli’s fails in the moral case it has no 
validity in the case of meaning. However, given that morality is the paradigm example of a normative area 
of thought and talk, the H&T-style Twin Earth argument is more likely to work for the case of morality 
than in any other area. So—in the absence of a detailed argument to the contrary—I can assume that if an 




                                                     
objection to the argument in the moral case fails, it will fail likewise in the case of meaning. This is a 
defeasible assumption, of course, but the onus at this point is on my opponent to provide the necessary 
detail. 






Chapter Six: In What Sense is Meaning Normative? 
§6.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines in broad terms two candidates for a theory of normative judgment 
that would explain the intuitions elicited from the Meaning Twin Earth scenario of Chapter Two. 
First, I consider how a theory of this kind is developed in the moral case by returning to R.M. 
Hare’s argument for prescriptivism, based on the ‘missionary’ thought experiment. I explain that, 
as Smith (1994) contends, there are effectively two main options for a theory of normative 
judgment: an expressivist form and a rationalist form. Gibbard (2012) adopts an account of the 
former type and uses an analogue of the missionary scenario to argue that meaning is normative. 
Baker (2016) claims that this argument fails. According to him, we simply do not have suitably 
similar intuitions in this case. Moreover, Baker argues that an analogue of the Moral Twin Earth 
scenario fails to generate analogous intuitions in the meaning case. I argue that Baker 
misconstrues each of these scenarios and that once we address this, we do get intuitions in favour 
of the normativity of meaning (and against reductive dispositionalism). I sketch out Gibbard’s 
expressivist view of semantic judgment in more detail and then turn to McDowell’s non-reductive 
realist alternative. I outline some obstacles ahead for each of these accounts and argue that, 
provisionally, McDowell’s appears to be more promising than Gibbard’s as far as meeting these 
obstacles is concerned. 
§6.2 Return to Hare 
Recall that in Hare’s scenario, Hare envisions a missionary who visits an island of 
cannibals and, in the course of trying to impress his religious and moral views on these cannibals, 
the two come to exchange their views about the sort of things that they each call ‘good’. The 
cannibals quickly discover that the missionary uses his term ‘good’ in a peculiar way, to apply to 
people who are meek and mild. The cannibals find this very strange; they use their term ‘good’ 
to apply to people who collect as many scalps as possible. On Hare’s view, the missionary and 
cannibals are “under no misapprehension” about the meaning of ‘good’ and are best viewed as 
genuinely disagreeing (1952, p.148). Hare uses these intuitions as evidence against a descriptivist 
moral semantics by showing that, if this semantics was correct, we would end up with highly 
unintuitive results with regards to the missionary scenario. 
A descriptivist moral semantics would imply that the missionary and cannibals do not 
genuinely disagree on account of their meaning different things by their respective terms, the 
missionary ‘good’ and the cannibal ‘good’. The missionary uses his term ‘good’ to refer to the 
property of being meek and mild, and the cannibals use their term ‘good’ to refer to the property 
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of collecting many scalps. As such, Hare explains, descriptivism would imply that the two simply 
speak at cross purposes in exchanging their views: 
[The missionary and cannibals] would not be disagreeing, because in English (at any rate 
missionary English), ‘good’ would mean among other things ‘doing no murder’, whereas 
in the cannibals’ language ‘good’ would mean something quite different, among other 
things ‘productive of maximum, scalps’. (1952, p.149) 
This suggests that we cannot view the missionary ‘good’ and the cannibal ‘good’ as descriptive 
terms. In order to view the two as disagreeing, Hare says, we need to view the missionary and 
cannibals terms as having the same meaning on account of their performing the same evaluative 
role in the language in which those terms are used, as the “most general adjective of 
commendation”: 
It is because in its primary evaluative meaning ‘good’ means neither of these things 
[“doing no murder” or “productive of maximum scalps”], but is in both languages the 
most general adjective of commendation, that the missionary can use it to teach the 
cannibals Christian morals. (1952, p.149) 
Moreover, Hare claims, any plausible account of our moral practice must leave room for “moral 
development” and this essentially involves the idea that moral judgment and thus moral terms are 
essentially evaluative. The idea that our moral judgments simply refer to a set of standards is too 
rigid and “the words used in referring to them . . . too dominantly descriptive” (1952, p.150). As 
Hare explains, these standards are bound to change as circumstances change and the “instrument” 
of this change is the “evaluative use of value-language” (1952, p.150). Moreover, Hare says this 
evaluative use of value-language is the cure for moral stagnation: 
The remedy, in fact, for moral stagnation and decay is to learn to use our value-language 
for the purpose for which is it designed; and this involves not merely a lesson in talking, 
but a lesson in doing that which we commend; for unless we are prepared to do this we 
are doing no more than pay lip-service to a conventional standard. (1952, p.150) 
This brings us to the focal point of Hare’s criticism of descriptivism. Descriptivism, according to 
Hare, cannot make sense of the idea that moral judgment and moral language are tied to the will. 
If an agent judges that some action is right, then he or she ought to be “prepared” to comply with 
that judgment. Smith (1994) develops this idea. 
§6.3 Smith: Two Options for a Theory of Normative Judgment 
One intuitive feature of our moralizing, according to Smith (1994), is the idea that moral 
judgments have a ‘practical upshot’. This feature of our moral practice is generally labelled 
‘internalism’ and refers to a broad category of claims about the connection between our moral 
judgments and our having some reasons or motivation to act in accordance with those judgments 
(1994, p.60). Smith outlines three main internalist claims that vindicate the idea that there is a 
conceptual connection between moral judgment and the will (1994, p.61). The first and strongest 
claim is the thesis that an agent’s moral judgments as a matter of conceptual necessity motivate 
that agent: “If an agent judges that it is right for her to Φ in circumstances C, then she is motivated 
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to Φ in C” (1994, p.61). It is unlikely that moral judgments are as closely linked to motivation as 
this first claim suggests because, Smith argues, this requires the abandonment of the idea that our 
motivation is defeasible, that sometimes we suffer from weakness of the will or the like and so 
fail to be motivated to comply with our judgments about what is right and wrong (1994, p.61). 
Consequently, Smith says it is more plausible to opt for the alternative view that moral judgment 
has a weaker and defeasible connection with the will. Smith embodies this view into a second 
internalist claim: “If an agent judges that it is right for her to Φ in circumstances C, then either 
she is motivated to Φ in C or she is practically irrational” (1994, p.61). Given that we are subject 
to the “distorting influences of weakness of the will and other similar forms of practical unreason,” 
we sometimes fail to be motivated to do what is right (1994, p.61). In most cases though, these 
influences are absent and so we are typically motivated to comply with our moral judgments. 
A final way to make sense of the idea that there is a ‘practical upshot’ to our moral 
judgments is by supposing that there is a conceptual connection between “the content of a moral 
judgment—the moral facts—and our reasons for action” (1994, p.61). This amounts, on Smith’s 
view, to the following third internalist claim: “If it is right for agents to Φ in circumstances C, 
then there is a reason for those agents to Φ in C” (1994, p.62). Alternatively, as Smith puts it, 
“moral facts are facts about our reasons for action; they are themselves simply requirements of 
rationality or reason (1994, p.62). Smith argues that this third claim may explain or even entail 
the second internalist claim above: An agent has a reason to act insofar the agent would be 
motivated to act accordingly if he or she were rational (1994, p.62). As such, Smith says, the 
agent who judges that he or she has a reason to act and yet fails to be motivated to do so, must be 
practically irrational: “if [the agent] is not motivated accordingly, then she fails to be rational by 
her own lights” (1994, p.62). According to the third form of internalism “the judgment that it is 
right to act in a certain way is simply equivalent to the judgment that there is a reason to act in 
that way” and so the third form of internalism entails the second form (1994, p.62). Nonetheless, 
Smith notes, the reverse claim is not true—the third claim does not follow from the second: 
Expressivists, for example, agree that someone who judges it right to act in a certain way 
is either motivated accordingly or practically irrational in some way, but deny that moral 
requirements are requirements of rationality or reason. They thus accept the second 
internalist claim because they think that a moral judgement is the expression of a 
preference, or perhaps the expression of a disposition to have a preference; but they reject 
the third because they think that fully rational creatures may yet differ in the preferences 
that they have, or are disposed to have. (1994, p.62) 
So though one must accept the second claim if one accepts the third, one can nonetheless accept 
the second and yet reject the third. Smith labels the second claim the ‘practicality requirement on 
moral judgment’ and the third ‘rationalism’. These two claims delineate the main branches of 
internalism. 
In the next sections, I argue that a semantic analogue of Hare’s argument supports the 
contention that meaning is normative, i.e. that semantic judgment is essentially evaluative or 
action-guiding in the sense described by Smith. Baker (2016) argues that such an argument cannot 
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succeed on the grounds that we do not have relevantly similar intuitions in the meaning case. I 
outline Baker’s argument and then respond to that argument by arguing that the scenario Baker 
uses is not in fact a suitable analogue of Hare’s missionary scenario. Once this discrepancy is 
addressed, it turns out that a proper analogue of Hare’s scenario does support the normativity of 
meaning. I use the Meaning Twin Earth argument proposed in Chapter Two to bolster this 
argument. 
§6.4 Baker: Intuitions about Disagreement Do Not Support the 
Normativity of Meaning 
Baker (2016) develops a metasemantic version of Hare’s thought experiment to test 
whether ‘means’ shares the special normative status as moral terms like ‘good’.97 Before he 
argues how this version fails to secure the right intuitions in support of the normativity of meaning, 
Baker explains what sets normative terms apart from other sorts of terms when it comes to cases 
of disagreement. The main thing that makes normative terms unusual in these cases, Baker says, 
is that they seem to violate the general principle that two terms will possess the same meaning 
only if those terms are roughly coextensive for competent speakers (2016, p.71). Normative terms 
apparently break this rule of translation by allowing radical disputes—disputes that involve 
radically non-coextensive uses of a term—to count as genuine disagreements: “our intuitions 
seem to allow for the possibility of radical disputes in the case of normative terms” (2016, p.72). 
As Baker explains, Hare took this unusual property of moral terminology as evidence for 
expressivism. According to Hare, we cannot reasonably treat moral terms as possessing meaning 
in virtue of what they refer to, but instead in terms of the prescriptive attitudes they express. That 
is, we should not attempt to give ‘good’ a referentialist semantics, but should adopt a form of 
prescriptivism (expressivism) instead. 
The most plausible assessment in Hare’s case involves viewing ‘good’ as meaning the 
same thing between the missionary and cannibals and then concluding that the two simply have 
incompatible views about the sort of actions that are ‘good’. As Baker has emphasized, the fact 
that the dispute is a moral one centred on the term ‘good’ is here responsible for our collective 
intuition that the missionary and cannibals genuinely disagree, i.e. despite the different extensions 
that the term ‘good’ has in each of their languages. The same goes for the Moral Twin Earth 
devised by H&T—the fact that the dispute between the Earther and Twin Earther centres on the 
term ‘good’ enables us to view their disagreement as genuine. Baker’s principle for translation is 
violated in both cases. If we look to more ordinary cases, involving any other sort of terms, we 
tend not to allow the same degree of difference in application between speakers who use a given 
term to exchange their views with one another, e.g. about ‘water’ or ‘pigeon’. In these cases, 
Baker says, we are more inclined to say that these speakers simply mean different things by a 
                                                     
97 Baker’s main target in using this test is Gibbard (2012), who argues that an analog of Hare’s scenario 
can be to show that the concept MEANING is normative. 
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term if their applications of that term are not broadly coextensive (in line with the general 
principle for translation). According to Baker, the analogue for Hare’s scenario in the case of 
meaning suggests that ‘means’ is less like ‘good’ and more like other ordinary sorts of terms. As 
such, Baker says, this analogue inspired by Hare’s argument cannot support the view that ‘means’ 
is a normative term. 
The semantic analogue Baker develops from Hare’s scenario is designed to be a test: If 
our intuitions in the meaning case match those in the moral case, then we have evidence to think 
that meaning is normative. If not, then then we have no such evidence. The result of this test, 
Baker says, is the latter; Hare’s scenario cannot be used in the case of ‘means’ to generate 
evidence for the normativity of meaning. Meaning may still be normative, Baker says, but the 
analogue from Hare’s argument does not provide evidence for that thesis. Let’s look at Baker’s 
scenario and see why he thinks the scenario fails to generate the same results as the moral case 
originally devised by Hare. 
§6.4.1 Baker’s Scenario 
Baker reimagines Hare’s thought experiment as one that focuses on a metasemantic 
dispute. In this new scenario, Baker borrows two characters, Jerry and Tyler, from Gibbard’s 
presentation of Hare’s argument in his Meaning and Normativity (2012). Jerry, we are to imagine, 
is an individualist about meaning, whereas Tyler is a communitarian about meaning. Baker 
imagines that Jerry and Tyler travel to an island inhabited by cannibal metasemanticists. These 
metasemanticists have access to very advanced technology, including a giant machine that 
enables the three parties to access all of the non-normative and non-meaning facts about the world, 
“all of the facts which potentially form part of meaning’s supervenience base” (2016, p.72). Jerry, 
Tyler, and one of the cannibals use this giant machine to look at a woman named Jenny. The 
machine tells us that “Jenny is disposed to apply ‘green’ to all and only green objects, but people 
in her community are disposed to apply the term ‘green’ to green objects before t and blue objects 
after” (2016, p.72). Moreover, the machine tells us that “[n]o one is disposed to apply the term to 
red objects” (2016, p.72). Jerry, Tyler, and the cannibal say the following things about Jenny: 
Jerry says, ‘“Green” uttered by Jenny means GREEN’. 
Tyler says, ‘“Green” uttered by Jenny means GRUE’. 
But the cannibal says, ‘“Green” uttered by Jenny means RED’. (2016, p.73) 
From here, the three assign meanings to all of Jenny’s other terms and the general pattern above 
continues: “Jerry and Tyler actually agree a lot . . . The cannibal never agrees.” (2016, p.73). Jerry 
and Tyler question the cannibal on this front. In particular, they ask “if he realizes that on his 
theory of meaning, neither individuals nor communities ever use their own concepts correctly” 
(2016, p.73). The cannibal answers in the affirmative, that “‘we agree about the subvening facts, 
we just disagree about what meanings supervene on them’” (2016, p.73). 
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Baker claims that our intuition in this scenario is that Jerry and Tyler genuinely disagree 
and the cannibal simply speaks at cross purposes with everyone else. Whatever the cannibal 
means by ‘meaning’ must be something other than what Jerry and Tyler are talking about. Baker 
justifies this assessment by using the principle for translation he introduces to explain Hare’s 
original scenario. Recall that in Hare’s scenario, the term ‘good’ can be plausibly understood as 
meaning the same thing between the missionary and cannibals of that scenario because ‘good’ 
has the unusual property of permitting radical disputes: “Even if two speakers apply the term 
‘good’ in radically different ways, we are still able to hear disagreements between them as genuine” 
(2016, p.73). In the case of ‘means’ though, Baker argues that the threshold for disagreement is 
lower: “. . . in the case of ‘meaning’, there is a much more significant limit to how radical 
disagreement can be before we hear it as merely verbal” (2016, p.73). Jerry and Tyler disagree 
about Jenny, but they also agree about a wide background of other cases. In this respect, Jenny’s 
case is anomalous (2016, p.73). As we know, Jerry and Tyler ascribe to quite different research 
programs. Consequently, the two disagree about the sort of linguistic phenomena that are central 
and those that are peripheral in determining meaning (2016, p.73). With this difference in mind, 
we can reasonably expect cases like Jenny to bring the two apart in that the two will have 
competing explanations for what counts as Jenny’s meaning something one thing or another. The 
cannibal, on the other hand, does not have any explanatory overlap with Jerry and Tyler and 
moreover does not offer any explanation for his judgment that Jenny means RED by ‘green’. For 
this reason, the cannibal cannot be viewed as genuinely disagreeing as Jerry and Tyler do. 
The main failure on the cannibal’s part is that his theory of meaning fails the “non-
negotiable desideratum on [any] theory of meaning . . . that it explains linguistic behaviour: why 
people speak and judge as they do” (2016, p.73). Jerry and Tyler’s theories abide by this 
desideratum in that they offer competing explanations for what Jenny means vis-a-vis the different 
linguistic phenomena they take to be relevant in determining what she means. For any theory of 
meaning, Baker explains, “there is a class of phenomena that intuitively make up the data for a 
theory of meaning to explain, and which both sides agree their theories must by and large explain, 
with some small remainder to be explained with auxiliary hypotheses, and an even smaller 
remainder to be at the very least explained away” (2016, p.74). Baker claims that it is this 
explanatory constraint that sets the meaning case apart from the moral case and crucially, it is this 
constraint that the cannibal of Baker’s scenario fails to meet. 
According to Baker, the key feature responsible for the different results between Hare’s 
case and his own is that ‘meaning’ must play an explanatory role whereas ‘good’ does not: “there 
is no requirement that a theory of goodness will explain actual behaviour” (2016, p.75). In Hare’s 
case, this explains why we can treat the missionary and cannibals as disagreeing even though they 
prescribe radically different kinds of behaviour when they use the term ‘good’ in each of their 
languages. Given that an account of ‘meaning’ must be sufficiently explanatory, Baker’s case 
fares differently. The explanatoriness requirement puts a limit on how far we can interpret ‘means’ 
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as meaning the same thing between two parties and thereby, on how far we can interpret two 
parties as genuinely disagreeing. This drives Baker to conclude that ‘means’ is not marked by the 
characteristics that allows a Hare-style argument to be run for ‘good’ and other normative terms. 
§6.4.2 Reply to Baker’s Objection to Gibbard 
I reply to Baker’s argument in two stages. In the first stage, I take issue with the scenario 
that Baker develops for his argument. I argue that this scenario is not a suitable analogue of Hare’s 
original thought experiment. If we repair this scenario, with some inspiration from the Meaning 
Twin Earth scenario of Chapter Two, it does yield evidence for the normativity of meaning. With 
this scenario in place, I turn to the second stage of my reply to Baker. In this stage, I object to 
Baker’s focus on the explanatory constraint on any account of meaning. I argue that this is a red 
herring on Baker’s part. The real issue, as my amended scenario shows, has to do with another 
constraint on any account of meaning, namely a normativity constraint. 
§6.4.3 Why Baker’s Scenario Is Inadequate 
Baker’s scenario is not a suitable analogue of Hare’s original thought experiment insofar 
as Baker mislocates the appropriate disagreement. The main reason that Baker’s scenario fails in 
this respect is because he assumes the cannibals have no principled reasons for viewing Jenny as 
meaning RED by ‘green’. It is this assumption that does all of the work for Baker’s argument in 
that naturally, this assumption about the cannibals preclude them from having any kind of genuine 
disagreement with the other parties, Jerry and Tyler. This marks a serious departure from Hare’s 
scenario. The cannibals described by Hare do have principled reasons for using ‘good’ as they do, 
to commend people who collect many scalps. The cannibals have a moral outlook that commends 
people who do this among other things. Baker does not assume anything of the sort about the 
metasemantic cannibals of his scenario, save for the fact that they think semantic predicates work 
in a radically different way from what Jerry and Tyler’s theories suggest. So ultimately, Baker 
chooses a rather inopportune thought experiment and this leads him to conclude that the scenario 
does not yield analogous intuitions in favour of the normativity of meaning. I argue that if the 
right changes are made to Baker’s argument, with an eye on Meaning Twin Earth, an analogue of 
Hare’s argument does support the normativity of meaning. 
§6.4.4 How to Recalibrate Baker’s Scenario 
I argue that Baker’s test, with some modification, does yield intuitions for the normativity 
of meaning if we use a proper analogue of Hare’s thought experiment. As I have mentioned, we 
can get such an analogue by combining Baker’s scenario with some of the features from my 
Meaning Twin Earth scenario. The main thing that this analogue aims to do is locate the right 
disagreement in the case of ‘meaning’ and then determine whether this disagreement provides 
evidence for the normativity of meaning. Baker failed to do this properly by using a scenario that 
does not conform to the one described by Hare. Once we rectify this mistake, I explain that 
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Baker’s focus on the explanatory constraint on any account of meaning turns out to be a red 
herring. In the next sections, I formulate a new scenario that is closer to the one described by Hare 
and then assess that scenario in line with Baker’s test for normativity. 
§6.4.5 Baker’s Scenario Revised 
Imagine that Jerry*, an individualist about meaning, visits an island inhabited by cannibal 
metasemanticists. Jerry* aims to convert these cannibals to his view about meaning. In the process 
of trying to convert these cannibals, Jerry* learns that the cannibals have access to very advanced 
technology, including a giant machine that enables Jerry* and the cannibals to access all of the 
non-normative and non-meaning facts about the world. Jerry* comes to exchange his views with 
one of the cannibals, Tyler*, who explains their communitarian view about meaning to Jerry*.98 
When Jerry* informs Tyler* about his individualist theory of meaning, Tyler* and the rest of the 
cannibals find this rather odd in that Jerry* is willing to ascribe meaning to speakers that their 
communitarian theory rules out as meaning anything at all. Jerry* and Tyler* step up to the giant 
machine that allows access to all non-normative facts. They use this machine to look at a border 
case that Tyler* takes as a counterexample to the individualist theory espoused by Jerry*. Tyler* 
asks Jerry* to observe, using the machine, a solitary individual Jenny* who inhabits a nearby 
island. The machine reveals that Jenny* was at a very young age shipwrecked on this island and 
managed to survive in spite of her solitary existence by hunting and foraging food on her own. 
One of the things that Jenny* does, the machine shows, is exclaim “Blackberry!” whenever she 
encounters one of the berries that are a staple in her diet. Jerry* and Tyler* exchange their views 
about what Jenny* means by her words: 
Jerry* says, ‘“Blackberry!” uttered by Jenny* means BLACKBERRY.” 
Tyler* says, “No, “Blackberry!” uttered by Jenny* does not mean BLACKBERRY nor 
anything else!”. 
The two assign meanings to the rest of Jenny’s terms and the general pattern continues. Jerry* 
insists that all of the utterances that Jenny* speaks are meaningful and Tyler* uniformly disagrees 
with this. Tyler* takes Jenny* to not mean anything by any of her terms. Tyler* presses Jerry* on 
this topic. 
Tyler* is especially sceptical about how an individualist theory, like the one espoused by 
Jerry*, can preserve the idea that there is a distinction between what seems right and what is right 
with respect to a speaker’s utterances. Tyler* uses the example of Jenny* to bring this problem 
out against Jerry*. According to Tyler*, his communitarian theory can make sense of this 
distinction by appealing to whether a speaker’s use of an expression conforms to the use of that 
expression by his or her speaking community. Jenny* has no such background, Tyler* explains, 
and so Jenny* cannot mean anything by her utterances. In fact, Tyler* and the other cannibals are 
                                                     
98 It may have been more appropriate to use Jerry* and Saul* here, given that we will discuss KW’s 
communitarian view later in the chapter, but I stick to Tyler* here for the purposes of responding to Baker. 
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in part motivated to accept their chosen theory of meaning in light of cases like this, where the 
seems right/is right distinction is inapplicable. When pressed about this, Jerry* concedes the need 
for the distinction between what seems right and what is right. Nonetheless, Jerry* explains, this 
distinction can be drawn by citing some system that Jenny* has for her uttering “Blackberry!” 
whenever she encounters such a berry. For example, Jerry* may cite that Jenny* associates a 
specific smell and taste with these berries and so knows when to exclaim “Blackberry!”. As such, 
there is room to view Jenny* as meeting the requirements for drawing a distinction between what 
seems right and what is right in virtue of her having this system. For this reason, Jerry* claims 
that Tyler* is wrong in saying that Jenny* does not mean anything by “Blackberry!”. 
§6.4.6 Assessing the Revised Scenario 
Intuitively, Jerry* and Tyler* genuinely disagree, though this disagreement does not hang 
on the explanatory role of their theories. Jerry* and Tyler* both have adequate reasons for their 
views about Jenny*. In other words, both parties accept the requirement that ascriptions of 
meaning are sufficiently explanatory vis-a-vis a speaker’s behaviour. The heart of the 
disagreement between Jerry* and Tyler* has to do with the applicability of the seems right/is right 
distinction, which serves as a constraint on any account of what Jenny* means (and more 
generally, any account of a speaker’s meaning full stop). Jerry* and Tyler* disagree because they 
disagree about whether Jenny* can mean anything by her utterances in light of this distinction. 
For Jerry*, Jenny* can mean something by her utterances and for Tyler*, she cannot. 99 For Tyler*, 
the requirement to preserve the seems right/is right distinction trumps the explanatory 
considerations.100 If we drop the constraint embodied by the distinction between what seems right 
and what is right, then it is unclear how we can plausibly explain the disagreement between Jerry* 
and Tyler*. Therefore, there seems to be similar scope in the semantic case for interpreting 
‘meaning’ as having the same status as ‘good’, as permitting some radical disputes to be plausibly 
viewed as genuine disagreements, and crucially, this is because meaning predicates perform the 
same evaluative role for Jerry* and Tyler* and their semantic judgements about Jenny* (even 
though they apply their respective meaning predicates differently). This is why I have referred to 
this further constraint on any account of Jenny*’s meaning a normative one. (Note that since 
Jerry* and Tyler* have different first-order semantic theories about the constitution of correctness 
conditions, it will not be possible to recover a locus of disagreement between them simply in 
                                                     
99 One may object by pointing out that Jerry* and Tyler* will actually agree most of the time when they 
apply their terms to individuals within communities. Baker emphasised this point about Jerry and Tyler in 
his scenario and I believe that similarly, Jerry* and Tyler* are likely to agree most of the time. Nonetheless, 
this does not bear on the disagreement over Jenny*. Even if Jerry* and Tyler* uniformly apply their terms 
for meaning ascription in most other cases, they are still polarized in their judgments about Jenny*. I have 
tried to emphasize this point by framing Jenny*’s case as something that Tyler* and the other cannibals use 
as a counterexample to Jerry*’s theory of meaning. 
100 Tyler* needn’t deny that there is some explanation of Jenny*’s behaviour, just that this explanation can 
involve ascriptions of meaning to Jenny*’s utterances. 
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terms of the first of the two sorts of normativity distinguished by Hattiangadi (norm-relativity). 
On this suggestion, Jerry* and Tyler* will simply talk past one another in the manner of Hare’s 
missionaries and cannibals) 
In order to meet Baker’s argument, I have shown that there is an analogue of Hare’s 
argument that does suggest that ‘meaning’ is normative—it just happens that Baker uses an 
inopportune analogue in his own argument. In the scenario I describe, this problem is resolved by 
using an appropriate analogue and by focusing on the right kind of constraint. The most plausible 
treatment of this scenario involved the distinction between what seems right and what is right, 
which operates as a further constraint on any account of meaning that is more important than that 
requiring meaning to play an explanatory role. Consequently, this scenario highlights the fact that 
Baker’s focus on explanatoriness is a red herring. Though an account of meaning does aspire to 
be explanatory in the way that Baker suggests, this is not the only constraint on any adequate 
account of meaning. In the case of Jerry* and Tyler*, the two both accept that an account of 
meaning should aspire to be explanatory but nonetheless disagree as to whether an account of 
Jenny*’s meaning can abide by the seems right/is right constraint, so that in this case the need to 
preserve the seems right/is right distinction trumps matters relating to explanation. 
§6.4.7 Baker’s Objection to Moral Twin Earth 
Baker argues that, like Hare’s case, there is no plausible semantic analogue of Moral 
Twin Earth that supports the normativity of meaning. We simply do not have analogous intuitions 
in the meaning case, Baker says, because semantic judgments do not have the same overriding 
importance that moral judgments do. According to Baker, this feature of moral judgment drives 
the collective intuition that the Earther and Twin Earther of the Moral Twin Earth scenario use 
the term ‘good’ with the same meaning and so genuinely disagree in spite of the fact that their 
applications of that term diverge in the way that they do. Baker claims that we cannot plausibly 
view ‘meaning’ as being univocal under similar circumstances, e.g. between Jerry and Tyler in 
his original scenario. 
Baker argues that Jerry and Tyler are more plausibly viewed as having a merely verbal 
dispute insofar as their use of the term ‘meaning’ equivocates between PRIVATE MEANING 
and PUBLIC MEANING, respectively (2016, p.78). Jerry argues that “the social aspects of 
language are explained by the linguistic and cognitive dispositions of individuals” and Tyler 
argues that “individual usage is parasitic on collective practice” (2016, p.78). Both parties have a 
theory with “grounds to argue that either public meaning or private meaning is a derivative 
property,” yet nonetheless “it could turn out that a theory positing distinct, explanatorily 
independent properties of public meaning and private meaning actually provides a more elegant 
and powerful account of the data” (2016, p.78). Consequently, Baker says, we can view ‘meaning’ 
as equivocating between PRIVATE MEANING or PUBLIC MEANING given that these 
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concepts are “explanatorily independent” of one another. In the moral case, Baker claims that 
‘good’ (or ‘morally right’) could not be similarly equivocal. 
Baker argues that ‘good’ cannot be plausibly viewed as being equivocal in moral contexts. 
Even if we suppose, for example, that two parties in a dispute view ‘good’ as referring to 
CONSEQUENTIALIST RIGHT and DEONTOLOGICAL RIGHT respectively, we are more 
inclined to view one party as wrong rather than treat ‘good’ as ambiguous between the two 
competing concepts (2016, p.78-9). Moral Twin Earth is designed to give credence to the view 
that ‘good’ functions this way; in that scenario, our intuitions suggest that ‘good’ means the same 
thing in English and Twin English and because of this, we still hear the  Earther and Twin Earther 
as disagreeing in spite of their different uses of that term: “Even when we imagine linguistic 
communities on two different planets, each using ‘right’ to express one of the proposed 
precisifications of the term, we still hear disagreement” (2016, p.79). Things cannot go similarly 
in the meaning case, Baker claims, because we cannot plausibly view judgments about ‘meaning’ 
as having the same action-guiding force as judgments about ‘good’. 
For a suitably-similar ‘Semantic Twin Earth’, Baker argues, we cannot plausibly view 
Earthers and Twin Earthers as using ‘meaning’ univocally and genuinely disagreeing across 
radically different views about what meaning consists in, e.g. PRIVATE MEANING or PUBLIC 
MEANING. Even if we assume that semantic judgment is action-guiding, judgments of this kind 
could only be weakly action-guiding in the sense that they are readily overridden by other sorts 
of considerations (2016, p.79). After all, Baker says, this is our intuitive view of semantic 
judgment here on Earth. We do not typically take our judgments about ‘meaning’ to have 
overriding importance in deciding what to do, whereas we do take our judgments about ‘good’ to 
have such importance (2016, p.79). The limit for interpreting ‘meaning’ as univocal in a dispute 
is considerably lower than it is for ‘good’. Consequently, there is a lower limit on viewing disputes 
about ‘meaning’ as substantive disagreements, compared to similar disputes about ‘good’. Given 
that we assign overriding importance to our judgments about ‘good’, there is wider scope for 
interpreting two speakers as disagreeing, even if they use ‘good’ in radically different ways. Moral 
Twin Earth is designed to illustrate this unusual feature of our thinking about ‘good’: 
The utility of Moral Twin Earth as a thought experiment depends in part on the fact that 
judgments about ‘right’ are typically treated as overriding by normal earthlings and their 
counterparts, thus we can imagine without strain significant and noticeable departures in 
behaviour on Moral Twin Earth. (2016, p.79) 
Judgments about ‘meaning’ are simply not overriding in this way, Baker says, so we cannot 
reasonably expect to hear genuine disagreement in radical disputes about ‘meaning’: 
Even if MEANING is normative, we cannot expect similar departures on a Semantic 
Twin Earth. (2016, p.79) 
This suggests, Baker says, that ‘meaning’ does not function like ‘good’ in the sense that the limit 
for univocity (and so substantive disagreement) is comparatively low—‘meaning’ is more like a 
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“standard referring expression” and so we do not get results on Semantic Twin Earth similar to 
those on Moral Twin Earth (2016, p.79). 
§6.4.8 Reply to Baker’s Moral Twin Earth Objection 
Baker’s focus on the overridingness of moral judgments is misleading. Admittedly, this 
feature of our moral judging is partly responsible for our intuitions about Moral Twin Earth, but 
this is only one part of the broader stipulation that ‘good’ plays the same role on Earth and Twin 
Earth. The main reason that the Earther and Twin Earther are most plausibly viewed as 
disagreeing in the scenario envisioned by H&T is that each of the parties use their respective 
terms, the English ‘good’ and Twin English ‘good’, to fulfil a distinctive role in guiding the moral 
judgments of the two communities. Of course, one of the distinguishing marks of this sort of 
discourse, shared between the two populations, is that judgments about ‘good’ are overriding 
relative to other sorts of considerations. Nonetheless, this alone does not carry our intuition that 
the Earther and Twin Earther genuinely disagree about ‘good’ in spite of the widely different 
ways they apply that term. What does carry that intuition is the fact that, as I have mentioned, 
Earthers and Twin Earthers use ‘good’ in their respective languages in the way that they do—to 
deliberate about what ought to be done and whether various actions are to be commended or 
permissible, etc. Given that ‘good’ plays this role between the two languages, there is room to 
view the Earther and Twin Earther as disagreeing with respect to what theory ought to regulate 
the use of ‘good’, i.e. whether a consequentialist or a deontological theory should play the role of 
guiding our thinking about what to do. As we know, the Earther and Twin Earther each have 
robust explanations for their views on this topic. The Earther vouches for his consequentialist 
theory and the Twin Earther for his deontological theory. Whether or not they assign overriding 
importance to judgments about ‘good’ is beside the point so long as in each case the degree of 
importance attached to the relevant judgments is the same on the two planets. We can readily 
assume, for instance, that the two parties do not assign overriding importance to these judgments 
without damaging the intuition about disagreement. The same can be said in the case of meaning. 
Baker seems to assume that if meaning is normative, then our judgments about meaning 
must have overriding force over other sorts of considerations; this is simply false. The thesis that 
meaning is normative is perfectly compatible with the idea that semantic judgments are not 
overriding over other judgments, such as those about ‘good’. Baker looks to concede this, though 
he ultimately concludes that because meaning is not normative in this overriding sense that a 
Semantic Twin Earth cannot succeed. This is too quick on Baker’s part. Even if our judgments 
about ‘good’ and ‘means’ come apart in that ‘means’ has a lower threshold for univocity and 
semantic judgments are not overriding, this does not preclude a Semantic Twin Earth scenario 
from generating intuitions for the normativity of meaning. The main reason for this is that we can 
assume that, in line with the discussion above, that Semantic Twin Earth involves two parties that 
use ‘means’ in their respective languages to perform the same role. So even though ‘means’ does 
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not have overriding force over either party’s other judgments, about ‘good’ etc., this does not 
have any bearing on the fact that they genuinely disagree in the Semantic Twin Earth scenario. 
In the next sections I consider how a robust theory of normative (semantic) judgment 
could explain our intuitions in cases such as those discussed in the preceding sections. I field two 
candidates for such a theory. The first is Allan Gibbard’s expressivist theory, advanced in his 
Meaning and Normativity (2012). According to Gibbard, the concept MEANING involves plans 
for belief and so is fundamentally normative. The second candidate I consider is a realist 
alternative that takes ‘meaning’ to refer to normative properties, suggested by John McDowell. 
After some scrutiny, I make a provisional ruling about which account is likely to do best in 
meeting the obstacles that each of these theories must meet in going forward. 
§6.5 Gibbard: Meaning is a Normative Concept 
Gibbard (2012) argues that the normativity of meaning derives from the fact that 
MEANING is a normative concept. According to Gibbard, meaning is essentially normative 
because certain categorical ‘oughts’ are built into the concept MEANING. This is not to say that 
the meaning of all terms is normative, but instead that the meaning of ‘meaning’ is normative. So, 
though terms like ‘rock’ and ‘tree’ etc. are clearly non-normative in that they don’t prescribe any 
categorical ‘oughts’, the term ‘meaning’ is special in the same way that ‘good’ is—both terms 
express normative concepts, i.e. MEANING and GOOD are normative concepts: 
The thesis that “meaning is normative” concerns not meaning itself but the concept of 
meaning. Equivalently, it concerns the meaning of our term ‘meaning’, or the content of 
our thoughts of what a person is thinking. Just as the concept GOOD is a normative 
concept, goes the claim, so is the concept MEANING (2012, p.6). 
Gibbard argues that MEANING is a normative concept because, in line with Kripke (1982), if a 
speaker means something by a term, that seems to have immediate implications for what that 
speaker should do when he or she uses that term (2012, p.10). In this respect, the slogan that 
“meaning is normative” might be better put, according to Gibbard, as “means implies ought” 
(2012, p.10). As we saw in Chapter One, Kripke’s Wittgenstein (KW) used this assumption about 
our intuitive notion of meaning to attempt to rule out dispositionalism about meaning as an 
adequate answer to the sceptical challenge posed in his 1982. The key assumption for Kripke is 
that it is because I mean addition by ‘+’ that I ought to answer ‘125’ to the query ‘58 + 67 = ?’. 
It is in virtue of the meaning that I ascribe to the sign ‘+’ that I ought to answer as I do in this new 
case, even if in practice I may fail to do so: 
From statements saying what I mean by the plus sign and other arithmetic terms and 
constructions, it will follow that I ought to answer “125” when I ask myself “What’s 58 
+ 67?” Not that I necessarily will answer “125”, but I ought to answer that way (2012, 
p.10). 
Gibbard admits that all of this is rather sketchy, but the terms ‘normative’ and 
‘normativity’ are after all not terms that “we learned at our parents’ knees” (2012, p.10). Instead 
these terms have an at-best “shallow” characterization of being about what we ought to do: “They 
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are judgments that are, as Wilfrid Sellars put it, “fraught with ought”. They are judgments that 
move within the “space of reasons”” (2012, p.10). These sorts of considerations are characteristic 
of our talk about ‘good’, and according to Gibbard, about ‘meaning’. So though we only have a 
rather general and vague idea of the kind of considerations that count as ‘normative’, this is 
enough for ‘normative’ to be used as a general umbrella term for our talk about ‘ought’ judgments. 
In the case of ‘meaning’, Gibbard says, there is a “primitive” and “idealized” kind of normative 
ought that issues from a speaker’s use of the term ‘means’ (2012, p.16).101 
§6.5.1 Meaning Ascriptions Imply ‘Ought’ Statements 
Meaning is normative, Gibbard argues, insofar as meaning ascriptions imply straight 
‘ought’ ascriptions that do not derive analytically from purely naturalistic facts (2012, p.11). 
Gibbard calls this the weak thesis, i.e. the view that means implies ought. As we saw above, 
something like this thesis motivates KW’s normative constraint on any plausible story about what 
constitutes meaning facts. The stronger thesis, Gibbard says, accepts both that means implies 
ought and, roughly, its converse—“for every means, there is an ought that implies it” (2012, p.12). 
The latter we can set aside for the moment. For now, let’s consider whether the former—the weak 
thesis—is plausible. 
First, Gibbard explains, it is unclear why we should accept the weak thesis. In particular, 
it is unclear why we should view meaning as normative simply because, for example, the fact that 
I mean addition by ‘plus’ implies that I ought to answer ‘125’ to KW’s sceptic. This example is 
surely a normative matter in that it has normative implications about what I should do, but this 
alone does not necessarily reveal anything about the concept of MEANING itself. As Gibbard 
puts it: 
If I mean PLUS by ‘+’, Kripke says, then I should answer 125. But what does this show? 
If it’s going to rain I should carry an umbrella, but that doesn’t make the concept of rain 
a normative concept. Not everything with normative import is itself normative. Mightn’t 
the tie of meaning PLUS to answering 125 be like the tie of rain to taking an umbrella? 
Oughts, in that case, aren’t built into the concept of meaning PLUS, any more than they 
are built into the concept of rain. (2012, p.12) 
If we drop the thesis that means implies ought, can we explain these two examples? Given that 
the concept of meaning PLUS and the concept RAIN do not seem to necessarily imply any straight 
‘ought’ ascriptions, there must be some alternative to Gibbard’s weak normativity thesis. Gibbard 
imagines how such an alternative might go: 
                                                     
101 Gibbard is careful to qualify that not all statements involving the term ‘ought’ are genuinely normative; 
some statements of this sort are simply degenerate (2012, p.11). For example, Gibbard explains, the claim 
“You ought to do whatever you ought to do” is a normative statement, albeit a degenerate one: “Any 
statement entails this one vacuously—and obviously, this fact doesn’t render all statements normative” 
(2012, p.11). The ought involved in genuine normative statements is a straight ascription that cannot derive 
analytically from “the purely naturalistic layout of things” (2012, p.11). We can roughly define genuine 
normative or ‘ought’ statements, Gibbard says, as “those thoughts or sentences that are ought-infused in a 
way that keeps them from following analytically from anything purely naturalistic” (2012, p.11). Gibbard 
claims that meaning is normative on this shallow characterization. 
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It does tend to be a good thing to have an umbrella when it rains, but that’s because an 
umbrella can keep you dry and—usually—you ought to keep dry. It’s also a good thing 
not to say or think that 58 + 67 = 5, but mightn’t that too just be a matter of consequences? 
If you do things like answering 5, banks dishonor your checks, buildings you design fall 
down, and all sorts of other bad things tend to happen. Or perhaps it’s also a matter of 
intrinsic value: to accept an answer 5 would be to believe falsely, and it is desirable to 
believe the truth. (2012, p.12-13) 
Gibbard argues that we need to adopt a normativist view of meaning because we must explain 
why certain ‘oughts’ follow from meaning. For example, Gibbard says, we need a thesis that 
explains why I ought to answer ‘125’ rather than ‘5’ to KW’s sceptic if I use ‘plus’ to mean 
addition and not quaddition (2012, p.13). The best way to explain this unusual quality of meaning 
is via an expressivist view akin to Ayer’s emotivism or Hare’s universal prescriptivism, according 
to Gibbard (2012, p.19). 
 Gibbard argues that the concept MEANING is normative insofar as it essentially involves 
states of planning, where Gibbard uses the term ‘plan’ in a somewhat technical way, to refer to 
plans for belief as opposed to, strictly-speaking, plans for action. On Gibbard’s view, to accept 
that a word has a meaning involves a plan to accept and reject sentences in one’s language. 
Gibbard claims that we can elucidate the concept MEANING in this “oblique” way by explicating 
the sort of planning state that a speaker is in when he or she takes an expression to have a certain 
meaning, e.g. that ‘Dogs bark’ means DOGS BARK. As Gibbard puts it: 
A sentence of mine that means DOGS BARK is ‘Dogs bark.’ The small caps convention, 
after all, is that ‘DOGS BARK’ just is whatever the sentence ‘Dogs bark’ means in my 
mouth (2012, p.179). 
Gibbard realizes that this construal of meaning, as it stands, is not robust enough. If we construe 
meaning in terms of a speaker’s plan for the use of an expression, it is unclear how we could 
capture shared meaning across languages or across, say, that same speaker in the past or future: 
The problem now is to extend this to other languages, beyond the sentences of my own 
language right now. What of Pierre, who speaks French but no English? What of myself 
at another time, when we can at least raise the question of whether my meanings have 
changed? Pierre’s believing DOGS BARK consists in accepting a sentence in his French 
that means DOGS BARK, and I am convinced that ‘Les chiens aboient’ is such a sentence. 
What does it mean, though, I am now asking, to say that his sentence ‘Les chiens aboient,’ 
means DOGS BARK? (2012, p.179) 
We can address this worry, Gibbard says, by further explicating the “state of mind that believing 
a meaning claim amounts to” (2012, p.179). In this case, for instance, we can cite the state of 
mind that a speaker would be in if he or she has the belief that Pierre’s sentence ‘Les chiens 
aboient’ means DOGS BARK. 
§6.5.2 Synonymy 
Gibbard argues that we can make progress towards such an account by citing the state of 
mind that a speaker is in when he or she takes two expressions to be synonymous, e.g. the state 
of mind of a speaker with the belief that ‘Les chiens aboient’ and ‘Dogs bark’ are synonymous. 
   
 
141 
If a speaker believes two sentences are synonymous, on Gibbard’s view, then that speaker takes 
those sentences to consist in the same plan for belief, i.e. they consist in the same plan for their 
use under various circumstances (whether that be to accept or reject them by Gibbard’s 
terminology). By extension, if two speakers mean the same thing by a sentence, then they will 
have the same plan for accepting and rejecting those sentences. Pierre and Gibbard, for instance, 
will mean the same thing by ‘Les chiens aboient’ and ‘Dogs bark’ insofar as they plan to accept 
or reject those sentences under the same conditions. So given the same circumstances, Pierre and 
Gibbard will use the sentences in their respective languages in the same way: Pierre will accept 
his sentence whenever Gibbard does, Gibbard will reject his sentence whenever Pierre does, and 
so on. A similar point can be made for other sentences in Pierre and Gibbard’s languages: “The 
epistemic circumstances for which I myself ought to accept ‘Here’s a dog’ are those for which 
Pierre ought to accept ‘Voici un chien’ . . . This is what it means to say that Pierre’s sentence 
‘Voici un chien’ is synonymous with my sentence ‘Here’s a dog’” (2012, p.180). Gibbard puts 
this more formally: 
1. For epistemic circumstances E, I ought to accept my sentence ‘Here’s a dog’. 
2. For epistemic circumstances E, Pierre ought to accept his sentence ‘Voici un chien’. 
(2012, p.180) 
If Pierre and Gibbard uniformly agree in their plans for using those sentences for any 
circumstances E, then we can conclude that the two mean the same thing; both use their sentences 
to express HERE’S A DOG. 
This is only an initial sketch of Gibbard’s expressivist account of meaning and there is a 
lot of detail that I am putting to one side for the purposes of my discussion here. The key takeaway 
for the purposes of this chapter is there is an expressivist analysis that respects the normativity of 
meaning. For Gibbard, the normativity of meaning is simply built into the concept MEANING. 
The best way to characterize this feature of meaning is to say that MEANING essentially involves 
some OUGHT beliefs, or plans, that regulate speaker behaviour. Pierre’s belief that ‘Voici un 
chien’ means HERE’S A DOG is an OUGHT belief in the sense that Pierre’s meaning determines 
how he ought to go on, to apply ‘Voici un chien’ only in circumstances where there is a dog. In 
the next section, I cast some doubt on this expressivist account of meaning. 
§6.5.3 Meaning Non-Factualism and scepticism 
I argue that Gibbard’s version of non-factualism about meaning is unlikely to provide a 
plausible vehicle for capturing the normativity of meaning. The main reason for this, beyond any 
of the paradigmatic problems that non-factualism faces in other domains (e.g. the Frege-Geach 
problem102), is that non-factualism about meaning has a special problem in addressing the 
sceptical line of argument proposed in Kripke (1982) and discussed in Chapter One. Gibbard’s 
                                                     
102 See Geach (1965). 
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position may readily accommodate the idea that meaning is normative, but this is all for nothing 
if it cannot face the more general problem at the heart of the sceptical argument. I argue that, in 
the end, Gibbard’s position is unlikely to solve this problem and so we may be better off in opting 
for an alternative account of meaning that takes meaning ascriptions to perform some fact-stating 
role. 
In the next sections, I first introduce the basic scheme of this more general objection to 
non-factualism about meaning by briefly explaining how it motivates a recent argument by 
Anandi Hattiangadi. I then argue that this objection can be delivered in a more straightforward 
way by following the strategy deployed in Miller (2010a). Once the strategy of this general 
objection to non-factualism about meaning is clear, I explain how Gibbard’s view from Meaning 
and Normativity (2012), as a kind of non-factualism about meaning, is under serious pressure to 
meet this objection. If this objection is not met, then Gibbard’s non-factualist view is forced 
toward the radical sceptical conclusion that all language is meaningless—something that any 
account of meaning ought to avoid. 
§6.5.4 Hattiangadi: The Limits of Expressivism 
In her recent paper “The Limits of Expressivism” (2015), Anandi Hattiangadi argues 
against Gibbard (2012) that non-factualism about meaning is both unprofitable and self-defeating 
in its treatment of the intentionality of language and thought—the power of language “to represent, 
to be about, or to stand for something or other” (2015, p.225). According to Hattiangadi, this 
feature of language essentially involves semantic properties such as “meaning, reference, content, 
extension, intension, truth conditions, and the like” (2015, p.225). On a factualist view about 
meaning, i.e. that views meaning ascriptions as performing some fact-stating role, this feature can 
be readily explained. For example, Hattiangadi says: 
Suppose you sincerely utter the sentence ‘Nehru was the first Prime Minister of India’. 
This sentence of your language means that Nehru was the first Prime Minister of India, 
and the belief that ensures your sincerity has the content that Nehru was the first Prime 
Minister of India. Your belief and your assertion are true iff Nehru was the first Prime 
Minister of India. The name ‘Nehru’ and its mental analogue the concept NEHRU refer 
to Nehru. These are all examples of semantic properties of language and thought. (2015, 
p.225) 
Hattiangadi argues that non-factualism cannot explain the intentionality of language by using, as 
Gibbard suggests, the idea that there are states of affairs that accord or fail to accord with a plan. 
This move is blocked, Hattiangadi says, because a non-factualist cannot take the notion of a plan 
for granted: in assuming that there are states of affairs that accord or fail to accord with a plan we 
would be assuming the existence of the very sort of semantic or intentional fact whose existence 
is denied by the non-factualist. This objection can be given in a more straightforward way, without 
getting into the details of Gibbard’s view. 
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§6.5.5 Meaning Scepticism 
Recall that KW’s sceptical argument is designed to show that there is are no facts in virtue 
of which ascriptions of meaning, such as Jones means magpie by ‘magpie’, are true or false. KW 
motivates this argument by envisioning a sceptic who claims that there is no fact that would 
determine what I meant in using the ‘plus’ sign in the past and as such, nothing determines that 
‘125’ would be the only answer I ought to give to when prompted with ‘68 + 57 = ?’, where ‘68 
+ 57 = ?’ is an arithmetic operation I have never performed before. KW’s sceptic hypothesizes 
that by ‘plus’, I did not mean addition but instead a non-standard function quaddition, where 
quaddition can be defined as the following function: 
x ⊕ y = x + y if x, y < 57 
= 5 otherwise 
As such the sceptic claims that I ought to answer ‘5’ to the query ‘68 + 57 = ?’. According to him, 
there is no fact that would secure ‘125’ rather than ‘5’ as the answer that I ought to give in this 
case: “no fact about my past history—nothing that was ever in my mind, or in my external 
behaviour—establishes that I meant plus rather than quus” (Kripke 1982, p.13). Given that there 
is no such fact about my past usage, as to whether I meant plus or quus in the past, there is nothing 
in my past history that dictates ‘125’ rather than ‘5’ as the answer I ought to give to the current 
query ‘68 + 57 = ?’. In other words, I have no justification for answering one way rather than the 
other. This challenge, the sceptic says, can be applied more generally against any of my other 
words (including words from all of the main syntactic categories). 
 The sceptic’s challenge is apparently radical and absurd, but what fact could there be that 
would determine that ‘125’ is the unique answer I ought to give when prompted with ‘68 + 57 
= ?’? Any adequate answer to KW’s sceptic must meet two constraints: 
1. It must offer a candidate fact that would constitute my meaning plus and not quus. 
2. It must explain how that fact justifies my giving the answer ‘125’ rather than the 
answer ‘5’. (Miller 2007, p.168) 
The first constraint is driven by the idea that the meaning of a term dictates a kind of (weak) 
normative standard for the correct use of that term, i.e. and so whether various applications of that 
term are correct or incorrect. Intuitively, the term ‘plus’ is used correctly if applied to the function 
addition, and incorrect if applied to any other function, including quaddition. As such, any 
adequate account of my meaning must specify addition (and only addition) as regulating my past 
use of the term ‘plus’ and thus rule out the sceptical hypothesis that I meant quaddition all along. 
The second constraint is driven by the idea that any fact about my past meaning must imply that 
‘125’ is also the only answer I ought to give to the query ‘68 +57 = ?’. 
KW enumerates a series of candidate facts that would secure my past meaning, but as we 
saw in Chapter One, each apparently fails to meet at least one of the above constraints. This leads 
KW to conclude that there are no facts that would secure a determinate meaning for my past self, 
for ‘plus’ or indeed for any other term. Consequently, KW says, the notion of meaning seems to 
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“vanish into thin air” in the wake of the sceptic’s challenge. Nonetheless, KW argues that we can 
revive the notion of meaning by means of a non-factualist ‘sceptical solution’.103 
§6.5.6 Non-Factualism and the Sceptical Problem 
KW claims that we can avoid the “intolerable” conclusion of the sceptic’s challenge by 
opting for a ‘sceptical solution’ that concedes the “sceptic’s negative assertions are unanswerable” 
and yet revives the notion of meaning by supposing that ascriptions of meaning perform some 
non-fact-stating role (Miller 2010a, p.5). We can get clear on how this would go in the meaning 
case by looking at a basic non-factualist theory in the moral case. For example: 
Suppose that for one reason or another you have reached the conclusion that there are no 
such things as moral facts, so no facts in virtue of which claims such as “Stealing is wrong” 
can be true or false. Then, you might worry that moral thought and talk is liable to be 
convicted of a massive and systematic error: since moral claims purport to describe moral 
facts, and there are no such facts, the conclusion that all (positive, atomic) moral 
judgments are false appears to follow, threatening us with a form of moral nihilism 
according to which the notions of right and wrong “vanish into thin air”. (2010a, p.5) 
Emotivism, a basic kind of non-factualist moral view, tries to avoid this radical conclusion by 
abandoning the claim that the function of moral claims is to state moral facts (2010a, p.5). The 
emotivist argues that moral claims instead perform under a non-fact-stating role of expressing 
emotion, e.g. of expressing a speaker’s feeling of disapprobation towards a kind of action, such 
as stealing. The most famous proponent of this view was A.J. Ayer: 
If I say to someone, “You acted wrongly in stealing that money”, I am not stating anything 
more than if I had simply said, “You stole that money” In adding that this action is wrong, 
I am not making any further statement about it. I am simply evincing my moral 
disapproval about it. It is as if I had said, “You stole that money”, in a peculiar tone of 
horror, or written with the addition of some special exclamation marks. The tone, or the 
exclamation marks, adds nothing to the literal meaning of the sentence. It merely serves 
to show that the expression of it is attended by certain feelings in the speaker … If I now 
generalize my previous statement and say, “Stealing money is wrong”, I produce a 
sentence which has no factual meaning - that is, expresses no proposition that can be 
either true or false. (Miller 2010a, p.5) 
The sceptical solution outlined by KW takes an analogous approach to the case about meaning. 
The main idea behind KW’s solution is that we can treat ascriptions of meaning as performing 
some non-fact-stating role, e.g. of expressing some degree of confidence that, say, Smith’s use of 
“+” will accord with the use that expression has in our speech community, “or perhaps as marking 
our acceptance of Smith as a member of that community” (2010a, p.5). This, KW argues, avoids 
the spiral into meaning nihilism from the sceptical argument because we can revive the notion of 
meaning on non-factualist grounds, where meaning ascription plays a function that is non-fact-
                                                     
103 Most but not all commentators view the sceptical solution as non-factualist. Wright (1984), McGinn 
(1984), Blackburn (1984), and Boghossian (1989) view the sceptical solution as non-factualist, whereas 
Wilson (1994) views the solution as factualist. For a critique of Wilson’s interpretation of the sceptical 
solution, see Miller (2010b). 
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stating and yet can make sense of our judgments concerning a speaker’s going right and wrong 
with respect to his use of a word.104 
Arguably the kind of non-factualism proposed in KW’s sceptical solution begs the 
question against the sceptical argument: “The ascription of a non-fact-stating function to a type 
of statement still presupposes that there is a distinction between correct and incorrect uses of 
statements of that type” (2010a, p.6). For example, Miller explains: 
. . . suppose that statements of the form “X is bad” have the function of expressing moral 
disapproval of X, while statements of the form “X is yummy” have the function of 
expressing a desire to eat X. Suppose that I intend to express moral disapproval of George 
Bush, and I utter, “George Bush is yummy”. Then we can say that this use of the sentence 
is incorrect, unlike “George Bush is bad”, which, modulo my intention, would have been 
correct. In other words, a serious non-factualist account of the semantic function of a type 
of statement requires a distinction between correct and incorrect uses of statements of 
that type, on pain of collapsing into a form of nihilism about the type of statement in 
question (according to which utterances of statements of that type would be mere noise 
or mere “sounding off”, and hence not assessable in terms of correctness and 
incorrectness)”. (2010a, p.6) 
Even if non-factualism may have some purchase in explaining the function of moral judgments, 
it faces a special difficulty in the case of meaning. Non-factualism must account for the platitude 
that there is a distinction between the correct and incorrect use of a meaningful word or expression, 
even if semantic judgments (ascriptions of meaning) are non fact-stating. In the moral case, we 
can drop the assumption that moral language is descriptive and still make sense of moral 
judgments as playing a non-factual role and expressing non-cognitive states, e.g. emotions or 
sentiments. In the meaning case, this cannot be done because we cannot drop the idea that 
ascriptions of meaning involve standards for correctness. 
A consequence of this is that the sceptical argument applies to both factualist and non-
factualist semantic functions and so meaning non-factualism cannot escape nihilism in the same 
way that moral non-factualism attempts to avoid moral nihilism: 
. . . the sceptical argument targets the notion of a rule per se, not just the notion of a rule 
governing the use of expressions with descriptive semantic functions: even non fact-
stating language is rule-governed, and hence susceptible to the argument of the rule-
following sceptic. (2010a, p.6) 
This argument can be applied against non-factualism more generally by following the emotivist 
model of moral judgment glossed above: 
Suppose for the sake of argument that we hold an emotivist account of judgments about 
goodness according to which the semantic function of “X is good” is to express moral 
approval of X. Suppose at time t I intend to express moral approval of Fidel. Then, it 
                                                     
104 KW expands this view into a communitarian account of rule-following and meaning. According to KW, 
we can only make sense of a speaker’s following a rule or speaking meaningfully insofar as he or she is 
part of a community of rule-followers or speakers. On KW’s view, the community provides the requisite 
check on the speaker’s accordance with a rule or meaningful use of an expression in the sense that, in light 
of that community’s background of use, we can judge whether the speaker in question does right or wrong 
by it (in that he or she either accords or fails to accord with the rule or the meaning of an expression as 
dictated by the community’s use). 
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seems, I ought to utter “Fidel is good”. However, according to the rule-following sceptic, 
I should not utter “Fidel is good” because the rule-governing “good” is not 
R1: Utter “X is good” if and only if you intend to express moral approval of X 
But rather 
R2: Utter “X is good” if and only if (a) it is time t* < t and you intend to express moral 
approval of X or (b) it is time t** ≥ t and you intend to express moral disapproval of X. 
(2010a, p.7) 
If R1 governs the use of ‘good’ then the utterance “Fidel is good” is correct at time t; if R2 governs 
the use of ‘good’ then the utterance “Fidel is good” is incorrect at time t (2010, p.7). In other 
words, “one might say: according to R1, ‘good’ expresses moral approval, whereas according to 
R2, ‘good’ expresses moral schmapproval” (2010a, p.7). 
Suppose that a bizarre sceptic challenges whether my use of ‘good’ is governed by R2 
rather than R1, that really I mean moral schmapproval rather than approval by my use of ‘good’. 
According to this sceptic, no fact can determine that my use of ‘good’ is governed by R1 rather 
than R2. In this case, non-factualism is no better off in that it must simply presuppose that there 
are some predetermined facts governing correctness and incorrectness that would secure my 
meaning R1 rather than R2 as the rule governing the use of the expression: 
. . . any form of non-factualism that is more sophisticated than e.g. a very crude form of 
emotivism that views moral judgments as mere “sounding off” presupposes determinate 
facts about the semantic functions of linguistic expressions, or the rules governing their 
correct use, irrespective of whether those functions are conceived to be descriptive or 
non-descriptive or whether the rules govern description or some non-descriptive 
linguistic practice. A generalized version of KW’s argument establishes that there are no 
such facts. (2010a, p.7) 
Any form of non-factualism that simply assumes there are some such correctness standards for 
the expressions of a language does not provide a legitimate response to the challenge posed by 
KW’s sceptic (2010a, p.7). 
The important point for our present purposes is that the preceding objection applies also 
to non-factualist accounts that characterize the function of meaning ascription in terms of 
prescriptions, i.e. as orders or commands (2010a, p.7). For example: 
. . . suppose that I intend to get Jones to open the window at time t. So I utter “Open the 
window!” Intuitively, this utterance is correct, modulo my intention to get Jones to open 
the window. But the sceptic can argue that it is incorrect, since actually “window”, as I 
use it, means windows before time t but doors at time t and thereafter. (In fact, “window” 
actually means qwindow …). Thus despite the fact that “Open the window!” is an 
imperative rather than a description, it presupposes facts about the meanings of its 
constituent expressions. (2010a, p.7-8) 
Consequently, any version of non-factualism that presupposes that there are standards governing 
correct use for various expressions will fall to KW’s sceptical argument. In other words, any 
sceptical solution along the non-factualist lines sketched by KW will fail as a response to the 
sceptical argument about meaning. 
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§6.5.7 Why Gibbard’s Sceptical Solution Cannot Succeed 
I will now argue that Gibbard’s theory of meaning, as a version of meaning non-
factualism, is equally susceptible to the sceptical line of argument delivered in the second chapter 
of Kripke (1982) and revived in Miller (2010a) against the sceptical solution suggested in 
Kripke’s third chapter. The key reason for this is that by bringing in the notion of a semantic plan, 
Gibbard begs the question by assuming that there are facts about which uses of expressions do 
and do not accord with the dictates of the plan. By using this notion, Gibbard smuggles the idea 
that one can go right or wrong in the sense that one can fulfil or fail to fulfil a plan for using an 
expression. Consequently, Gibbard’s account of meaning is no improvement on the factualist 
alternatives, i.e. ‘straight solutions’, to KW’s sceptical challenge in that his account must also 
presuppose that there are some facts that determine when various expressions are correctly and 
incorrectly applied. This point is made especially clear by re-applying the sceptical line of 
argument to a scenario where a speaker’s plan for using an expression (in line with Gibbard’s 
view) is the centre of the sceptic’s attention. When we apply the sceptical challenge in this 
scenario, it turns out that the notion of a plan has no more traction than any of the alternatives 
outlined by Miller. Gibbard’s view does no better in addressing the sceptical challenge because 
we can draw the sceptical challenge again at the level of a speaker’s plan. As noted above, the 
only way that a non-factualist view like Gibbard’s can escape here is by presupposing that there 
are some predetermined facts that fix correctness standards for meaning. However, this move is 
blocked for any account of meaning that is truly non-factualist. As such, there is no clear way to 
adopt non-factualism and at the same time meet the requirements for addressing the sceptical 
argument proposed by KW. This can be shown by using the following example. 
Suppose that I have a plan to use the term ‘magpie’ in accordance with the meaning I take 
that word to have, as a term that is applied correctly only insofar as it is applied to magpies and 
not finches, sparrows, or anything else.105 From time to time, I might fail to execute this plan. For 
instance, I might mistakenly use the term ‘magpie’ to describe a seagull—perhaps it is dusk and 
I am not wearing my glasses. By the lights of my plan for using ‘magpie’ in accordance with its 
meaning, I have made a mistake in that I have used that term to apply to something other than a 
magpie. Most of the time though, I do abide by my semantic plan and use the term ‘magpie’ 
accordingly. In fact, I believe that the term ‘magpie’ possesses a meaning that corresponds to this 
plan for applying the term, i.e. to magpies and nothing else. Insofar as I have this plan for the use 
of the term ‘magpie’, I use that term meaningfully: the plan is what governs my use of the 
expression, and determines which uses are correct and incorrect. 
Imagine that a stranger takes a seat next to me while I am enjoying a view of the Dunedin 
harbour. The stranger says nothing at first. He and I simply relax and observe the birds circling 
                                                     
105 The specific details of the plans are simplified here and are not necessarily identical to the plans deployed 
by Gibbard—but this simplification makes no difference to the plausibility of my argument.  
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the harbour. After some time, let’s say time t, I notice a magpie among the seagulls that 
dominantly populate the harbour area. I point out this unusual sight to the stranger by gesturing 
at the bird and by saying to him “Hey, that is a magpie!” in a tone of surprise. The stranger, who 
reveals himself to be a studied philosopher, poses a challenge to me in response to my statement; 
he says that the term “magpie” as I use it is governed by a deviant rule that dictates that I utter 
“magpie” to refer to magpies before time t and seagulls after time t. More formally, he argues that 
R2 rather than R1 dictates the correct application of the expression ‘magpie’ in this case: 
R1: Utter “x is a magpie!” if and only if x is a magpie. 
R2: Utter “x is a magpie!” if and only if (a) it is time t* < t and x is a magpie or (b) it is 
time t** ≥ t and X is a seagull. 
If R2 is the rule that governs my use of the term ‘magpie’, then my utterance “That is a magpie!” 
was incorrect insofar as I was speaking and gesturing at the unusual bird, a magpie and not a 
seagull, at time t. According to the stranger, my utterance would have been correct (modulo the 
intention to conform to R2) if applied to one of the many seagulls that dominantly populate the 
harbour. Minimally, the stranger argues, there is no fact that could determine that my use of the 
term ‘magpie’ is governed by R1 rather than R2. 
In order to meet this sceptical challenge from the stranger, I concede that indeed there are 
no facts that could determine that my use of the term ‘magpie’ is governed by R1 rather than R2. 
Nonetheless, I argue that I was correct to use ‘magpie’ as I did insofar as I have a plan for using 
that term in line with R1 and not R2 or any other plan. So in response to the stranger, I specify 
my plan for using the term ‘magpie’ in accordance with the meaning I take that term to have, in 
line with R1 and as a term that is only applied correctly if used to refer to magpies and no other 
birds (or anything else for that matter). Given that I have this plan for the use of the term ‘magpie’, 
I argue in response to the stranger that I used the term ‘magpie’ correctly in referring to the 
unusual bird that appeared over the harbour at time t. I insist that this plan dictates that my 
utterance “There’s a magpie” was correct under the circumstances. The stranger argues that this 
is not enough. He demonstrates this by generalizing his sceptical challenge to target my plan for 
using the term ‘magpie’. 
The stranger recalibrates his sceptical challenge and suggests that my plan to apply 
‘magpie’ only to magpies consists in P2 rather than P1, where P1 and P2 are the following 
semantic plans: 
P1: Utter “x is a magpie!” if and only if x is a magpie. 
P2: Utter “x is a magpie!” if and only if (a) it is time t* < t and x is a magpie or (b) it is 
time t** ≥ t and x is a seagull. 
At this stage, the stranger argues that there is nothing that could specify on purely non-factualist 
grounds that P1 rather than P2 regulates my behaviour for using ‘magpie’ and that uttering “That 
is a magpie!” at time t was correct, modulo the intention to comply with P1. 
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Under this pressure from the stranger, it is unclear what kind of answer I could offer other 
than to insist that ‘magpie’ possesses a meaning that dictates that that expression is only correctly 
applied to magpies and not seagulls, or anything else. Invariably, this involves assuming that 
‘magpie’ already has a meaning that is specified in terms of some fact about how that term is 
correctly and incorrectly applied. So given the sceptical considerations raised in Miller’s 
argument, it seems that Gibbard’s account of meaning can do no better here. The notion of a 
semantic plan for applying an expression must, at its core, assume that the expression in question 
already has a determinate meaning insofar as it assumes that there are facts about which uses of 
the expression do and do not accord with the dictates of the plan. 
The main problem with Gibbard’s construal of the concept MEANING is that in using 
the notion of a semantic plan, Gibbard helps himself to the notion of accord and effectively 
ignores the sceptical problem about the determination of reference, embodied in the challenge 
posed by KW’s sceptic. The problem with this move on Gibbard’s part is that his position is 
supposed to offer a solution to this challenge in the sense that it is supposed to explain what 
meaning consists in and part of that is explaining how reference is determined, e.g. what makes it 
the case that I mean addition rather than quaddition by ‘plus’. Gibbard does not have an answer 
to this sceptical challenge, but instead assumes that the notion of a plan includes the idea that one 
can accord or fail to accord with a plan, i.e. in terms of whether a plan is executed or not. This is 
not an adequate answer to the challenge posed by KW’s sceptic insofar as the success or failure 
of a speaker’s attempt to execute a plan is ultimately measured by relying on predetermined facts 
about what uses of an expression do and do not accord with a plan. As a non-factualist account of 
meaning, this move is both self-defeating and ultimately no more successful than the factualist 
alternatives.106 
Overall, then, Gibbard’s non-factualist account of ascriptions of meaning as expressing 
‘plan-laden’ states, does not provide us with an adequate vehicle for capturing the intuitions 
elicited by the Meaning Twin Earth scenario. 
§6.6 McDowell: Non-Reductionism about Meaning 
In the next sections I motivate McDowell’s non-reductionist account of meaning as a 
vehicle for the normativity of meaning and hence for a normativist explanation of the Meaning 
Twin Earth scenario. I introduce McDowell’s view by detailing his response to KW’s sceptical 
argument in his 1984 and 1992 essays on the topic and then expand on this by appealing to 
McDowell’s remarks on meaning and understanding in Mind and World (1994). I motivate one 
objection against McDowell, raised by Fodor (1995), and then consider whether McDowell’s non-
reductionism does any better than Gibbard’s non-factualism. In concluding, I argue that, at least 
                                                     
106 For similar arguments to the effect that meaning non-factualism is in some sense incoherent or self-
defeating, see Wright (1984), Boghossian (1989), and especially Boghossian “The Status of Content” 
(1990). 
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provisionally, McDowell’s view fares better in that the most serious objection for non-factualism 
is a knock-down objection whereas the most serious objection for McDowell’s non-reductive 
factualism is a challenge, albeit a formidable one. 
§6.6.1 Wittgenstein’s ‘Straight Solution’ and the Master Thesis 
McDowell argues that the sceptical argument at the heart of Kripke (1982) rests on an 
assumption that Wittgenstein rightly rejects. The crux of this is that Kripke’s Wittgenstein (KW) 
mistakenly accepts the conclusion that there are no meaning facts in the face of the sceptical 
paradox posed by Wittgenstein in Investigations §201: 
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every 
course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything 
can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. 
And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here. (Wittgenstein 1953/2009) 
According to McDowell, Wittgenstein rejects the sceptical conclusion of the paradox. This is 
evidenced by Wittgenstein’s proposal in the second paragraph of §201: 
It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course 
of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at 
least for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it. What this shews 
is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is 
exhibited in what we call “obeying the rule” and “going against it” in actual cases. 
(1953/2009) 
McDowell points out that, contrary to Kripke’s reading, Wittgenstein here proposes a ‘straight 
solution’ to the paradox, one that specifies a fault in the reasoning that led to the paradox. Kripke 
neglects this second paragraph of §201 and reads Wittgenstein as embracing the sceptical 
conclusion and subsequently, offering a ‘sceptical solution’. This misconstrues the point of §201, 
according to McDowell: 
. . . what Wittgenstein clearly claims, in the second paragraph of §201, is that the 
reasoning [that yields the sceptical paradox] is vitiated by “a misunderstanding”. The 
right response to the paradox, Wittgenstein in effect tells us, is not to accept it but to 
correct the misunderstanding on which it depends: that is, to realize “that there is a way 
of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation.” (McDowell 1984, p.331) 
The paradox of §201, McDowell says, is the first horn of a dilemma generated by the 
mistaken idea that grasping a rule is always an interpretation (1984 p.331). McDowell attributes 
this ‘misunderstanding’ to the acceptance of what he calls the ‘master thesis’ in his 1992 paper 
“Meaning and Intentionality in Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy”: 
. . . the thesis that whatever a person has in her mind, it is only by virtue of being 
interpreted in one of various possible ways that it can impose a sorting of extra-mental 
items into those that accord with it and those that do not. (1992, p.45) 
McDowell argues that Kripke’s tacit acceptance of this thesis drives his embrace of the sceptical 
paradox, i.e. the first horn of the dilemma. Kripke assumes that a mental representation only has 
a content (and so can sort items into those that accord and fail to accord with it) insofar as that 
mental representation is given an interpretation: 
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Kripke's reading of how the regress of interpretations threatens the very idea of 
understanding turns on this thesis: ‘no matter what is in my mind at a given time, I am 
free in the future to interpret it in different ways’ [Kripke 1982: 107]. This presupposes 
that whatever is in a person's mind at any time, it needs interpretation if it is to sort items 
outside the mind into those that are in accord with it and those that are not. There are 
always other possible interpretations, and a different interpretation, imposing a different 
sorting, may be adopted at a different time. Considered in themselves, that is, in 
abstraction from any interpretations, things in the mind just ‘stand there’. (1992, p.44) 
The master thesis assumes that we can draw a distinction between a mental state and its content, 
something that requires interpretation in order to have a content at all according to the master 
thesis. Hattiangadi (2007) teases these two apart by drawing a contrast between a kind of ‘vehicle’ 
and its content: 
The vehicle is thought to be a non‐intentional state—such as a brain state, or a 
dispositional state. The vehicle is as devoid of intentional content as a stone, or an un‐
interpreted word. In order for the vehicle to have a content it needs to be interpreted. 
Without an interpretation, we cannot make sense of the idea of the vehicle applying 
correctly or incorrectly.” (2007, p.168) 
On this thesis, interpreting a rule R is a matter of applying a further rule R* that tells what R 
requires in a given situation. So if we accept the master thesis and thus the idea that grasping a 
rule always involves interpretation, it turns out that there are no facts about the correct and 
incorrect application of the rule. As such, the first horn of the dilemma (generated by the master 
thesis) threatens to dissolve the notion of meaning into thin air. In the absence of some fact that 
would constitute “my having given some expression an interpretation with which only certain 
uses of it would conform,” the notion of meaning begins to appear an illusion (McDowell 1984, 
p.331-2).107 
The other horn of the dilemma is a “familiar mythology of meaning and understanding,” 
that meaning is like a sign that is not even potentially subject to interpretation: 
[the idea that] coming to mean the expression in the way I do (my ‘grasping the rule’) 
must be my arriving at an interpretation; but it must be an interpretation that is not 
susceptible to the movement of thought in the sceptical line of reasoning—not such as to 
content us only until we think of another interpretation standing behind it. (1984, p.332) 
McDowell cites Wittgenstein as rejecting this idea: 
What one wants to say is: “Every sign is capable of interpretation; but the meaning 
mustn’t be capable of interpretation. It is the last interpretation.” (Wittgenstein, Blue Book, 
p.34) 
Wittgenstein claims that ‘what one wants to say’ is based on a tacit acceptance of the master thesis, 
which is taken to an equally intolerable extreme at the other end of the spectrum in the idea that 
                                                     
107 There is room for the non-factualist to explain why the notion of meaning is not in danger of nihilism, 
but the most serious challenge for this view, as I have argued, is that meaning non-factualism looks 
committed to the self-defeating assumption that there are predetermined facts determining which uses of 
expressions are correct or incorrect(irrespective of whether those expressions themselves have a non-
factualist semantics). Consequently, it is hard to see how non-factualism can avoid the intolerable 
conclusion that meaning is illusory without begging the question. McDowell has his own reservations to 
this effect, which he raises in §3 and §10 of McDowell 1984, p.328-30, 345-7. 
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following a rule is akin to the operation of a rigid mechanism. This is the second horn of the 
dilemma: 
How queer: It looks as if a physical (mechanical) form of guidance could misfire and let 
in something unforeseen, but not a rule! As if a rule were, so to speak, the only reliable 
form of guidance. (Wittgenstein, Zettel §296) 
Wittgenstein attacks this ‘mechanical’ picture of meaning and understanding as well, though this 
attack is, contrary to Kripke’s reading, not an argument for the acceptance of the sceptical 
conclusion (impaling oneself on the first horn of the dilemma). Given that Kripke accepts the 
master thesis, he assumes that the dilemma is compulsory, that we must choose between admitting 
the intolerable conclusion of the sceptical paradox or accept the “fantastic mythology” that there 
is a kind of final sign-post, a last interpretation: 
[Kripke would be right about Wittgenstein] if the dilemma were compulsory; but the 
point of the second paragraph of §201 is precisely that it is not . . . the attack on the 
mythology is not support for the paradox, but rather constitutes, in conjunction with the 
fact that the paradox is intolerable, an argument against the misunderstanding. 
(McDowell 1984, p.332) 
For McDowell’s Wittgenstein, the dilemma is not compulsory; he sees a course between the two 
horns. According to McDowell, Wittgenstein introduces the dilemma to mock, in a rather 
dramatic way, the misunderstanding at its root—the idea that understanding a rule or the meaning 
of an expression is always an interpretation. 
§6.6.2 Steering the Middle Course: Introducing the Notion of a Practice 
If we abandon the master thesis, then as Wittgenstein suggests in the second paragraph 
of §201, this opens up a way of understanding meaning that both avoids the paradox and the 
absurd conception of meaning as consisting in a sign that cannot be itself interpreted; there is a 
way of grasping a rule that is not an interpretation. Wittgenstein gestures at this solution in §201: 
And hence also ‘obeying a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to 
obey a rule. Hence it not possible to obey a rule ‘privately’: otherwise thinking one was 
obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it. (1953/2009, p.87) 
For Wittgenstein, the notion of a practice or a custom enables an escape from the dilemma. The 
makings of this escape, McDowell says, are already present in §198: 
“Then can whatever I do be brought into accord with the rule?” - Let me ask this: what 
has the expression of a rule - say a sign-post - got to do with my actions? What sort of 
connexion is there here? - Well, perhaps this one: I have been trained to react to this sign 
in a particular way, and now I do so react to it. 
“But that is only to give a causal connexion: to tell how it has come about that we go by 
the sign-post; not what this going-by-the-sign really consists in.” - On the contrary; I have 
further indicated that a person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there exists a regular 
use of sign-posts, a custom. (1953/2009, p.86) 
Wittgenstein introduces the analogy with reading a sign-post in §198, McDowell says, “in order 
to adumbrate the diagnosis that he is going to state more explicitly in §201”: 
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When I follow a sign-post, the connection between it and my action is not mediated by 
an interpretation of sign-posts that I acquired when I was trained in their use. I simply act 
how I was trained to.108 (1984, p.339) 
This, McDowell claims, prompts an objection analogous to the one advanced by the interlocutor 
in §198—something like: 
‘Nothing in what you have said shows that what you have described is a case of following 
a rule; you have only told us how to give a causal explanation of certain bits of (what 
might tell as well be for all that you have said) mere behaviour.’ (1984, p.339) 
Wittgenstein’s answer to this objection, McDowell argues, corresponds to the first sentence of 
§201: 
. . . the training in question is initiation into a custom. If it were not that, then the account 
of the connection between sign-post and action would indeed look like an account of 
nothing more than brute movement and its causal explanation; our picture would not 
contain the materials to entitle us to speak of following (going by) a sign-post. (1984, 
p.339) 
By introducing the notion of a custom Wittgenstein is able to, in one fell swoop, block the regress 
of interpretations before it begins and rule out the conception of meaning and understanding as 
“nothing more than brute movement and its causal explanation,” i.e. the conclusion that there is 
no such thing as following a rule or being guided by one’s understanding of a word. McDowell 
articulates a more nuanced version of this reply on Wittgenstein’s behalf in his 1992: 
When one follows an ordinary sign-post, one is not acting on an interpretation. That gives 
an overly cerebral cast to such routine behaviour, Ordinary cases of following a sign-post 
involve simply acting in the way that comes naturally to one in such circumstances, in 
consequence of some training that one underwent in one’s upbringing. (Compare §506: 
“The absent-minded man who at the order ‘Right turn!’ turns left, and then, clutching his 
forehead, says ‘Oh! right turn’ and does a right turn.—What has struck him? An 
interpretation?”). (1992, p.50) 
If we overstate the role of interpretation, McDowell explains, then we force our intuitive 
conception of understanding into danger by ‘overbalancing’ the notion of grasping a rule toward 
something like a brute causal mechanism: 
. . . if we give this corrective to an over-mentalizing of the behaviour, perpetrated by 
giving the concept of interpretation an unwarranted role in our conception of it, we run 
the risk that we shall be taken to overbalance in the opposite direction, into under-
mentalizing the behaviour-adopting a picture in which notions like that of accord cannot 
be in play, because the behaviour is understood as nothing but the outcome of a causal 
mechanism set up by the training. Such a picture might fit an acquired automatism, in 
which there is no question of acting on an understanding of the sign-post’s instructions 
at all. This risk, that if we exploit the concept of training to exorcize the idea of 
interpretation, we shall lose our entitlement to the idea of understanding as well, is averted 
by adding another bit of common sense, that the training is initiation into a custom. (1992, 
p.50) 
                                                     
108 That is, you do not need some further rule R that allows you to work out what the sign-post says. 
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As McDowell recognizes, we can only protect the notions of meaning and understanding by 
abandoning the master thesis and thus the idea that the grasp of an expression’s meaning is always 
up to an interpretation. 
The upshot of McDowell’s response to Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein is that Kripke 
makes a serious mistake in locating Wittgenstein on the first horn of the dilemma, as embracing 
the conclusion that there are no facts about meaning. As we have seen, Wittgenstein views both 
horns of the dilemma as unacceptable—the paradox and the rigid mechanism—and suggests an 
escape by way of jettisoning the view that got us into the dilemma in the first place, the ‘master 
thesis’ and the idea that understanding can be assimilated to interpretation. Once we are rid of 
this misunderstanding, a middle course between the horns of the dilemma becomes possible: 
There is a way of grasping a rule that is not an interpretation and the notion of a custom provides 
this.109 McDowell’s view is a natural extension of this approach to explaining the possibility and 
existence of meaning facts. 
§6.6.3 Second Nature and ‘Bildung’ 
McDowell argues for a non-reductive factualist view of meaning, according to which 
there are facts about meaning that are essentially normative. In light of this normative character, 
McDowell argues that such facts cannot be reduced to natural facts as they are standardly 
conceived under the restrictive purview of what McDowell calls “bald naturalism”, according to 
which natural facts are understood on a narrow scientistic view to include only the subject matter 
of the empirical sciences. McDowell rejects the standard interpretation of naturalism. According 
to him, we should expand naturalism, with some inspiration from Aristotle and Wittgenstein, to 
include both natural facts as standardly conceived plus content beyond the scope of the empirical 
sciences—in particular, moral facts and meaning facts at the level of the space of reasons 
(McDowell 1994, p.109). According to McDowell, facts of this sort should be admitted by a 
proper naturalist view in that they are ‘second nature’ to rational beings like us with a distinctive 
capacity for reasoning and reflection. McDowell takes natural facts (standardly conceived) to 
                                                     
109 Some readers of Wittgenstein, such as Malcolm (1986), take the notion of a custom as a constructive 
philosophical thesis, one that answers the question “How is meaning possible?” (1992, p.49). McDowell 
argues that this is a misreading: 
. . . there is no reason to credit Wittgenstein with any sympathy for this style of philosophy. When 
he says “What has to be accepted, the given, is—so one could say—forms of life” (p.226), his 
point is not to adumbrate a philosophical response, on such lines, to supposedly good questions 
about the possibility of meaning and understanding, or intentionality generally, but to remind us 
of something we take in the proper way only after we are equipped to see that such questions are 
based on a mistake (1992, p.50-51). 
Wittgenstein’s uses the concept of a custom not as a positive thesis but instead as a tool for halting the 
regress of interpretations before it begins—to show that the regress is based on a misunderstanding: 
What made the notion of accord seem problematic was the regress of interpretations, and the first 
move in the passage [of §198], the appeal to training, has ensured that we need not begin on the 
regress of interpretations. The point of the appeal to custom is just to make sure that that first move 
is not misunderstood in such a way as to eliminate accord, and with it understanding, altogether 
(1992, p.50). 
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constitute only part of our natural world—what he calls the ‘realm of law’. The move toward a 
less restrictive naturalism is necessary, McDowell says, because an important part of our natural 
history as rational beings cannot be understood from within the realm of law. The primary 
example for this is our intuitive notions of meaning and understanding, which have a “spontaneity” 
that fits them outside the realm of law. For this reason, McDowell locates these notions under a 
distinctive part of our natural world, the ‘space of reasons’. 
In order to forestall the worry that his view is committed to an untenable kind of 
supernaturalism about meaning, McDowell qualifies that his view does not simply equate nature 
with the realm of law. Instead, McDowell’s view widens the conception of nature to include both 
the realm of law and the space of reasons. According to McDowell, this move enables him to 
escape the charge about supernaturalism and deny the idea that meaning facts are part of the realm 
of law. McDowell calls this view a ‘naturalism of second nature’ (Miller 2013, p.253). 
McDowell argues that meaning facts are a special species of facts about reasons for action. 
According to him, we develop an appreciation for facts of this sort by having a certain upbringing 
and undergoing a certain kind of education—what McDowell calls a process of ‘Bildung’. By 
bringing in the process of Bildung, McDowell argues that we can treat meaning facts as ‘natural’ 
in spite of their residing in the space of reasons rather than the realm of law (Miller 2013 p.254). 
Moreover, McDowell claims that construing meaning facts as the result of this process enables 
him to avoid the charge that his non-naturalism is disrespectful of the tenets of natural science 
(Miller 2013 p.254). 
The initiation into a custom which avoids the master thesis is an example of Bildung that 
enables our access to normative facts in the space of reasons. So, by introducing the notion of a 
custom and of Bildung, McDowell is able to both reject the master thesis and maintain the view 
that there are facts about meaning, facts that we have access to via our second nature and Bildung 
and that are essentially normative in kind. Though this account looks especially promising, 
especially in light of the apparent failure of Gibbard’s non-factualist account of meaning, 
McDowell’s theory must face a formidable challenge: How can we account for our access to the 
normative facts of the space of reasons if they are facts of a distinct kind (that is, aside from saying 
they are a natural part of Bildung)? 
§6.6.4 Fodor’s Objection 
In response to McDowell’s analogous account for non-naturalism about moral properties, 
Jerry Fodor objects that McDowell’s view requires an epistemology that he simply cannot provide. 
Having situated . . . the ethical . . . outside the realm of law, McDowell needs to face the 
embarrassing question how, by any natural process, do we ever manage to get at it? 
(Fodor 1995, p.11) 
The best that McDowell can do to assuage this worry is by “naturalizing” his moral epistemology 
to something that human beings develop in the course of their upbringing, i.e. via the process of 
Bildung: 
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The picture is that ethics involves requirements of reason that are there whether we know 
it or not, and our eyes are opened to them by acquisition of ‘practical wisdom’. (1994, 
p.79) 
The rational demands of ethics are not alien to the contingencies of our life as human 
beings. Even though it is not supposed that we could explain the relevant idea of 
demandingness in terms of independently intelligible facts about human beings, still 
ordinary upbringing can shape the actions and thoughts of human beings in a way that 
brings these demands into view. (1994, p.83) 
The result of this process of education is our second nature, “[a] conception of nature that includes 
a capacity to resonate to the structure of the space of reasons” and thereby to moral properties 
(1994, p.109). 
Fodor argues that McDowell’s use of metaphor is unhelpful and still leaves the nature of 
moral epistemology mysterious: 
‘Bringing into view’ is a metaphor; only what is in Nature [on the usual characterization] 
can literally be viewed. And ‘resonating’ is also just a metaphor; only what is in Nature 
[on the usual characterization] can be literally attuned to. (1995, p.11) 
Again, the best that McDowell can do to meet Fodor’s worry is to insist that human beings realize 
what he calls their ‘distinctive potential’ for exercising ‘practical wisdom’ in the normal course 
of their upbringing. According to McDowell, there is nothing mysterious in our upbringing that 
brings about this awareness of the demands of morality and so likewise there is nothing ‘occult’ 
in the idea that there is a distinctive space of reasons that we have access to via this matured 
capacity. McDowell attempts to clarify how this process goes by drawing an analogy with our 
capacity to learn language: 
This transformation [the realization of the ‘distinctive potential’] risks looking mysterious. 
But we can take it in our stride if, in our conception of the Bildung that is a central element 
in the natural maturation of human beings, we give pride of place to language. In being 
initiated into a language, a human being is introduced into something that already 
embodies putatively rational linkages between concepts, putatively constitutive of the 
layout of the space of reasons, before she comes on the scene. This is a picture of initiation 
into the space of reasons as an already going concern; there is no problem about how 
something describable could emancipate a human individual from a merely animal mode 
of living into being a full-fledged subject, open to the world. A mere animal, moved only 
by the sorts of things that move mere animals, could not single-handedly emancipate itself 
into possession of understanding. (McDowell 1994, p.125) 
Arguably, the analogy with language-learning does not get McDowell out of trouble. First, 
McDowell helps himself to the idea that human beings have a ‘distinctive potential’ for accessing 
the space of reasons. McDowell does not help his case by claiming that our responsiveness to 
moral reasons is a responsiveness we have in virtue of some ‘second nature’ of ours, external to 
the realm of laws, and then explaining how we develop this ‘second nature’ capacity: 
If one found the idea that we can responsive to moral reasons underexplained when 
neither the relevant facts about reasons nor the capacities allegedly responsive to them 
are conceived of as belonging to the realm of law, it helps little to be told that acquiring 
the relevant capacities is a way of realizing our ‘distinctive potential’. To say all of that 
is simply to paraphrase the claim that human beings are capable of making ethical 
judgments: it is not something that can even begin to help us understand what ethical 
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judgments are or how it might be possible for us to engage in a practice of making them. 
(Miller 2013, p.256) 
Second, the analogy with language-learning is likewise unhelpful: 
We are trying to understand how it could be that human beings are capable of speaking 
intelligibly where this is conceived of as a matter of acquiring a capacity to be responsive 
to facts about meaning, where neither the capacity nor the facts about meaning can be 
rendered intelligible from the viewpoint of the realm of law. Does it help to be reminded 
that humans, but not, say gerbils, can acquire the capacity to converse intelligibly? Of 
course not.110 (Miller 2013, p.256) 
McDowell does not alleviate the ‘fog of mystery’ that surrounds the transformation from 
‘distinctive potential’ to ‘awareness of moral reasons’ by using the language analogy. For this 
reason, McDowell’s notions of Bildung and ‘second nature’ are no improvement on the non-
naturalist theories of yesteryear, such as that proposed by G.E. Moore in his Principia Ethica 
(2013, p.256).111 Given that they don’t work in the moral case, they are unlikely to work in the 
case of the normative meaning properties either. 
§6.7 Review and Provisional Conclusion 
In this chapter, I fielded two potential candidates for a robust account of the normativity 
of meaning. The first candidate was Allan Gibbard’s non-factualist view of meaning, which took 
the concept MEANING to be normative insofar as it is plan-laden, i.e. consists in states of 
planning. The principal appeal of this non-factualist view is that it can readily make sense of the 
idea that meaning ascription is normative by appealing to the non-cognitive ‘planning states’ of 
speakers. In spite of this appeal, non-factualism about meaning faces a serious challenge from a 
line of objection advanced in Hattiangadi (2015) and Miller (2010a). According to this objection, 
non-factualism looks committed to supposing that, on pain of being self-defeating and begging 
the question, there are determinate facts about the meanings of expressions according to which 
the use of those expressions are either correct or incorrect even if those expressions are afforded 
a non-factualist semantics. 
The second candidate I considered for an account of normative judgment was John 
McDowell’s non-reductive factualist view about meaning. According to McDowell, there are 
facts about meaning that are both essentially normative and cannot be reduced to natural facts 
(under the standard interpretation). The inspiration for this view is Wittgenstein’s reflections on 
rule-following and meaning in his Philosophical Investigations. McDowell’s view escapes the 
line of objection posed against Gibbard’s non-factualist view, though McDowell’s view has a 
problem of its own, pointed out by Jerry Fodor. Fodor argues that McDowell cannot provide an 
                                                     
110 Miller attributes this reply to McCulloch 1996, who seconds Fodor’s argument that McDowell needs an 
epistemology for the moral facts of ‘second nature’ that he cannot provide. 
111 Moreover, there is a certain circularity in McDowell’s argument: McDowell uses the language analogy 
to defend the notion of ‘second nature’ in the moral case, but referring to ‘second nature’ in the moral case 
will not help assuage any worries about its cogency in the case of language and meaning. 
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adequate epistemology for how we could access irreducible meaning facts, at the level of what 
McDowell called the ‘space of reasons’. 
I suggest that, though McDowell is under pressure to provide an adequate epistemology 
for his view of meaning facts, this problem is less serious than the one that Gibbard faces with 
respect to non-factualism. In Gibbard’s case, there is no clear escape from the challenge that non-
factualism smuggles in the notion of accord by assuming that there are predetermined facts about 
the meaningful use of language. In McDowell’s case, McDowell can at least argue that our 
commitment to the standard ‘bald’ naturalist metaphysics is unreasonable, given that the notions 
of meaning and understanding simply cannot be captured by a narrow scientistic view of content. 
Moreover, McDowell can argue that his view does not need to provide a robust epistemology 
with respect to our access to meaning facts. McDowell may simply dig his heels in here and insist 
that we are perfectly familiar with the sort of facts that ground ascriptions of meaning and so 
Fodor and other critics are demanding more than McDowell needs to provide on his quietist 
view.112 Of course there is good reason to think that this kind of response is, as Boghossian puts 
it, ‘facile’ but perhaps this non-reductionist suggestion is the best we can do: 
It is sometimes said that an anti-reductionist conception is too facile a response to the 
problem about meaning. It is hard not to sympathize with this sentiment. But if the 
considerations canvassed against the alternatives are correct, and if it is true that the ‘rule-
following’ considerations leave an anti-reductionist conception untouched, it is hard, 
ultimately, also to agree with it. Meaning properties appear to be neither eliminable, nor 
reducible. Perhaps it is time that we learned to live with that fact. (1989, p.548) 
Admittedly, the claim that non-reductionist factualism is a better vehicle for normativism than 
non-factualism would require a full defence in a separate thesis that would no doubt be longer 
than the present one. Outlining this defence is a task for another day.  
                                                     
112 There are additional challenges for non-reductionism about meaning and content that I do not address 
here. For example, Boghossian (1989) outlines some further problems for McDowell’s non-reductionist 
view: 
McDowell, rightly in my view, rejects the suggestion that correct application might be analysed 
in terms of communal dispositions. Indeed . . . he rejects the very demand for a substantive account 
of correctness: norms are part of the ‘bedrock’, beneath which we must not dig. But if we are 
simply to be allowed to take the idea of correctness for granted, unreduced and without any 
prospect of reconstruction in terms of, say, actual and counterfactual truths about communal use, 
how is the necessity of an 'orderly communal' practice to be defended? From what does the demand 
for orderliness flow? And from what the demand for community? McDowell's paper contains no 
helpful answers. (1989, p.544) 
Boghossian explains that these problems for McDowell’s view echo those from Wittgenstein: 
Though see his remarks—which I am afraid I do not understand—on a ‘linguistic community [that] 
is conceived as bound together, not by a match in mere externals (facts accessible to just anyone), 
but by a meeting of minds’. McDowell's problems here echo, I think, Wittgenstein's own. The 
main difficulty confronting a would-be interpreter of Wittgenstein is how to reconcile his rejection 
of substantive constitutive accounts—especially of meaning, see Zettel #16: ‘The mistake is to say 
that there is anything that meaning something consists’—with the obvious constitutive and 
transcendental pretensions of the rule-following considerations. It is fashionable to soft-pedal the 
rejection of constitutive questions, representing it as displaying a mere ‘distrust’ on Wittgenstein's 
part. But this ignores the fact that the rejection of analyses and necessary and sufficient conditions 
is tied to extremely important first-order theses about meaning, including, most centrally, the 
family-resemblance view of concepts. (1989, p.544 fn66) 







In the course of the dissertation I have attempted to provide some new evidence in favour 
of the claim that meaning is normative—specifically, for the claim that semantic judgments or 
ascriptions of meaning are action-guiding. 
In Chapter One, I outlined KW’s sceptical argument that there are no meaning facts in 
virtue of which ascriptions of meaning, such as ‘Molly means blackbird by ‘blackbird’’ are true 
or false. One of the crucial components necessary for this argument to succeed with the kind of 
generality that KW intended it to have (against any putative candidate for a meaning fact), is the 
assumption that meaning is normative—or what we called the ‘normativity constraint’. 
In Chapter Two, I explained how KW’s main argument against dispositionalist accounts 
of meaning can be viewed as an application of Moore’s open question argument to the case of 
meaning. However, construed this way, the argument failed because modern reductive 
dispositionalist accounts of meaning do not accept the principle that meaning facts are reducible 
to dispositional facts as a matter of conceptual or analytic necessity. Proponents of 
dispositionalism about meaning view the reduction of meaning facts to dispositional facts as being 
an a posteriori or synthetic reduction on par with the identification of water with H2O. 
Nonetheless I argued that a revised open question argument based on an analogue of Horgan and 
Timmons’ Moral Twin Earth argument does apply against reductive dispositionalist accounts of 
meaning. According to Horgan and Timmons (H&T), our linguistic intuitions about a Moral Twin 
Earth scenario suggest that synthetic ethical naturalism is false. Moral terms such as ‘good’ or 
‘morally right’ do not possess a meaning determined by the natural properties that causally 
regulate their use (contrary to the tenets of contemporary forms of synthetic ethical naturalism). 
The best explanation of this result, according to H&T, involves the idea that moral terms are 
essentially normative. I argued that a suitably similar Meaning Twin Earth scenario yields 
analogous results, and that arguably these are best explained by the normativity of meaning. 
In Chapter Three, I outlined an objection to H&T’s Moral Twin Earth argument from 
Plunkett and Sundell (2013). According to Plunkett and Sundell, H&T’s argument crucially turns 
on the thesis that speakers who genuinely disagree must mean the same thing by the terms used 
in communicating that disagreement. This is strictly-speaking not true. Some genuine 
disagreements are non-canonical disputes—disputes in which the conflicting contents of a 
disagreement are expressed non-literally, e.g. by implicature. So, one way for a naturalist to 
escape the Moral Twin Earth argument would be to view the Moral Twin Earth scenario as 
involving a metalinguistic negotiation, a special kind of non-canonical dispute where the parties 
involved use terms with different meanings precisely because they disagree about what those 
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terms ought to mean. I argued that the Meaning Twin Earth is a limiting case for this method of 
explaining disagreement. That is, Meaning Twin Earth cannot be plausibly viewed as being about 
a metalinguistic negotiation, and therefore, Plunkett and Sundell’s strategy cannot be used to 
block the Meaning Twin Earth argument. 
In Chapter Four, I discussed two objections advanced by David Copp (2000) against the 
Moral Twin Earth argument. In his first reply, Copp argued that we can view the Earther and 
Twin Earther of the Moral Twin Earth scenario as meaning roughly the same thing and as 
genuinely disagreeing, even if they ultimately mean different things in the philosophically 
preferred sense of referring to the same properties. I argued that that this first reply is 
unconvincing for two reasons. First, the reply involved a disposal of the general principle that 
meaning determines reference, something that would seriously limit the options for giving an 
account of meaning, and in particular, for capturing the compositionality of meaning and 
reference. Second, the reply does not meet the requirements for actually viewing the Earther and 
Twin Earther as disagreeing, but only as if they disagree. In his second reply, Copp objected that 
Horgan and Timmons fail to respect the details of a proper realist semantic theory. On a more 
complete Putnamian moral semantics, Copp argued, a naturalist can vindicate the intuitions that 
Horgan and Timmons elicit from the Moral Twin Earth scenario. I argued that even if this 
argument can successfully meet the Moral Twin Earth argument, an analogous argument cannot 
be used against my Meaning Twin Earth argument without begging the question. 
In Chapter Five, I outlined three objections against the Moral Twin Earth argument 
advanced by Merli (2002). In his first objection, Merli argued that the Moral Twin Earth argument 
depends on an underdescription of the Moral Twin Earth scenario. Once these details are suitably 
clarified, it turned out that the Moral Twin Earth argument is faulty. I argued that, in this first 
objection, Merli makes a crucial misstep by viewing the ‘Earth’ of the Moral Twin Earth scenario 
as actual Earth. Given that Horgan and Timmons are using a thought experiment, they can subtly 
alter the details to meet this objection. In his second objection, Merli argued that naturalistic moral 
realism’s prospects for preserving the univocity of moral terms are good if it addresses the issue 
holistically, i.e. by appealing to realist solutions to similar problems in moral epistemology. The 
main reason that the realist can be optimistic about preserving univocity, Merli claimed, is that 
we have good reason to expect a convergence in moral theory and so disputes like the one 
showcased in the Moral Twin Earth scenario are likely to result in convergence. So, according to 
Merli, the realist can respond to the Moral Twin Earth argument by treating the Moral Earther 
and Moral Twin Earther as referring to the properties that their moral communities would both 
refer to at the end of inquiry. I argued that this second objection is unconvincing because we 
cannot plausibly view some radical disagreements as trending toward convergence. I used an 
example of a political dispute between Putnam and Nozick to bring this point out. Merli also 
suggested that we should defer to idealized moralizers in these cases. I argued that this is likewise 
no help to the realist’s case given that we can only speculate about what these idealized thinkers 
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would judge. In his third objection, Merli argued that we can explain the disagreement between 
the Moral Earther and Moral Twin Earther as a practical disagreement about what to do and that 
we can explain this disagreement by using an expressivist view of all-in endorsement. I argued 
that this objection fails because the dispute between the Earther and Twin Earther cannot be 
viewed as a practical disagreement and that bringing in expressivism to explain this disagreement 
leaves moral realism either unmotivated or unable to meet the Moral Twin Earth argument. Either 
way, Merli’s objection cannot be used to damage the Moral Twin Earth argument or, by proxy, 
the Meaning Twin Earth argument. 
 In Chapter Six, I considered two broad options for a normativist account of meaning that 
would explain the intuitions elicited from the Meaning Twin Earth scenario: an expressivist form 
(Gibbard) and a rationalist form (McDowell). In order to motivate how these two forms of 
normativism could go, I looked at how an account of normative judgment could be developed in 
the moral case by looking at Smith (1994) and Hare (1952). I argued against Baker (2016) that an 
argument for the claim that meaning is normative can be mounted, as Gibbard (2012) suggests, 
from an analogue of Hare’s ‘missionary’ scenario. I outlined, in brief, Gibbard’s expressivist/non-
factualist account of meaning and McDowell’s non-reductive factualist alternative. I concluded 
by arguing, provisionally, that McDowell’s view faces a less serious challenge than Gibbard’s 
view in going forward. Gibbard’s view faces a knock-down objection, whereas McDowell’s view 
faces a challenge, albeit a formidable one. 
If successful, the Meaning Twin Earth argument has two important consequences: First, 
it shows that a revised open question argument might pose a threat to modern reductive 
dispositionalist accounts of meaning (even if the classical version of that argument fails). Second, 
it provides some new evidence to think that meaning is normative and thus constitutes a challenge 
to the anti-normativist to explain the intuitions elicited from the Meaning Twin Earth scenario 
without invoking the normativity of meaning. 
It is important to be clear about some of the limitations of my argument. Firstly, I have 
attempted to provide some new evidence for the claim that meaning is normative and that 
ascriptions of meaning are action-guiding. However, I have not attempted to respond to the many 
serious challenges faced by the idea that meaning is normative. We saw in Chapter One that the 
claim that meaning is normative could be cashed out as the claim that ‘correct’ is a normative or 
evaluative term, or that there are specifically semantic prescriptions governing the use of 
meaningful expressions. However, there are formidable arguments against both of these claims 
in the literature, including especially Boghossian (2005), Glüer (1999), Glüer and Wikforss 
(2009), Hattiangadi (2006, 2007, 2009), Miller (2010c, 2012), Verheggen (2011), and Wikforss 
(2001). In a full defence of the claim that meaning is normative, these arguments would need to 
be met. 
Secondly, although I have discussed and attempted to defuse some of the standard 
objections to the Moral Twin Earth argument itself, as well as its application in the case of 
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meaning, this discussion  has been far from exhaustive. The Moral Twin Earth argument has 
generated a huge literature, and among the discussions that a full treatment of the issues would 
need to cover are Dowell (2016), Freiman (2014), Geirsson (2005, 2014), Gert (2006), Horgan 
and Timmons (2000a, 2015), Rubin (2008, 2014a, 2014b, 2015a, 2015b), van Roojen (2006), and 
Sonderholm (2013). Dealing with these issues is a task for future work. 
 Thirdly, although I have attempted to provide new evidence in favour of the claim that 
ascriptions of meaning are action-guiding, I have not attempted to provide a detailed account of 
what the action-guiding nature of ascriptions of meaning consists in. In Chapter Six we looked at 
two broad ways in which this might be done. As we saw, an expressivist account of meaning 
ascription along the lines of Gibbard’s arguably falls prey to a generalised version of KW’s 
sceptical argument. However, a non-reductive normative realist view of meaning such as that 
defended by John McDowell may fare better. Non-reductive normative realist views face 
considerable challenges: How do we account for our epistemic access to normative facts and 
properties? And how we assuage naturalistic worries about their inclusion in our metaphysics? 
Arguably, though, these are challenges rather than knock-down arguments. In my view, the same 
cannot be said for the objection facing Gibbard’s expressivist view. 
Overall, then, this thesis aspires to make a modest contribution to the case in favour of 
the claim that meaning is normative, and there is no shortage of serious challenges that will need 
to be addressed in future work. 
  






Appendix: Frege on Meaning, Reference, and Compositionality 
 In Chapter Four, we discussed two objections advanced by David Copp (2000) against 
the Moral Twin Earth argument developed by Horgan and Timmons (1992a). In his first of these 
two objections, Copp argues that the Earther and Twin Earther of the Moral Twin Earth scenario 
can be viewed for most practical purposes as genuinely disagreeing even if strictly-speaking they 
do not mean the same thing, i.e. given that moral and twin-moral terms refer to distinct properties. 
I argued in response to this objection that this would involve an unpalatable disposal of the 
principle that the meaning determines reference, something that any adequate account of meaning 
should aim to preserve. In this brief appendix, I expand on some of the reasons that this general 
principle is worth preserving by looking at Frege’s account of sense and his introduction of the 
principle that meaning/sense determines reference/semantic value. 
Frege: Sense and Semantic Value 
Frege had principled reasons for introducing the notion of sense and the principle that 
sense determines semantic value. First and foremost, Frege introduces sense as a semantic 
property over and above the property of semantic value, i.e. the property possessed by an 
expression that determines whether sentences in which that expression appears are true or false 
(Miller 2007, p.23). Frege does this in order to deal with three problems that arise if we assume 
that meaning can simply be identified with semantic value. 
Bearerless Names 
First, if meaning is identified with semantic value, then we are forced to conclude that 
bearerless names—names that do not refer to existing persons or objects—are meaningless.  This 
we can call the ‘problem of bearerless names’. Take for example the sentence ‘Harry Potter is a 
wizard’. Harry Potter is a fictional character and so the name ‘Harry Potter’ does not refer to an 
actual person. The expression ‘Harry Potter’ is thus a bearerless name. According to Frege, the 
semantic value of a name is its bearer—the object or person that that name refers to (Miller 2007, 
pp.12-13). As such, the name ‘Harry Potter’ cannot have a semantic value given that ‘Harry Potter’ 
has no bearer. Moreover, according to Frege, “the semantic value of a sentence is determined by 
the semantic value of its parts” (Miller 2007, p.24). Consequently, the sentence ‘Harry Potter is a 
wizard’ likewise has no semantic value. So if semantic value is the only property that determines 
meaning, then we would be forced to say that the sentence ‘Harry Potter is a wizard’ is 
meaningless. Intuitively though, the sentence is perfectly intelligible, like many similar sentences 
involving bearerless names, e.g. ‘Atticus Finch is a lawyer’, etc. For Frege, this suggests that there 
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must be some other semantic property that can account for the meaning of bearerless names, in 
addition to semantic value. As Miller puts it: 
. . . names without a reference (semantic value) are not meaningless; so there must be 
some other semantic property possessed by names in addition to having a reference 
(semantic value). (2007, p.25) 
This additional property is that of possessing a sense. Two further problems point us in this 
direction, according to Frege. 
Substitution and Belief Contexts 
A second problem that Frege points out is that semantic value alone cannot make sense 
of cases in which co-referential terms, such as ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’, are substituted in 
belief contexts. This we can call the ‘problem of substitution into belief contexts’. Let’s use an 
example to bring the problem into clear view: Suppose that Lex Luthor, Superman’s arch nemesis, 
does not know that Clark Kent is Superman. In other words, Lex Luthor does not know that ‘Clark 
Kent’ and ‘Superman’ refer to the same person. Lex Luthor is nonetheless very familiar with 
Superman as the pesky superhero who always foils his plans, can leap buildings in a single bound, 
etc.. We can safely accept the sentence ‘Lex Luthor believes that Superman is Superman’ as being 
true. This much is uncontroversial of course, unless Lex has some bizarre understanding of 
identity (2007, p.25). 
Remember that, according to Frege, the semantic value of a name is its bearer. Given that 
‘Clark  Kent’ and ‘Superman’ have the same bearer (are co-referential), they must have the same 
semantic value. If we combine this with Frege’s two basic principles about the compositionality 
of semantic value, i.e. that (1) “the semantic value of a complex expression is determined by the 
semantic value of its parts” and (2) the “substitution of a constituent of a sentence with another 
which has the same semantic value will leave the semantic value (i.e. truth-value) of the sentence 
unchanged,” then we should be able to substitute ‘Clark Kent’ for ‘Superman’ and vice versa 
without changing the semantic value of any sentence in which those names appear (2007, p.11-
12). Let’s see if we can do this in the case of sentences about Lex Luthor’s beliefs.. 
If we substitute ‘Clark Kent’ for ‘Superman’ in the sentence “Lex Luthor believes that 
Superman is Superman’, we end up in trouble—for this substitution yields ‘Lex Luthor believes 
that Clark Kent is Superman.’ If semantic value is identified with meaning and ‘Superman’ and 
‘Clark Kent’ are co-referential, then we should have no change in semantic value—we should end 
up with a sentence that possesses the same truth-value as “Lex Luthor believes that Superman is 
Superman.” That is, the two sentences should have the same semantic value given that their parts 
have the same semantic value. But this does not seem to be the case. By stipulation, Lex Luthor 
does not know that Clark Kent is Superman, so the sentence ‘Lex Luthor believes that Clark Kent 
is Superman’ is false. Lex Luthor does not have this information; after all, things would go much 
better for him if he did have this information about the pesky Superman! This example suggests, 
like the preceding case, that the notion of semantic value alone is insufficient for capturing our 
   
 
165 
intuitive notion of meaning. In this case, the problem is that a theory of meaning utilizing only 
the property of semantic value cannot make sense of how two terms that are co-referential could 
make a difference when substituted in belief contexts. Intuitively, there must be some additional 
property to semantic value in terms of which we can understand the different contributions of co-
referential names to this sort of case. Before we introduce the property of sense to play that role, 
let’s look at one final problem that results from identifying meaning with semantic value. 
Informativeness 
A third problem that arises from the assumption that meaning can be identified with 
semantic value can be called the ‘problem of informativeness’. In order to bring this problem out, 
we need to first gloss how the notion of understanding is related to meaning. One way to do this 
is as follows: “When someone understands an expression, we say that he knows its meaning: 
meaning is that semantic property of an expression which someone with an understanding of that 
expression grasps” (2007, pp.26-7). If we combine this intuitive view of understanding with the 
assumption that meaning is identical with semantic value, then we end up in trouble. This can be 
demonstrated by returning to Frege’s classic example about the planet Venus: 
It took an empirical discovery in astronomy to discover that this planet was both the 
celestial object known as the Evening Star and also the celestial object known as the 
Morning Star. Consider the state of a competent language speaker before this empirical 
discovery (or of a competent language speaker after the discovery who is unaware of it). 
Such a person understands the identity statement “The Morning Star is the Evening Star”, 
even though they do not know its truth-value. Frege’s point is that if meaning were 
identified with semantic value, this would be impossible. (2007, p.27) 
As Frege argues, it seems possible for someone to understand the sentence ‘The Morning Star is 
the Evening Star’ without knowing that ‘The Morning Star’ and ‘The Evening Star’ have the same 
semantic value in that they refer to the same celestial body. If we assume that meaning is identified 
with semantic value, this would be impossible because grasping the meaning of those two 
expressions would amount to grasping their shared semantic value. This seems wrong because it 
is clearly possible for someone to understand the sentence ‘The Morning Star is the Evening Star’ 
without knowing that that sentence is true. As such, Frege argues (again) that the semantic value 
of an expression cannot be the only component of its meaning. 
 
Introducing the Notion of Sense 
In order to address the preceding problems outlined against the assumption that meaning 
is identical with semantic value, Frege introduces the notion of sense. Frege defines sense as a 
semantic property with a few key features, the most important of which is that “The sense of an 
expression is that ingredient of its meaning which determines its semantic value” (Miller 2007, 
p.28). Consequently, there is a property in addition to semantic value that determines what 
semantic value that an expression has: “Thus, a name has a reference—stands for a particular 
object—and also has sense, some means of determining which particular object this is” (Miller 
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2007, p.28). Note that this feature of sense corresponds to the principle that Copp rejects, namely, 
the principle that meaning determines reference. Let’s see how the notion of sense can address 
the three problems we have outlined so far. 
Addressing the Problem of Informativeness 
If we return to the classic example that Frege describes concerning Venus, the property 
of sense enables us to explain how a competent speaker can grasp the meaning of the sentence 
‘The Morning Star is the Evening Star’ without knowing that ‘The Morning Star’ and ‘The 
Evening Star’ actually share the same reference (and therefore without knowing that the sentence 
is true). A speaker can do this by grasping the sense of ‘The Morning Star’ and the sense of ‘The 
Evening Star’ where we think of these senses as descriptive conditions associated with the names 
which an object must satisfy in order to be the referent of the relevant names.113 In this case, the 
sense of ‘The Evening Star’ could be something along the lines of ‘that object which appears in 
such and such a place in the sky at such and such times in the evening’ and mutatis mutandis for 
‘The Morning Star’ (Miller 2007, p.28). Thus, a speaker can grasp the meaning of ‘The Morning 
Star’ and ‘The Evening Star’ vis-a-vis the notion of sense insofar as that speaker grasps the 
conditions under which an object would be the referents of those names. It is possible then that a 
speaker could fail to know that the relevant object in the sky (Venus) is in fact the referent of both 
‘The Morning Star’ and ‘The Evening Star’ and nonetheless understand the meaning of the 
sentence ‘The Morning Star is the Evening Star’, given that that speaker knows what objects 
would count as the referent of each of those names. That is, the speaker knows the senses of those 
expressions. It is possible to know the sense of an expression without knowing its semantic value. 
This principle enables us to solve the problem of informativeness: The sentence ‘The Morning 
Star is the Evening Star’ is informative for the speaker in that he can grasp its sense and go on to 
discover that ‘The Morning Star’ and ‘The Evening Star’ refer to the same celestial object.114 
Addressing the Problem of Bearerless Names 
 Introducing the notion of sense also enables us to explain how bearerless names are 
meaningful. Remember that, on the assumption that semantic value is the only semantic property 
behind the notion of meaning, the expression ‘Harry Potter is a wizard’ must be meaningless, 
given that the name ‘Harry Potter’ has no bearer. If we deploy the notion of sense, we can avoid 
this unintuitive conclusion. Suppose for instance that the sense of ‘Harry Potter’ is given by the 
description ‘The protagonist of J.K. Rowling’s most popular fiction series and the arch-nemesis 
of Lord Voldemort.’ Even though there is no actual object that meets that descriptive condition, 
                                                     
113 Frege is not committed to the idea that the sense of a name must be given in terms of its description, 
though this is one effective and at least initially attractive way to take Frege’s point. I follow Dummett 
again here. See Miller 2007, p.58. 
114 A similar line of argument shows how the sentence ‘The Morning Star is the Morning Star’ would be 
uninformative for the speaker. See Miller 2007, p.46-47. 
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a competent speaker could still understand what it would be for an object to meet that condition. 
As such, it is clear that one could grasp the meaning of the sentence ‘Harry Potter is a wizard’ 
even though Harry Potter is a fictional character and the name has no actual referent. This amounts 
to accepting the principle that an expression without a semantic value can nonetheless have a 
sense. And so names that do not have a semantic value, such as ‘Harry Potter’, are not simply 
meaningless because they can nonetheless have a sense (Miller 2007, pp.30-31). 
Addressing the Problem of Substitution in Belief Contexts 
 Finally, the notion of sense allows us to explain how substituting apparently co-referential 
names can lead to a change the truth-value of sentences in certain belief contexts. Let’s return to 
our example about Lex Luthor. Remember that Lex Luthor does not know, by stipulation, that 
Clark Kent is Superman. That is, he does not know that ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ are co-
referential terms in that they refer to the same person. In this, we can safely judge that Lex Luthor 
believes that Superman is Superman or even that Lex Luthor believes that Clark Kent is Clark 
Kent, but we cannot judge that Lex Luthor believes that Clark Kent is Superman—this is clearly 
false in that given our description of the scenario. If we stick to the assumption that semantic 
value is the only property involved in meaning, then we cannot make sense of the change in truth-
value in this context between ‘Lex Luthor believes that Superman is Superman’ and ‘Lex Luthor 
believes that Clark Kent is Superman’. As we know, the semantic value of ‘Clark Kent’ and 
‘Superman’ are the same, given that the semantic value of a name is its bearer and the two names 
share the same bearer. Again, Lex Luthor does not know this; he does not know that the names 
‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ have the same bearer. As such, substituting the former for the latter 
in ‘Lex Luthor believes that Clark Kent is Superman’ takes us from the a truth to a falsehood. 
How can the notion of sense help here? 
Frege addresses the problem about substitution in belief contexts by introducing the 
notion of customary sense. Under ordinary circumstances, i.e. outside of belief contexts, Frege 
admits that ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ refer to the same person. Frege is committed to admit 
this much given his aim to preserve the compositionality of semantic value, which he encapsulates 
in two principles mentioned above, that (1) “the semantic value of a complex expression is 
determined by the semantic value of its parts” and (2) the “substitution of a constituent of a 
sentence with another which has the same semantic value will leave the semantic value (i.e. truth-
value) of the sentence unchanged” (Miller 2007, pp.11-12). Frege wants to preserve these two 
intuitive principles about meaning and so he must say that, for any sentence involving a name 
such as ‘Clark Kent’ or ‘Superman’, the semantic value (or truth-value) of that sentence will be 
preserved when a co-referential term is exchanged for that name, e.g. if ‘Superman’ is substituted 
for ‘Clark Kent’. In belief contexts, things go differently, according to Frege. 
For Frege, some terms that are co-referential outside of belief contexts can fail to be co-
referential within belief contexts. In these cases, apparently co-referential terms like ‘Clark Kent’ 
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and ‘Superman’ do not refer to the same person, but instead to what Frege calls the ‘customary 
sense’ or ‘indirect reference’ of those names. The customary sense of ‘Clark Kent’ is given by 
the description ‘the mild-mannered reporter of the Daily Planet’ and the customary sense of 
‘Superman’ is given by the description ‘the pesky superhero who always foils Lex Luthor’s plans 
and can leap buildings in a single bound’. So though the names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ are 
co-referential outside of belief contexts, they are not so within those contexts, i.e. provided that 
the customary senses attached to those names are different. So by introducing the idea that the 
customary sense of an expression is its indirect reference, Frege can preserve the aforementioned 
principles about the compositionality of semantic value in spite of apparent counter-examples like 
the one we have focused on about Lex Luthor’s putative belief that Clark Kent is Superman. 
Sense as an ‘Ingredient in Meaning’ 
We must be clear that Frege’s notion of sense is an ingredient in meaning in addition to 
semantic value, where ‘ingredient in meaning’ has a semi-technical meaning borrowed from 
Dummett: 
What we are going to understand as a possible ingredient in meaning will be something 
which it is plausible to say constitutes part of what someone who understands the word 
or expression implicitly grasps, and in his grasp of which his understanding in part 
consists. (Dummett 1973, p.93) 
Sense is an epistemic notion insofar as it is that ingredient of an expression’s meaning that 
constitutes what someone grasps (implicitly or otherwise) whenever they understand the meaning 
of that expression. The key contrast here with semantic value is that semantic value is not an 
ingredient of an expression’s meaning (whereas sense is such an ingredient). Consequently, the 
notion of semantic value is not epistemic in the way that the notion of sense is. We can spell this 
out as the principle that “[t]he semantic value of an expression is no part of what someone who 
understands the expression grasps” (2007, p.35). We can see that this aspect of Frege’s view also 
plays an important role in his solution to the problem of informativeness. 
Suppose for a moment that the contrary is true, that semantic value is an ingredient of 
meaning and is part of what a speaker grasps when they grasp the meaning of an expression. Now 
if a speaker were to grasp the semantic value of an expression in grasping its meaning, then it 
would be impossible, for instance, for a speaker to understand the sentence ‘The Morning Star is 
the Evening Star’ and then go on to make the empirical discovery that ‘The Morning Star’ and 
‘The Evening Star’ in fact refer to the same celestial body. If a speaker already grasps the semantic 
value of both ‘The Morning Star’ and ‘The Evening Star’ in grasping the meaning of those 
expressions, then he would already know that the Morning Star is indeed the Evening Star and 
consequently the truth-value of the sentence ‘The Morning Star is the Evening Star’. Thus, dealing 
with this problem about informativeness moves Frege to rule out semantic value as an ingredient 
in meaning—as something a speaker must grasp in order to understand the meaning of an 
expression. 
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What then is the place of semantic value in the theory of meaning if it is not an ingredient 
of meaning? Dummett clears this up for us: 
To say that reference [semantic value] is not an ingredient in meaning is not to deny that 
reference [semantic value] is a consequence of meaning, or that the notion of reference 
[semantic value] has a vital role to play in the general theory of meaning: it is only to say 
that the understanding which a speaker of a language has of a word in that language . . . 
can never consist merely in his associating a certain thing with it as its referent [semantic 
value]; there must be some particular means by which this association is effected, the 
knowledge of which constitutes his grasp of its sense. (Dummett 1973, p.93) 
So as Dummett points out, semantic value still plays a key role with respect to the meaning of an 
expression even though it is not part of what someone grasps in knowing what an expression 
means. As Dummett says, there must be some special means by which a speaker can grasp the 
meaning of an expression and, on Frege’s view, sense fulfils this role. 
Consequences for Copp 
The main point of this brief detour is not that in giving up the principle that meaning 
determines reference Copp would be committing himself to giving up Frege’s own conception of 
sense. Although we would be committing himself to giving this up, he would also be committing 
himself to giving up any account of meaning which, like Frege’s, ties the compositionality of 
meaning/sense to the compositionality of reference/semantic value. It is worth nothing that 
although Putnam himself takes the Twin Earth argument to show that we should jettison the 
Fregean idea that grasp of meaning is a psychological state, even Putnam (1975) retains the 
principle that meaning determines reference (or extension).115 So, in giving up the principle that 
meaning determines reference, Copp would be giving up a very broad set of accounts of meaning, 
a set that includes not only Frege’s own view of sense but also a rival view like that proposed in 
Putnam (1975) and obliquely endorsed by Copp himself. The main point in the text is that, prima 
facie, this is a very high price to pay for a response to the Moral Twin Earth argument. 
  
                                                     
115 Putnam claims that it would be “preferable to take a different route [to giving up the idea that meaning 
determines extension] [which] makes it trivially true that meaning determines extension . . . but totally 
abandons the idea that if there is a difference in meaning my Doppelgänger and I assign to a word, then 
there must be some difference . . . in our psychological state” (1975, p. 165). So, Putnam actually argues 
that meaning determines reference, but what's in the head doesn't determine reference, so meanings ain't 
in the head. Putnam accepts that meaning determines reference, but wants to deny that the grasp of 
meaning is a psychological state. 
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